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Abstract
Over the last couple of years, there has been significant research effort in mining user
behavior on online social networks for applications ranging from sentiment analysis to
marketing. In most of those applications, usually a snapshot of user attributes or user
relationships are analyzed to build the data mining models, without considering how user
attributes and user relationships can be utilized together.
In this thesis, we will describe how user relationships within a social network can be
further augmented by information gathered from user generated texts to analyze large scale
dynamics of social networks. Specifically, we aim at explaining social network interactions
by using information gleaned from friendships, profiles, and status posts of users. Our
approach profiles user interactions in terms of shared similarities among users, and applies
the gained knowledge to help users in understanding the inherent reasons, consequences
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Almost half a century has passed since the ARPANET network crashed when for the
first time researchers attempted to transmit a word from a workstation at University of
California to another one at the Stanford Research Institute. What started as a government
funded defense project with the ARPANET has in years evolved into a huge network that
carries and supports resources and services, such as personal blogs, news media sites, social
networks, video sharing sites and online gaming platforms.
In the early days of the Internet, although work stations could communicate with each
other, ordinary users were still out of the picture as the Internet was limited to commu-
nications among universities and research centres. Starting with the 90s, the Internet saw
the creation of hyper-text documents and the World Wide Web, which connected these
documents. Web browsers, such as the Netscape Navigator, were developed to surf the
WWW, and scripting languages, such as JavaScript, were created to provide interactive
hyper-text documents.
Despite interactive elements, the first hyper-text documents were static in the sense
that they were loaded into the web browsers as “static screenfuls”.1 In 1999, the Web 2.0
concept was pushed forward to open web sites and documents to ordinary user input, and
allow users to create, mesh and change documents. The Web 2.0 concept advanced the
idea that user created content could replace or augment static web pages, and web sites
could benefit from user collaborations. Although some services existed before the concept,
with Web 2.0, online social networks, personal blogs, collaboration wikis, and video sharing
services grew more popular.
While these fundamental changes were happening on how the Internet was being used,
research works have been looking into network communications, and finding global patterns
that explain dynamics within the Internet topology [44, 27, 132]. Once the WWW came into
existence, research works turned their attention to human communications, and found that
the Internet communication patterns, to some degree, also applied to human interactions.
For example, the power law theory [44] that has originated from works on the Internet
topology has also been observed on social networks [96].
1Excerpted from Fragmented Future by Darcy DiNucci.
12
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 13
Increased attention to human interactions has also benefited from a growing number of
online human population. Web 2.0 influenced services, such as social networks, personal
blogs and even video sharing services, have become very popular in recent years and at-
tracted a huge registered user base. Among these, online social networks hold the most
data about the Internet users; starting with the SixDegrees.com in 1997, online social net-
works, such as Friendster in 2002 and Facebook in 2004, became popular among hundreds
of millions of users.
The growing population of online social network users has resulted in an abundance of
user generated data, whether of the new friendships users make or profile information they
enter. Social networks have also developed new functionalities such as “likes” and “shares”
on Facebook, that increase the number of user generated data items (i.e., traces or texts
of user involvement on the social network). From an information retrieval point of view,
regardless of the studied social network, users’ friendships, or connections to other social
network users are the easiest data items to retrieve and analyze. A connection is also easy
to represent on a global graph; the two users are denoted as two nodes, and the connection
becomes the edge between them. By considering all friendships, a global graph can be
constructed, and problems, such as influence propagation [66] or user clustering [78], can
be studied with techniques that have been developed in graph theory works [103].
A specific problem that hindered efforts to utilize user generated text data, such as
profile information or status posts, is that these data items were unstructured or noisy.
For example, user locations on Twitter are still manually typed, therefore unstructured,
because users do not have to choose their city, region, country values from a list. For
this reason, aggregating user locations from many Twitter users are difficult and time
consuming. Despite these problems, several research works have utilized user generated
text and profile data. For example, the influence of gender and race/ethnicity of users have
been studied to understand network behavior [79] on Facebook, and Twitter users have
been modeled to provide personalized news services [1]. However, difficulties in aggregating
text based user data has hindered efforts to combine network information (e.g., friendships)
with text based information (e.g., users’ posts and bios).
In recent years, the unstructured user data problem has been alleviated by the choice
of online social network companies to provide an API access to their social network data.
For their APIs, online social network companies have created structured user profiles. For
example, Facebook has transitioned to a structured version of its user profiles by accepting
most frequent manually entered data values as its predefined data values. A further data
standardizing effort on social networks has resulted in a machine readable ontology in
FOAF (Friend of a Friend) [51]. With FOAF, social network users and their relations to
each other can be described in attributes within and across different social networks.
Our work shares a common goal with the FOAF approach; once the edges in a social
network graph are labeled with shared attributes, or users are profiled with their attributes,
a large scale analysis of shared attributes and created edges can be completed to have a
better understanding of why and how interactions happen among social network users. Such
an analysis can be used to understand and verify the sociological theories. Specifically we
focus on the homophily [92] and heterophily [113] theories from sociology.
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According to homophily, personal attributes and connections affect creation of new ties
in social life and result in homogeneous groups of individuals. Political party supporters
and religious communities are examples of homophilous groups. In contrast to homophily,
heterophily is the tendency to interact with people that are not similar to you. In social
networks, this tendency is mainly motivated by the fact that social interactions (e.g.,
creation of new relationships) might give a user some benefits in terms of acquaintance of
new information.
In this thesis, we will describe how network connections within a social network can be
further augmented by information gathered from user generated texts to analyze large scale
dynamics of social networks. Specifically, we aim at explaining social network interactions
by using information gleaned from friendships, profiles, and status posts of users. Our
approach profiles user interactions in terms of shared similarities among users, and applies
the gained knowledge to help users in understanding the inherent reasons, consequences
and benefits of interacting with other social network users.
1.0.1 Outline of the Dissertation
The content of this dissertation is described in the following:
Related Work
In the related work chapter, we will explain previous work on finding similarities of users,
and give the related work which deal with user interactions in privacy and risk domains.
Afterwards, we will outline existing work in detecting which interactions among social
network users can be labeled as anomalies. The chapter closes with the related work on
micro analysis of user generated data to explain interactions. The content of this chapter
is based on “Graphical User Interfaces for Privacy Settings” [10] and “Similarity Metrics
on Social Networks” [11].
User Similarity in Interactions
In this chapter, we build on current research and propose measures for evaluating social
network users’ similarity according to both their connections and profile attributes. From
the network connections perspective, we propose a novel measure that facilitates finding
user similarity without observing an important fraction of the network. This approach
reduces computational costs by limiting the number of queries to be performed on the
network. We also propose a profile similarity measure to find semantic similarities among
users. Moreover, since user profile data could be missing, we present a technique to infer
them from profile items of a user’s contacts. Metrics that are studied in this chapter
constitute the building block of our studies in the following chapters. The results presented
in this chapter has been published in [9].
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Explaining Privacy with Interactions
In this chapter, we focus on the risk of new interactions from a privacy point of view. We
investigate a risk measure to help users in judging another user with whom they might
create a friendship relation. We assume that risks of interactions are impacted by several
different dimensions, such as the other user’s characteristics and shared friends, whose
importance may greatly vary from user to user. Our risk measure captures the personal
judgment of users, and helps them in forming their own opinions. This study has been
tested with real life social network data through a human experiment, and the results
validate our approach. The results presented in this chapter has been published in [7].
Risks of Interactions
Once we have learned privacy decisions of users in Chapter 4, we turn our attention to
labeling users’ interactions with their one and two degree neighbors on the social network.
Based on neighbors’ characteristics, in this chapter we categorize social network users, and
find that all neighbors can be put into a relatively small number of groups, regardless of
their differing characteristics. The results presented in this chapter has been published in
[8].
Detecting Anomalies in Interactions
In this chapter, we propose novel anomaly detection measures that use both categories
of users and the evolution of the social network graph. Our proposed anomaly measures
model a user based on his/her social network structure and the characteristics of the other
users she/he follows on the network. In this study we consider the follower relationship
on Twitter as an interaction which is initiated to benefit from learning about another
user’s tweets. Through a large user experiment, we empirically show that anomalies in
interactions can be found by analyzing data consumption patterns in a social network
graph. The results presented in this chapter has been published in [64].
Micro Analysis of User Interactions
In this chapter, we study the problem of how interactions are governed by certain charac-
teristics of posts across Facebook and Twitter. Rather than external features such as the
network structure or user information, we focus on tweets/posts themselves to understand
what aspects of tweets/posts help them to get retweeted and liked. Moreover, we analyze
how location information influences retweet, comment and like interactions. The results




With the increasing popularity of online social networks, many studies have been carried on
to better understand how and why humans interact on social networks (see e.g., [42, 131]).
As our research has focused on using both the network information and the user generated
data, we will start discussing the related work that have focused on finding and explaining
commonalities between users with similarity metrics. Afterwards, we will give the state of
art in profiling user interactions from privacy, risk and anomaly perspectives. We conclude
this chapter with the related work which explain user interactions with certain dimensions
of user generated data, such as the sentiments expressed in user posts.
2.2 Similarity metrics
In the literature, the term similarity has been used in different meanings (e.g., the short
distance between two users, shared features or shared actions) to quantize similarity for
different application fields. Some work have attempted to define similarity rigorously
[112, 54, 81]. Among these, the four principles by Lin [81] are widely used to implement
similarity metrics on social networks. We will explain these four principles with commonal-
ity, differences, maximum and minimum similarity. In commonality, shared commonalities
(e.g., race, gender, sex of users) increase the similarity of two users. On the other hand,
the more differences lead to smaller similarity. Regardless of the number of features, two
users are said to have the maximum similarity when they are identical in every feature.
Similarly, regardless of the number of features, two users are the least similar when they
are different in every feature. In current studies, the maximum and minimum similarity
values are given as 0 and 1, respectively.
A more rigorous set of properties for similarity metrics can be adopted from distance
metrics by considering similarity = 1 − distance. For any given distance metric, these
properties are 1) symmetry, 2) identity, 3) non-negativity, and the 4) triangle equality. In
the identity property, distance(a, b) = 0, when a = b. On social networks this property
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can have different explanations; on the graph structure distance(a, b) = 0 is assumed to
be true when the two nodes have the same set of friends, whereas if profile information
are considered, two users must have the same values for every profile item. In setting a
lower bound for distance, the non-negativity property defines distance(x, y) ≥ 0 for any
user pair. The symmetry condition assures that distance(a, b) = distance(b, a), while in
the triangle equality distance(a, c) ≤ distance(a, b) + distance(b, c).
The absence of some of these properties can be used to classify different formulas. For
example, quasi-metrics do not provide the symmetry property, whereas semi-metrics do
not have the triangle property. Traditionally, the symmetry property is not applicable in
directed networks, because directions of edges can lead to different similarity values for
a pair of users. In this case, two different values are computed; sim(a, b) denotes the
similarity value according to a user a and sim(b, a) denotes a potentially different value
from the perspective of user b.
Similarly, the triangle equality is difficult to achieve for similarity of user profiles because
profiles can consist of more than one dimension (i.e., profile item). As a result, although the
triangle property holds for one dimension, similarities for three user profiles with multiple
dimensions might not adhere to the triangle property. Ideally, any formula that does not
carry all these four properties should be called a measure, but researchers still prefer to
use the word metric interchangeably with the term measure.
Founded upon these theoretical definitions, similarity metrics that have been proved
efficient and practical on social networks are those that exploit a locality principle in
similarity computations. The basic idea underlying such metrics is that, given two social
network users, their similarity is computed by observing only a subset of vertices (e.g.,
friends of the two users) in the social network. This approach restricts required information
about the social network to a minimum, and reduces the required time of calculations.
Even though global measures (e.g., the shortest path between users, or the community
membership of users) can be used in the same context, they are more costly in time and
computational power because they require too much information about the social network.
For example, shortest path calculation might require observing friendship links of many
users. Moreover, even though the costs can be undertaken, researchers and companies
cannot have access to the whole social network data because of privacy issues. Only owners
of social networking services can have the complete data that is required to compute global
similarity measures. Therefore, local similarity metrics provide a simple alternative in the
face of these costly issues.
In 1970s, early attempts at defining similarity metrics involved finding similarities
among text based documents [91] that were modeled as a collection of words. Similar-
ity metrics were used to discover relations between documents or rank the documents
according to their similarity to a given query. These efforts have resulted in several well
known metrics, such as the Cosine and Jaccard similarities [55]. With the advent of the
Internet, researchers have applied document based similarity metrics to user generated
web items, such as friendships and status posts, to discover relationships between web
users. Specifically, similarity research on user generated data has focused on predicting
links (relationships) among users and mining past user behavior to predict future actions.
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In the link prediction problem [80], similarity of social network users has been exploited
to predict new friendships. In this context, high similarity between two social network
users is assumed to increase the probability of them creating a new friendship [118]. With
generalization, this idea has been explored in the homophily theory which states that people
tend to be friends with other people who are similar to them along personal attributes,
such as gender, race and religion [92].
In addition to user characteristics, actions of a user is exploited to predict actions of
similar users. This idea has been studied in recommender systems to observe existing item
ratings (for movies, books, songs etc.) of users and predict ratings of unseen items [93].
Similar users are assumed to give similar ratings to similar items. From this assumption,
similarity of ratings are predicted by finding either similar users (i.e., user based) or similar
items (i.e., item based).
On social networks, user generated data are classified into two types: profile data, which
refers to user entered textual information, such as personal information, and network data,
that is information on created relationships, such as friendships with other users on the
social network. Depending on the type of user data, similarity metrics differ in how they
model a social network user. Furthermore, some similarity metrics can be used only on
one type of user generated data. By taking this into account, we will first explain how
similarity metrics work on network data, and then continue to explain metrics for profile
data.
2.2.1 Network Similarity
In network similarity metrics, existing user relationships are exploited to find similarity.
For example, a big number of shared friends between two users can be assumed to imply
their high similarity. Network data that represent relationships can be modeled as a graph
G = (V,E), where each user a in the network is considered a vertex va ∈ V , and a
relationship between users a and b is an edge eab ∈ E on the graph G. If relationships are
established by mutual consent of two users, an edge between them is said to be undirected
(the edge has no start and end points), and it can be called a friendship. Friendship
relations on social networks, such as Facebook, Orkut, and LinkedIn, are modeled with
undirected graphs. On an undirected graph, first level neighbors of a vertex va are a set
of vertices Γ(va) who share an edge with va (e.g., friends of a). Similarly, second level
neighbors Γ(Γ(va)) (e.g., friends of friends of a) share an edge with first level neighbors of
a. If relationships can be created without mutual consent, an edge is said to be directed;
it starts from the user who initiated the relationship (i.e., source vertex) and ends at the
user with whom the relationship was established (i.e., target vertex). For example, the
popular social networks Twitter and Google+ are directed social networks; when user a
starts following user b, an edge is created, starting from vertex va and ending at vertex
vb. On directed graphs, the friendship term from undirected graphs is replaced with in-
neighbors and out-neighbors. In-neighbors Γ−(va) and out-neighbors Γ
+(va) of a vertex va
are defined as target and source vertices of all edges that have vertex va as their source
and target vertex, respectively.
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Measure Formula Description
Overlap |Γ(va) ∩ Γ(vb)| The number of common
neighbors.
Preferential Attachment |Γ(va)| × |Γ(vb)| Multiplied neighbor
counts of both users.
Jaccard (|Γ(va) ∩ Γ(vb)|)/(|Γ(va) ∪ Γ(vb)|) The percentage of
shared neighbors over
all neighbors.
Cosine (|Γ(va) ∩ Γ(vb)|)/(
√








Log(|Γ(vc)|) Common neighbors who
have very few neighbors
are given more impor-
tance.





How much the prob-
ability of having the
current set of common
neighbors differs from
the case where neigh-
bors would be added by





βp ×NumOfPath(va, vb, p) Similarity is implied by
the number and length
of paths that connect
two users on the graph.
Each path 0 < p < +∞,
whereas 0 < β < 1.
Table 2.1: Network Similarity Metrics
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Although the similarity metrics are designed to work with the neighborhood notion
of undirected graphs, they can be applied to directed networks by small modifications.
For example, direction of edges can be removed to make the graph undirected. Another
approach is to consider only one type of edges (out-neighbors or in-neighbors) as neighbors
while using the metrics. As these modifications can be used to define neighbors of a user
on directed graphs, we will give metric definitions in terms of user neighbors. Assume that
a similarity function sim(va, vb) computes the similarity of users va and vb by considering
their neighbors Γ(va) and Γ(vb), respectively. We will denote one of their common neighbors
with vc, i.e., vc ∈ (Γ(va) ∩ Γ(vb)). High similarity between two users who do not have a
relationship will be assumed to increase the probability of them creating a relationship
edge. With these definitions, metric formulas that we will explain are given in Table 2.1.
Next we will discuss these network similarity metrics in more details.
Overlap: The overlap measure [124] counts the number of common friends of va and
vb to compute similarity.
Preferential Attachment: For relationship creation on social networks, the prefer-
ential attachment metric reflects the “rich gets richer” notion from sociology [14]. The
metric assumes that highly connected vertices (i.e., users who have many neighbors) are
more likely to create relationships with each other.
Jaccard (L1 norm): The Jaccard metric [124] counts the number of common neigh-
bors as in the overlap metric, but it normalizes this value by using the total number of
neighbors of users va and vb.
Cosine (L2 norm): Cosine similarity was originally devised to find the similarity of
two documents by computing the cosine of the angle between their feature vectors [124].
When the angle between the two vectors is 0, they are considered identical, and the cosine
of the angle equals the maximum similarity value 1.
Adamic & Adar: Like the overlap metric, Adamic & Adar considers common neigh-
bors, but each neighbor’s impact on the similarity value depends on the number of its
neighbors [3]. If a common neighbor has few neighbors, its impact on the similarity is
assumed to be higher. For example, if users va and vb are the only neighbors of vc, 1/log(2)
is added to the overall similarity. The similarity is computed by summing values from all
common neighbors.
Point-wise Mutual Information (Positive correlations): Point-wise mutual in-
formation [22] is computed in probabilistic terms where joint probability distribution
function P (Γ(va),Γ(vb)) computes the probability of a graph vertex vx ∈ V |x 6= a 6= b
sharing edges with both va and vb, whereas marginal probability distribution functions
P (Γ(va)) and P (Γ(vb)) are probabilities of a graph vertex sharing an edge with va and
vb, respectively. If edges are assumed to represent friendships, P (Γ(va),Γ(vb)) is equal
to #mutual friends#users in the social network . Similarly, P (Γ(va)) is equal to
#friends of va
#users in the social network . In
other words, point-wise mutual information shows whether two users share mutual friends
due to randomness. Note that due to computing probability with the total number of users
in the social network, point-wise mutual information produces very low average similarity
values, because #users in the social network can be in millions.
Katz’s Measure: Katz’s measure [65] was designed in 1950’s to find the status of a
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vertex on a graph. The vertex which had the biggest number of shortest paths to the other
vertices was considered a central vertex with high status. To compute sim(va, vb), Katz’s
measure finds the number of paths that connect va and vb for path length p, 1 < p < +∞.
The number of paths (i.e., the value of NumOfPath(va, vb, p)) is dampened by a β
p value,
where 0 < β < 1. In practice, the β value is chosen as small as 0.005 [80]. Although p
values can be increased to cover a big portion of the graph, usually p = 2 or p = 3 values
are chosen to find similarity, because computations for p > 3 contribute very less to the
overall value. Note that although the Katz’s measure can be used as a global measure
with big p values, small p values (e.g., 2 or 3) make it a practical measure for fast, local
similarity computations.
In research work, performance of similarity metrics has been compared by making
predictions based on similarity values, and validating the results [80, 118]. Typically,
metrics are used to predict top-k relationships (e.g., k most probable future friendships
that will be created between users) on graphs at a time t1, and these predictions are
validated at a time t2 > t1. The performance of a metric can be computed by counting the
number of correct predictions.
In Liben et al. [80], Adamic & Adar has been shown to perform better than preferential
attachment, Jaccard, overlap and Katz’s measure on a scientific co-authorship network. On
another social network, Orkut.com, Spertus et al. [118] have found that cosine similarity
performed better than Jaccard and point-wise mutual information metrics.
Despite these comparisons, it is important to understand that each metric has its weak-
nesses in different application fields. Preferential attachment is widely used in social net-
works to predict friendships, but unlike Jaccard or cosine similarity its computed value
does not reside within [0,1]. In fact, its max value is only bounded by the total number
of users in a social network, because there are no theoretical limits to prevent a user from
having every other social network user as a neighbor. However, some social networks may
choose to limit the number of neighbors; for example, an undirected network, Facebook,
allows up to 5000 neighbors, whereas a directed network, Twitter, does not have such a
limit. Because of this, preferential attachment can not be used to quantify how much per-
cent two users are similar. When the graph has many vertices (i.e., the probability of an
edge between two users are very small), computed value of point-wise mutual information
can be very small, and it can not be used to define how much percent two users are similar.
Point-wise mutual information and preferential attachment can be best used in ranking a
set of users according to their similarity to a specific user. There are some limitations in
using Katz’s measure too. In popular social networks, discovering edge counts for paths of
length 2 or more can be restricted because social networking services do not allow access
to social network data. Furthermore, Katz’s measure can be costly to compute when the
social network is large. Considering these limitations, research work [61, 134] have mostly
used Jaccard, cosine or Adamic & Adar in their user similarity computations, because these
measures are fast and easier to interpret.
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2.2.2 Profile Similarity
Along with network data, profile data constitute the second type of user generated data
on social networks. We will call similarity metrics which work with profile data as profile
similarity metrics. On social networks, we will consider profile information as a set of unique
items (e.g., hometown, location, education of a user), which can have one or multiple sub-
fields for each value.
After modeling profile data with a set of items, similarity between two users is computed
by first finding the similarity of individual item values on the two profiles. For example,
similarity of two users according to the gender item compares gender values on the two
profiles. If the considered item has many values, or each value has multiple sub-fields, an
aggregation function is required to find item similarity. An overall profile similarity value is
determined by aggregating (e.g., by weight averaging) all item similarity values. However
in practice, most of the research work on profile similarity consider a user profile to be a set
of unstructured keywords. For example, in [16], Facebook user profiles only consist of user
values from the “hobbies” item. With this simplification, profile similarity of two users is
found by computing item similarity of hobbies on two profiles.
In a more detailed study, similarity of items which have multiple values or subfields have
been weight averaged to model the importance of similarity for some items or sub-fields
[6]. For example, when user profiles consist of hometown and hobbies fields, hometown
similarity can be weighted with a bigger coefficient to show that hometown similarity is
more important than hobbies similarity.
When similarity computations are reduced to find item similarities, the type of item
values determines the way similarity is computed. Although some items have numerical
values (e.g., age, zip code), most of the item values on social networks are text based
categorical data which can not be ordered on an axis to find similarity/distance of two
data points. Using simple approaches, such as string matching, is not efficient because
the text represents an identity (e.g., hometown:Barcelona), or partial (n-gram) similarities
(e.g., bARcelona:pARis) are trivial.
Two main approaches are used to find similarity of item values: ontology based [63, 94]
and our social graph based [6]. In ontology based approaches, a graph of entities is created
to define their relationships or distance [37]. For example, considering hometown similarity
of three social network users with values Barcelona, Madrid and New York, an ontology
can classify Barcelona and Madrid as Spanish cities, whereas New York is classified as
an American city, and compute a higher similarity for users from Barcelona and Madrid.
The main disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a reliable ontology which can
be difficult to create. Furthermore, as social networks are dynamic, new item values are
added in time and the ontology must be updated frequently.
In the social graph based approach (see Chapter 3) we assume that neighbors (e.g.,
friends/coauthors) of a user va are similar to va along profile attributes. For example, if
hometown of va is Barcelona, we can expect many of its neighbors to be from Barcelona
and other Spanish cities. When hometown values of neighbors are observed, another city
(e.g., Madrid) can be found similar to Barcelona without explicitly creating an ontology.
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With this intuition, a user vb is said to be similar to va if its hometown is similar to the
hometown values of va’s neighbors. Furthermore, even when a user has a blank profile, using
its neighbors in such a way allows one to compute its similarity with other social network
users. The social graph approach has also been found effective for network similarity metrics
[38]. The disadvantage of this approach is that neighbors are assumed to be similar to users.
This assumption is more applicable in undirected social networks where mutual consent is
required to create a relationship edge. However, if the network is undirected, neighbors
can have very different characteristics from users, and performance of social graph based
approaches can deteriorate.
2.3 Privacy in user interactions
Nissenbaum’s work [105] on defining personal privacy in terms of interaction contexts has
led to influential privacy work (e.g., [45, 39]) from machine learning and community detec-
tion communities. Considering context to be a role within which users interact, contextual
privacy assumes that users publicize different parts of their social lives to specific people.
For example, social network friends who are colleagues from a workplace are assumed to
be interacting within office related roles, and their private pictures are not made visible
to each other. In other words, “contextual privacy requires that particular information
from users’ roles in another context should not discredit a convincing performance in the
current situation” [128]. To this end, Berg et al. finds two issues to be central to contextual
privacy: user awareness about a specific context should be raised, and “the user should be
provided with tools to help him/her make sure that certain users who interact with the
user in a context will not be the individuals who witness them in another of their roles”
[128].
The research work on understanding the context of user interactions has resulted in
two main techniques: audience segregation and content segregation.
Audience Segregation
The audience segregation methods aim at grouping social network users automatically
such that when privacy settings for some members of the group are learned, the same
privacy settings can be applied to the remaining members in the group. Each group is then
called an audience, and information sharing is targeted to different audiences. Audience
segregation approaches use five methods to find distinct audiences: manual selection by
the user, selections by attribute rules, contact interactions, attribute similarity and contact
relationships [102]. Among these approaches, selection by contact interactions has been
commercially deployed by Google Buzz, where the number of exchanged e-mails was chosen
to create audiences. The drawbacks of this approach has been found to be very severe,
because exchanged mails without considering the content of information has been found
not to reflect audiences or social tie strengths.
From the remaining options, privacy research has mostly focused on contact relation-
ships [39, 45] where the social graph of a user is analyzed by community detection algo-
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rithms to find distinct audiences.
Current day social networks employ audience segregation to a degree, but research work
offer richer representation of audiences. For example, on many social networks, users are
divided into four audiences by default: friends, friends of friends, network/group members
and everyone. Research work create finer granularity audiences such as university friends
and work colleagues, and this approach has only been recently employed by Facebook.com.
With this richness in audiences, research work aim at presenting the user with a simple
and intuitive privacy setting interface to compensate the difficulty of choosing the correct
privacy setting for each audience. To this end, research work represent audiences within
graph layouts, such as in the Fruchtermann-Reingold layout [48].
Audiences can also consist of overlapping communities, and user features can be used
to choose privacy settings with a finer granularity in the audience. For example, gender
attribute can be used in a community to select a finer granularity setting for female users
[45]. More than showing communities as nodes in a graph, a community can also be labeled
with textual or numerical flags to distinguish its members from the rest of the nodes in the
graph [90], and nodes in the community can be colored differently (e.g., in white or black)
to show whether they can access a data type or not.
Regardless of presenting the user with or without a graph layout, audience segregation
methods pick some users from each audience, and asks the user to choose yes or no on
whether a data type should be accessible by the selected users. This approach has been
shown to reduce required user effort in setting privacy [45] because members within an
audience have been found to receive similar privacy settings from the user.
Further validation of audience segregation approaches have been done by measuring
the number of time spent and the number of clicks needed by users to complete privacy
setting tasks. Mazzia et al. have used 36 tasks which consisted of single and a group of
privacy settings to show the efficiency of their results [90]. In addition to required time
and clicks, success rates to asked questions about chosen privacy settings and correctly set
privacy rules have been used to validate interface efficiency [109].
A further inquiry into the efficiency of audience segregation research can be made
by asking whether the found audiences receive privacy settings that are distinct enough
across audiences to justify asking a user the same question for multiple audiences. In a
work by Onwuasoanya et al., 14 social network users out of 20 have chosen to manually
create only one group from all of their friends “meaning that Facebook’s default privacy
settings for all friends accurately reflect their privacy settings” [106]. For the mentioned 14
users, multiple audiences would require choosing privacy settings for each audience, but the
resulting privacy settings would not be different than those chosen by applying a privacy
setting to all audiences at once. However, from the same study we note that for some
users audience segregation would be desirable. To the best of our knowledge, no large scale
survey work exists in understanding the percentage of users who would like to use audience
segregation methods.
A critique of audience segregation work can be made regarding the scope of these
studies. Although the idea of contextual privacy from Nissenbaum’s perspective [105] was
not defined to be applied to friends only, the current state of art in contextual privacy have
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largely avoided creating audiences from friends of friends or other non-friend social network
users. This shortcoming has mainly been the result of social network users’ reluctance to
deal with privacy issues beyond information disclosure to friends. Stutzman et al. suggest
that “due to a normative lack of interaction with outsiders, Facebook users may have
constructed a boundary of privacy with weak ties” [120].
Content Segregation
Content segregation is based on the idea that user generated instances (e.g., a single photo)
of a data type (e.g., photo) can belong to different contexts [87]. Whereas audience segrega-
tion aims at finding the appropriate audience for a data type (i.e., which audiences should
be allowed to access a specific data type), content segregation aims at finding the context
of each data instance regardless of its type in order to specify audiences with respect to
contexts. Social network users already employ such strategies by selectively allowing dif-
ferent users to access a data instance. For example, although party photos are considered
very private and hidden from the public, photos of mountains/cities, or even the profile
photo are not considered to be private enough to be hidden from everybody.
Among contextual privacy works, we have found Madejski et al. provide the first
approach in content segregation [87]. In this work, information categories (i.e., contexts
for content) for data instances “were selected based on themes that were most likely to
elicit user intent to show or hide from certain profile groups”. 12 such categories have been
“defined by a careful consideration of Facebook data, Facebook terminology lists and tags
as religious, political, alcohol, drugs, sexual, explicit, academic, work, negative, interests,
personal and family”.
By this approach, users’ desire to hide data related to certain concepts can also be
realized with ease. For example, “drunk photos, or check-ins to pubs can both be contex-
tualized with alcohol and hidden from selected friends” [87]. We believe that when used
with powerful machine learning/data mining techniques, such as face recognition and sen-
timent analysis, content segregation can facilitate privacy settings and prepare a coherent
view across all data types for better privacy.
2.4 Risk in user interactions
In the literature, risk models [28, 130, 41] have been proposed to put privacy in a context so
that social network users would be empowered to understand privacy risks. Privacy risks
have been evaluated from access control [29, 52] and information leakage [71] perspectives.
Lately, analyzing the social graph of a user [71, 20, 95] has been found successful in revealing
personal information even when the user does not enter personal data to the social network.
Similar to our research focus, the risk of maintaining an online presence has been
studied in [84], from which we borrowed our visibility measure for items in Chapter 4.
In [84] a privacy score is computed for social network users, which measures the user’s
potential privacy risk due to his/her online information sharing behaviors. Such a measure
depends on the sensitivity of the information being revealed and the visibility the revealed
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information gets in the network. In contrast, in our work we are interested in finding risks
of becoming friends with certain social network users.
Friends’ role in user interactions has been studied in sociology [114], but observing
it on a wide scale has not been possible until online social networks attracted millions
of users and provided researchers with social network data. For online social networks,
Ellison et al. [43] defined friends as social capital in terms of an individual’s ability to stay
connected with members of a previously inhabited community. Differing from this work, we
study how friends can help users to interact with new people on social networks. Although
these interactions can increase users’ contributions to the network [120] and help the social
network evolve by creation of new friendships [127], they can also impact the privacy of
users by disclosing profile data. Squicciarini et al. [119] have addressed concerns of data
disclosure by defining access rules that are tailored by 1) the users’ privacy preferences, 2)
sensitivity of profile data and 3) the objective risk of disclosing this data to other users.
Similarly, Terzi et al. [84] has considered the sensitivity of data to compute a privacy
score for users. Our work differs in scope from these in that we study the role of friends
who connect users on the social network graph and facilitate interactions. Indeed, research
works (see [15] for a review) have been limited to finding the best privacy settings by
observing the interaction intensity of user-friend pairs [13] or by asking the user to choose
privacy settings [45]. Without explicit user involvement, Leskovec et al. [77] have shown
that the attitude of a user toward another can be estimated from evidence provided by
their relationships with other members of the social network. Similar works try to find
friendship levels of two social network users (see [5] for a survey). Although these work can
explain relations between social network users, they cannot show how existence of mutual
friends can change these relations.
Privacy risks that are associated by friends’ actions in information disclosure has been
studied in [125], but the authors work with direct actions (e.g., re-sharing user’s photos)
of friends, rather than their friendship patterns.
Recent privacy research focused on creating global models of risk or privacy rather than
finding the best privacy settings, so that ideal privacy settings can be mined automatically
and presented to the user more easily. Terzi et al. [84] has modeled privacy by considering
how sensitive personal data is disclosed in interactions. Although users assign global privacy
or risk scores to other social network users, friend roles in information disclosure are ignored
in these work.
An advantage of global models is that once they are learned, privacy settings can be
transfered and applied to other users. In such a shared privacy work, Bonneau et al. [19]
use suites of privacy settings which are specified by friends or trusted experts. However,
such works do not use a global risk/privacy model, and users should know which suites to
use without knowing the risk of social network users surrounding him/her.
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2.5 Detecting Anomalies in Interactions
Our work on detecting anomalies in interactions focuses on profiling Twitter users, and
analyzing their friendships in time to detect anomalous interactions. As such, in addition to
traditional approaches for anomaly detection [32], there are several research work on topic
modeling for microblogging data, topical anomaly detection, graph based and classifier
based anomaly detection on microblogs that are relevant to our work.
Early work on using topic models with microblogging data focused on choosing a strat-
egy that would allow using traditional topic models with Twitter’s short tweets. Similar to
our tweet aggregation process, Hong et al. [58] experimented with different user represen-
tations with tweets, and checked the accuracy of their aggregation strategy by comparing
a user’s topics to an external ground truth (i.e., listings of web services that group users
based on several criteria). However their work does not consider friends in defining a user’s
profile. Another early effort to look beyond traditional topic models and design a topic
model that would work with Twitter data is from Ramage et al. [111]. They acknowledge
the existence of some new dimensions in Twitter data, such as “substance, style, status,
and social characteristics of posts” rather than a set of words to describe topics. Similar to
using tweets and bios as two different datasets to find user topics, Zhao et al. [133] performs
a study of comparing New York Times newspaper articles to Twitter news. Their approach
aims at finding the best set of topics, without representing users with topic distributions.
With early applications in more traditional settings, graph based anomaly detection ap-
proaches [108] are established methods, but they are computationally expensive. A more
local and cheap approach involves using classifier based anomaly detection. In “Warning-
Bird”, Lee et al. trains a classifier to detect suspicious URLs on Twitter [74]. In another
classification work, Chu et al. [35] aims at classifying Twitter accounts into Human, Cy-
borg and Bot classes. Using our approach, anomalies can be detected as well to identify
“Cyborg” and “Bot” accounts, because they are known to follow a large number of users
regardless of user characteristics.
In user behavior, Anantharam et al. [12] analyze contents of URLs that are given in
tweets to find topically anomalous tweets. By using this information, users can be labeled
as having anomalous behavior. Similar to our friendship oriented approach, Takahashi et
al. [122] propose a probability model to detect the emergence of a new topic between two
users from the anomaly measured through the model. Their assumption is that users tweet
about changes in their behavior.
2.6 Micro analysis of Interactions
Other than finding similar users or profiling users with certain topics, some related work
focus on a certain dimension of the available profile or network data to study user interac-
tions. These related work can be considered as the micro analysis of user interactions. For
example, the use of hashtags (i.e., Twitter topics) and addressivity (i.e., @ sign) has been
studied to understand interactions among Twitter users [57]. A comprehensive analysis has
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found that online social networks, such as Twitter, can also act as an information source
[72] to a high degree, thereby pointing to an information seeking behavior among Twitter
users. This functionality of Twitter is provided by tweets and conversations that occur
among users [59, 101, 121].
From a theoretical point of view, sentiment analysis of user generated texts is a widely
studied problem in research work [70, 4], but its impact on conversational interactions has
not been explored in detail. In these research works, sentiments are used to find aggregate
public opinion about a given topic such as the approval rates of political actors.
Another dimension of user interactions is related to geolocation studies. Recent works
by Takhteyevet al. [123] and Leetaru et al. [75] have analyzed the geography of Twitter
and found that users communicate more often with those closest to them. However such
works have been limited to studying Twitter users only, because accessing user location
data on other social networks, such as Facebook.com, has been fraught with privacy and
security problems, which makes a large scale analysis very difficult. In a limited study on
Facebook, locations of friends have been studied from a privacy point of view on Facebook
[73]. In this work, researchers come to the conclusion that friends/followers share common
locations to a high degree, but an analysis of the impact of locations on conversational
interactions has not been studied.
Chapter 3
User Similarity and Interactions
3.1 Introduction
Today, social network data are regarded as one of the most highly valuable source of
information over the Web [25], as they can broaden our horizons in keeping track of the
life, in learning about societies, or, simply, in making advertising more profitable. In
this framework, social network studies [80, 116, 26] help us in understanding how user
relationships will evolve, and which paths should be taken to spread specific news, ads and
political views. The basis of the majority of such work [104, 92] is finding user similarity
from different perspectives.
In our work, we build on current research and propose measures for evaluating social
network users’ similarity according to both their connections and profile attributes. From
the network connections perspective, we propose a novel measure that facilitates finding
user similarity without observing an important fraction of the network. This approach
reduces computational costs by limiting the number of queries to be performed on the
network. We also propose a profile similarity measure to find semantic similarities among
users. Moreover, since user profile data could be missing, we present a technique to infer
them from profile items of a user’s contacts.
Besides proposing the measures, this chapter presents a comprehensive evaluation study
aimed at comparing the proposed similarity measures with those previously proposed in
the literature. The main goal of the experimental evaluation is to test how the considered
measures are able to forecast creation of new relationships. We have conducted our experi-
ments on different kinds of graph data (i.e., Facebook, Youtube, Epinions, and DBLP data
sets) to see how different scenarios and graph sizes affect performance. Considered scenar-
ios allow us to see the influence on the measure performance of different key dimensions of
graph data, such as whether the relations are directed (e.g., Epinions), or undirected (e.g.,
Facebook), or they are explicitly (e.g., Facebook) or implicitly given by the semantics of
the considered data (e.g., Youtube). Moreover, we show how the proposed technique to
infer missing profile items performs on the undirected social network Facebook. Finally,
to observe how profile and network similarities interact, we carried out experiments on a
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DBLP data set enriched with profile data from the ACM digital library.
Specifically, we detail the relation between profile and network similarity measures,
and explain how they are affected by the characteristics of studied networks. As such, we
believe that the results reported in this chapter can be useful not only for evaluating the
performance of our measures, but also to evaluate future developments in the area.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents our similarity
measures. Section 3.3 describes our experimentation methodology. Section 3.4 reports the
experiments on undirected Facebook and DBLP datasets, whereas Section 3.5 illustrates
the experiments on directed Youtube and Epinions datasets. Section 3.6 gives absolute
performance results for our similarity measures. In Section 3.7 we discuss experimental
results with a holistic view.
3.2 Similarity Measures
Our measures have been mainly designed to predict new relationships in the network. More
precisely, we take into account the theory of homophily [92], from which we learn two issues
related to the establishment of a new relationship in social networks. The first is that, as
shown in [92], people tend to create new relationships with people that are closer to them on
a social graph. As an example of this trend, in the Facebook data used for our experiments
(cfr. Section 3.4), 83% of new edges are created between users and contacts of their friends.
The second fact is that users tend to create relationships with people that are similar to
them along certain profile attributes, such as gender, education and religion. Therefore,
we introduce two distinct similarity measures, namely, network and profile similarity, and
show how these two can be combined to find user similarity. Both of these measures are
designed in such a way that we only consider the data in the social graph between the
target user u and the new possible friend x, who is selected from u’s friends of friends. Any
user x who is connected to u within a two-hop distance is hereafter called a stranger. We
model a social network G = (E,N) as a graph, such that the set of nodes N represents
social network users, whereas the set of edges E ⊆ N ×N denotes relationships. Moreover,
we use dot notation to refer to a specific component within a graph.
3.2.1 Network Similarity
Similar to existing measures [40, 36], we compute network similarity between a target user
u and a stranger x based on the use of network information of both u and x. A common
way to estimate this similarity is to count the number of mutual friends between u and x.
However, in existing approaches relationships among mutual friends of u and x are ignored,
losing valuable information. Our intuition is that, if a stranger is connected to friends of
u who themselves are well connected to each other, the stranger is more connected to the
target user u. To understand this, assume that in one extreme, relationships among mutual
friends of u and x provide a complete graph, and, in the other extreme, mutual friends
have no friendship relations among them. In existing measures that just use the count of
mutual friends, these cases are considered the same.
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Our measure takes into account friendship edges among the mutual friends of u and
x, in addition to the number of mutual friends. To find out how friendship edges should
be used in the network similarity measure, we define the mutual friends graph of u and
x as a subgraph of the target social network G, where the node set consists of u, x and
their mutual friends. The edge set includes all edges among the above considered nodes.
Formally, we define mutual friends graph as follows.
Definition 1 (Mutual Friends Graph) Given a social network G and two nodes u, x ∈
G.N , the mutual friends graph of u and x, denoted as MFG(u, x), is a sub-graph of G
where: (1) MFG(u, x).N = {u, x} ∪ {n ∈ G.N |n 6= x, n 6= u,∃e, e′ ∈ G.E, e = 〈u, n〉 ∧ e′ =
〈n, x〉}; (2) MFG(u, x).E = {〈n, n′〉 ∈ G.E|n, n′ ∈MFG(u, x).N}.
Edge count of the mutual friends graph shows strength of ties between two nodes in
the graph. When computing how the target user u is similar to a stranger x with respect
to the network, we compare edge count of mutual friends graph of u and x to edge count
of the friendship graph of the target user u, that is, a graph consisting of all friends of u
and all edges between the corresponding nodes. This is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Friendship Graph) Given a social network G and a node u ∈ G.N , the
friendship graph of u, denoted as FG(u), is a sub-graph of G where: (1) FG(u).N =
{u} ∪ {n ∈ G.N |n 6= u,∃e ∈ G.E, e = 〈u, n〉}; (2) FG(u).E = {〈u, n〉 ∈ G.E|n ∈
FG(u).N} ∪ {〈n, n′〉 ∈ G.E|n, n′ ∈ FG(u).N}.
Network similarity can thus be measured through a comparison between the number
of edges in the mutual friends graph of u and x and the number of edges in the friendship
graph of u, as follows.




where |MFG(u, x).E| and |FG(u).E| are the number of edges in MFG(u, x) and FG(u),
respectively.
The value of the proposed network similarity measure is damped by the log function,
and a constant 2 is used to normalize the similarity value. This normalization is motivated
by the fact that when a stranger x is connected to all friends of a target user u, the
following holds: |MFG(u, x).N | = |FG(u).N | + 1, and |MFG(u, x).E| ≤ 2 × |FG(u).E|.
Thus, when comparing the number of edges in the mutual friends graph to the number
of edges in the friendship graph, we normalize the similarity function by taking this into
account. If strangers do not have mutual friends with the target user, the mutual friendship
graph consists only of two nodes, i.e., MFG(u, x).N = {u, x} and no edges. Hence, network
similarity is zero.











Figure 3.1: An exemplary social graph for a target user u. Six friends and two strangers
are shown in the graph as nodes, and their friendship relations are denoted by edges.
Example 3.2.1 Consider the social network graph in Figure 3.1. Friendship graph of user
u has 7 nodes and 9 edges. Stranger str1 has 3 mutual friends with user u and there are
9 edges in the mutual friends graph MFG(u,str1); stranger str2 also has 3 mutual friends
with u but the mutual friends graph MFG(u,str2) has only 6 edges. Network similarity
of str1 to u is then NS(u, str1) = Log(9)/Log(2 × 9) = 0.76, whereas NS(u, str2) =
Log(6)/Log(2 × 9) = 0.61. Our measure favors str1, as it is connected to a stronger
community around u than str2.
3.2.2 Profile Similarity
Profile similarity compares personal data stored in the profile items associated with two
social network users, say u and x, to determine how much they are similar. The easiest
way is to use a string matching approach to compute individual item similarity. Items on
two profiles are said to be similar if their values are identical, and dissimilar otherwise.
Therefore, similarity increases only when the target user u and the stranger x have the
same values for an item. However, while this solution is quite simple to perform, it results
in low average similarities in presence of profiles with high percentage of missing values.
Unfortunately, this is indeed the case of user profiles in current social networks. In our
experiments on Facebook data, we found that the percentage of missing profile values is
64% (see Section 3.4). To overcome this limitation that could affect also our similarity
measure, we propose a method to infer a portion of the missing values of a stranger profile
before computing profile similarity. This inferral mechanism reduces the number of blank
profile items, and helps profile similarity to be computed with more profile information.
In the following, we first present the inferring technique, then we show how the proposed
profile similarity is computed. We assume that the target user u has all the information
entered, so item values are inferred for strangers of u.
Inferring Missing Item Values. In general, each social network user is associated
with a profile, consisting of a set of items I storing user personal data (e.g., date of birth,
religion, school, hobby). Each item could be optionally structured into subfields (e.g., date
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of birth=[day, month, year]) and could contain several values (e.g., hobby=[reading, chess,
music]).
Hereafter, given a profile item i ∈ I, we use the function values(i) to denote the set of
values associated with it or one of its subfields (e.g., birthday.year denotes the year subfield
of the birthday item, values(birthday.year) returns the value of the year subfield).
Typically, inferring a stranger’s profile information is done by aggregating all profile
information of his/her friends or looking at group memberships of the stranger. In the
literature, this approach has been used to infer political views, sexual orientation or hidden
parts of profiles ( see [82] for an example). The implicit assumption in this approach is
that we can easily obtain group memberships of the stranger or profile informations of
stranger’s friends from the social network. However, current social networks no longer allow
this access, and we cannot even get the complete friends list of a stranger. For example,
in the past Facebook had allowed researchers to access all information about users in a
local network (e.g., users from a city, users from a university) but growing privacy threats
compelled Facebook to discontinue this service. Moreover, even if the social networks
allow this access, social network users are now able to hide their profile information by
strict privacy settings. As a result, all the information we can get about a stranger is
limited to the mutual friends he/she has with the target user, because by default social
network APIs allow us to retrieve the list of mutual friends.
To overcome this dearth of information about a stranger, we propose an inferral method
based on a localized approach. This is motivated again by the homophily theory, stating
that users with similar profiles will more likely create a relationship. Therefore, given users
u and x, the proposed technique to infer x’s missing item values exploits profile information
of mutual friends of u and x. By doing so, we avoid considering profiles of all x’s friends.
More precisely, we make use of the majority voting scheme [110, 97] to infer the value of
a missing item i in x profile from the i’s values in the mutual friends profiles. In majority
voting, each mutual friend has a vote, and a count of votes Vv from all mutual friends is
associated with each possible value v of item i (e.g., if there are two mutual friends who live
in London, then London will have 2 votes). Upon collecting votes from n mutual friends,
for each possible item value v, we compute the percentage of vote Pv as Vv/n. Then, the
value with the highest percentage of vote is chosen as the inferred value for that given
missing item.
In this process, two limitations can affect the inference: (1) small number of votes, (2)
no clear majority for a value in voting. To prevent inferences from a very small number of
votes, we use a required minimum number of votes from friends, denoted as f . Similarly, a
minimum percentage (i.e., a threshold t) of votes is used to prevent inferences when there
is no clear majority in the voting. Thus, a value v is inferred, if Vv ≥ f and Pv ≥ t.
Example 3.2.2 Assume that we are trying to infer current location of a stranger who has
5 mutual friends with the target user. Let us assume that mutual friends have current
locations listed as A, B, A, C and A. There are m = 3 distinct item values (A, B, C),
n = 5 votes, and VA = 3, VB = 1, and VC = 1. Hence, PA = 3/5. If we set f = 7 or
t = 0.85, we cannot make an inference, because at least 7 friend votes or a value with 0.85
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percentage of all votes is required. If f = 3 and t = 0.5, then we can infer the current
location of the stranger as A.
The system learns the required number of friend votes f and the threshold t for user
u by inferring item values of each of u’s friends and comparing the inferred values with
friends’ existing values. Note that f and t values are user specific. With every f and t
value pair, count of inferred values and precision in inferrals are expected to be different.
At this phase, we had two goals in mind; inference should be precise and it should allow
us to fill in as much missing profile items as possible. Small f and t values help us to infer
more values with smaller precision. Big f and t values, on the other hand, bring better
precision but fewer inferred values.
To detect the optimum value of f and t, we use the following modularity function:
L(f, t) = P(f, t)× Log(C(f, t))
where C(f, t) is the number of correct inferrals and P(f, t) denotes precision in inferral.
Thus, values of f and t are chosen to maximize the modularity function L(f, t). During the
selection of this modularity function we heuristically experimented with different variations.
A possibility was to multiply precision and the number of inferred items as in L(f, t) =
P(f, t) × C(f, t). This did not work because while P(f, t) showed a linear behavior (it
increases or decreases linearly), the number of inferred items were exponentially increasing
or decreasing. To smooth the exponential part (number of inferred items) we therefore used
a log transformation and experiments with this specific formula provided better results. As
the experimental results in Section 3.4.3 will show, this formula achieves precisions as high
as 71.7%. Even with unstructured 1 multiple value items, we have found the performance
of the modularity function satisfactory.
Profile Similarity Measure. In defining our similarity measure, we have taken
into account that user profile mainly contains categorical data. Literature offers several
similarity measures for categorical data (see [21] for a survey). Among these, the most
basic measure is the overlap similarity which returns a similarity of 1 if two item values are
identical and 0, otherwise. Other more complex measures return a non-zero similarity in
case of non-identical item values, as well as a value different from 1, in case of two identical
item values. In general, this is achieved by taking into account the item values distribution
in a dataset. This dataset is used to discover similarity relations between item values,
therefore its creation requires careful consideration. Adhering to the homophily theory, we
assume that friends of a target user are similar to him/her, and profile items of friends
can guide us in computing similarity of strangers. For this reason, we propose aggregating
item values from friends of the target user u to create the dataset. With this approach, the
measure learns the dataset from social network data automatically, therefore creating an
ontology or defining a dictionary is not needed to compute similarity between value pairs.
Given a dataset, various measures differ in their approach to compute a similarity value
for two item value pairs. We will give two examples to illustrate different behaviors. Both
1User inputs with Facebook auto-completion and aggregation was imposed just in recent years. Before
this, users could enter unstructured texts.
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Figure 3.2: An exemplary profile for target user u. The profile consists of single valued
gender and hometown items, as well as multiple valued education and work items.
in Occurrence and Inverse Occurrence Frequency two identical item values are assigned 1
for similarity, but similarity for non-identical item values is computed in different ways.
In Occurrence Frequency (OF), “mismatches on more frequent values are assigned higher
similarity” [21]; if two values are non-identical but highly frequent in the dataset, similarity
is higher. In comparison, Inverse Occurrence Frequency (IOF) gives higher similarity to
mismatches on less frequent values.
Among all measures discussed in [21], we chose to use the occurrence frequency for
profile similarity, because our dataset consists of items from all friends of user u, and,
according to homophily theory, we expect that friends are in some way similar to each
other. Thus, we chose a measure that gives 1 for two identical profile item values, and, in
case of non-identical values, gives a non-zero value which is computed by considering the
frequency of the item values in the dataset (i.e., the friend profiles). We have validated this
choice by considering other categorical similarity measures and observing their performance
on social network data (see experimental results in Section 3.4.2).
Before giving our profile similarity definitions, profile items of a target user u are shown
in Figure 3.2 to familiarize the reader with the structure of profile data on a social network.
In general, items on a social network profile can be classified according to two orthogonal
dimensions. A first classification is based on whether they are single value (e.g., gender)
or multiple value (e.g., hobbies) items. The second dimension is related to whether they
contain multiple sub-fields (e.g., education contains degree and school) or not. In Figure
3.2, gender and hometown are single value items and hobbies is a multiple value item.
Furthermore, education and work are multiple value items with multiple subfields. Values
of these items are shown with numbers, such as 1, 2 and 3. Similarity of single-value (sub)
items is computed using Occurrence Frequency (OF) as follows:
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Definition 4 (Single-value similarity) Let i be a single value profile item consisting of
a set of subfields Sb.2 Let iu and ix be the value of item i in u and x profiles, respectively.
The value of the n-th subfield of iu is denoted as i
(n)
u . Furthermore, we create a dataset
D that contains item values from profiles of u’s friends. In this dataset, A and B are
defined as A = log(|D| /r(i(n)u )) and B = log(|D| /r(i(n)x )), where r(i∗) denotes the number
of friends who have item values i∗ in D. Single value similarity is given by the following
formula:












(1 +A×B)−1 if i(n)u 6= i(n)x
Single-value similarity computes the similarity of two single-value items on different
profiles. As shown in Figure 3.2, some items (e.g., education) can have more than one
value (e.g., {(Upenn, Master’s),(Umass, B.S.)} and therefore similarity of single value
items must be aggregated to compute the item similarity. In this aggregation, we first
compute single-value similarities for all possible item value pairs on the two profiles, and
pick the highest valued ones. More precisely, Item Similarity is computed as follows.
Definition 5 (Item similarity) Let i be a profile item consisting of a set of subfields Sb.
Let values(iu), values(ix) be the set of values for item i in u and x profiles, respectively.
∀h ∈ values(iu), let SimItem(h) = {OF (h, k)|k ∈ values(ix)} be the set of single-value item
similarities computed between an element h in values(iu) and all elements in values(ix).








Item similarity computes similarity of an item (e.g., education, hometown) on two
profiles, however social network profiles do not consist of a single item. In fact, most social
networks have tens of profile items, such as current location, education and hometown. To
find the profile similarity, these item similarities must be once again aggregated. As some
items can have different weights in computing the similarity, we employ a weighted average
model in aggregation. This allows us to indicate importance of some items over others.
Therefore, we define profile similarity of stranger x to target user u as follows.







βi × Si(u, x)
where βi and Si(u, x) are the importance and the similarity of the ith item, respectively,
whereas I is the item set on user’s profile. Importance coefficients are user-defined.
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User School Dept. Degree
u Umass (75) CSE (57) Ph.D.(8)
u SUNY (23) CSE (57) B.S.(37)
x UPenn (21) CSE (57) Ph.D. (8)
x UPenn (21) EE (11) B.S. (37)
Table 3.1: Education items of a stranger (x) and a target user (u). Number of occurrences
of item values on profiles of u’s friends are given in parentheses. These values in parantheses
are what we termed as the dataset, and they are used to find the similarity between two
non-identical item values.
Example 3.2.3 Values of the education item of target user u and stranger x are those
given in Table 3.1. For instance, target user u and stranger x each have two education
values on their profiles. Target user u had her B.S. degree from SUNY in Computer Science.
Next to item values, we give the number of u’s friends who have the same item value. In
total, we assume that there are 200 friends of u. For example, 23 of u’s friends have studied
in SUNY. Target user u also got her Ph.D. degree in computer science from Umass. 75
friends of u have also studied in Umass, but only 57 of them studied computer science, and
of those only 8 had their Ph.D. in Computer Science. Stranger x studied EE in UPenn
as an undergraduate student and had a Ph.D. in CSE from UPenn. In the table, we see
that 21 friends of u have studied in Upenn. Similarly, we see that 11 studied EE in various
degrees (B.S., M.S. or Ph.D.).
Given the information in Table 3.1, we want to compute the similarity of x’s education
values to education values of u. There are three subfields (school, department, degree) in
education, so Sb = 3.
For the two item values of user x, we need to compute single-value similarities of all
item value pairs on u and x profiles. These are OF (eduu.1, edux.1), OF (eduu.1, edux.2),
OF (eduu.2, edux.1) and OF (eduu.2, edux.2). As we have two item values on the profile of
u, we need to choose the two highest values among them. From Table 3.1, we can see that
OF (eduu.1, edux.1) returns the highest similarity value because out of three subfields, two of
them (i.e., dept:CSE and degree:Ph.D.) are identical in both item values. When all three


















x ), so from Definition 4 similarity is 1 for these two
subfields. For the first education subfield, edu
(1)
u 6= edu(1)x , therefore occurrence frequencies
2where |Sb| = 1 in case of non-structured items, like gender.
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of edu
(1)
u (University: Umass) and edu
(1)
x (University: Upenn) are found from the data set
to compute similarity. In this calculation, 75 of 200 friends of u have Umass educations,
whereas 21 have Upenn educations.
Once the similarity between first education values from both profiles are found, we
are left with OF (eduu.2, edux.2) only, because OF (eduu.1, edux.1), OF (eduu.1, edux.2) and
OF (eduu.2, edux.1) involved eduu.1 or edux.1 but these education values had already been
used. Here only the degrees (B.S.) are identical on both profiles, whereas other two sub-
fields are non-identical:
























× {0.901 + 0.703} = 0.802.
3.3 Experimental Methodology
We conducted several experiments to provide a comparison between the proposed similarity
measures and those discussed in the literature. The comparison is done by showing how
similarity measures can forecast the creation of a new relationship in a graph. With this
aim, we considered several types of graphs, which can be grouped into “directed graphs”
(i.e., Youtube and Epinions datasets) and “undirected graphs” (i.e., Facebook and DBLP
datasets).
To verify how much similarity measures correctly forecast the creation of a new edge,
we adopt the following methodology. We assume to have a social network graph G, where
each edge is complemented with information on the time of its creation. Then, given G:
(1) we randomly select a target user u and one of its strangers x; (2) we generate the graph
G at a given time instant T , denoted as GT ,3 where T just precedes the time of creation of
edge e = 〈u, x〉 in G; (3) we compute the similarity between u and each of its strangers, x
included, in GT according to the considered measures; (4) we evaluate how the network and
profile similarity values between u and x in GT imply the creation of the edge e = 〈u, x〉.
The strength of implication is given by how the similarity measure ranks x among all other
3This is done by creating the graph using only edges established before time T .
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strangers in GT . In the ideal case, the measures would rank x as the first stranger that the
target user would add.
We conduct several experiments by focusing on edge prediction based on profile simi-
larity, network similarity, as well as a combination of them. Before describing the results
of experiments, we want to clarify the relationship between rank and similarity, since they
can confuse the reader about prediction performances.
Rank and Similarity. Although similarity measures involve using different data
(network and profile information), for each one of them, edge prediction aims at producing
for each target user an ordered list of potential new friends from his/her strangers. In this
ordered list, position of a stranger is called his/her rank, and the goal is to compute the
list in such a way that strangers who are most likely to create new friendships with target
users are ranked the highest.
Ranking requires ordering strangers on a scale; similarity measures use similarity as the
scale and order strangers according to their similarity values. As a result, the most similar
stranger has rank 1, whereas the least similar stranger is at the bottom of the list. The
rank of this lowest stranger depends on the total number of strangers. Because of this,
ranks cannot be compared in their absolute values. Therefore, we normalize the ranks such
that percentage ranks 1 and 0 correspond to the top and bottom strangers, respectively.
More precisely, for each target user, percentage rank for an m ranked stranger in a list of
n total strangers is computed as 1 −m/n. For example, if a stranger is ranked 10th in a
list of 100 strangers, he/she is assigned the rank 0.9. In what follows, we will use rank and
percentage rank interchangeably to mean percentage rank.
Although similarity and rank values of a stranger are directly proportional because
similarity is used to compute rank, similarity and rank cannot be used interchangeably.
Rank of a stranger is not equal to his/her similarity, because rank is found by normalizing
an ordered list of all strangers. For example, a rank value of 0.9 does not mean that the
similarity value is 0.9. Two strangers ranked 0.9 from the prediction lists of two target
users can have drastically different similarity values such as 0.90 or 0.10. For the same
reasons, a similarity value of 0.9 does not imply a rank value of 0.9.
A further issue is about comparing values from different similarity measures. The
characteristics of the measures can be different, therefore similarity values from two different
similarity measures cannot be directly compared. This is because one measure can assign
very low similarities to all strangers, whereas another one can assign high similarities to
all. However, percentage ranks of the same stranger from two similarity measures can be
compared because ranks are normalized by taking similarities of all strangers into account.
Having explained similarity and rank notions, we will now review the network and
profile similarity measures against which we compare our measures.
Network Similarity. We compare our network similarity measure (NS) with other
well known similarity measures, namely L1 Norm, Cosine Similarity [40] and positive cor-
relation Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI) [36]. We modify the considered measures to
take into account friendship links as follows:
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Measure Assigns 0 Assigns 1 For multiple value pairs
OF never identical simple average
IOF never identical simple average
Eskin never identical simple average
Overlap non-identical identical simple average
Lin possible possible function of log frequencies
Goodall non-identical possible simple average
Table 3.2: Similarity values for identical and non-identical item values for different categor-
ical similarity measures. Assigning 0 implies that there is no similarity between two item
values. The highest similarity value is 1, and it is assigned to indicate maximum similarity.
By possible, we mean that a specific frequency distribution of values in the dataset can
result in a 0 or 1 similarity. In computation with multiple item value pairs, an overall
similarity value is computed by simple averaging, or by using the similarity value of each




, Cos(u, s) =
|Fu ∩ Fs|√
|Fu| . |Fs|
where with Fu and Fs we denote friends of user u and friends of stranger s, respectively.
Pointwise mutual information is computed in probabilistic terms as follows:
PMI(u, s) = P (Fu, Fs) . log
P (Fu, Fs)
P (Fu).P (Fs)
where joint probability distribution function P (Fu, Fs) computes the probability of a
social network user being friends of both u and s, whereas marginal probability distribution
functions P (Fu) and P (Fs) are probabilities of a social network user being a friend of u
and s, respectively.
Given a new edge e between a stranger x and user u, we say that a network similarity
measure m1 wins over another similarity measure m2, if rank of x according to m1, denoted
as Rm1(x), is higher than the rank obtained according to m2, i.e., Rm1(x) > Rm2(x).
Similarly, a loss for m1 is recorded when Rm1(x) < Rm2(x), finally a draw occurs when
Rm1(x) = Rm2(x).
For L1, Cosine and PMI measures, total number of wins, losses and ties are computed
against our network similarity measure by considering all new edges in the dataset. We
will detail this process by the following example.
Example 3.3.1 Assume that we are given a timestamped edge e connecting a user u to a
stranger x. Creation time of e is denoted by T1. Assume that at time T < T1 user u has
only three strangers S = {x, x2, x3}. Furthermore x2 and x3 will not become friends of u
until a time T2 > T1. Note that x ∈ S. So, at time T , u and x are not yet friends.
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Measure x x2 x3
NS 0,6 0,4 0,1
PMI 0,06 0,05 0,023
Cosine 0,2 0,3 0,1
L1 0,3 0,35 0,4
Table 3.3: Similarity values of three strangers for corresponding categorical similarity mea-
sures.
Assume that NS(.), PMI(.), L1(.) and Cos(.) similarity values for (u, x) at time T
are given in Table 3.3.
Ordering similarities of x, x2 and x3 in each measure, we see the percentage ranks in
the list as RNS(x) = 1, RCos(x) = 0.33, RL1(x) = 0 and RPMI(x) = 1. Note that each
measure orders the similarity values of x, x1 and x3 separately. As a result, x has rank 1
with 0.06 similarity in PMI, whereas it has the rank 0 with 0.3 similarity in L1. Hence, we
say that for this edge, NS wins over L1 and Cosine, but it ties with PMI.
Comparison of our network similarity measure against L1, Cosine, and PMI will be
done with total win numbers with respect to the considered measures. We denote these
numbers as W (NS,m), L(NS,m), and T (NS,m), respectively, where m ∈ {L1, PMI,
Cosine}. Win ratio of our measure NS against other measures is defined as:
WinRatio(NS,m) =
W (NS,m)
W (NS,m) + T (NS,m) + L(NS,m)
Profile Similarity.
In the experiments we will compute profile similarity with Overlap, IOF, OF, Eskin,
Lin and Goodall measures which are defined for categorical data and discussed in [21].
All the considered measures assign similarity values to strangers based on their item value
frequencies in a dataset. Table 3.2 shows the behavior of the considered similarity measures
according to different dimensions. For Lin and Goodall measures, there are two and four
versions, respectively, that are slight alterations of their original formula. These variations
are not shown in Table 3.2 because their behaviors in considered dimensions are identical.
Performance results of these variations will be given in Section 3.4.2.
The considered measures can be grouped according to the similarity value assigned to
identical and non-identical item values. As reported in Table 3.2, Overlap and Goodall
assign zero similarity for non-identical item value pairs, whereas OF, IOF, Eskin and Lin
variations return a similarity value based on item frequencies of the dataset. Some measures
also have opposite behaviors. For instance, for non-identical item values, IOF assigns lower
similarity on more frequent item value pairs, whereas OF gives higher similarities to more
frequent item values. When user and stranger have more than one value for an item,
these measures employ different weighting schemes. In Lin variations, a weight based
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Win Loss Equal
NS, L1 Norm 213 241 179 052 7 708
NS, Cosine 246 956 145 979 7 066
NS, PMI 206 732 168 963 24 306
Table 3.4: Comparison of win/loss/draw counts
on logarithmic item frequencies is used, whereas in other measures simple averaging is
employed.
Although we chose OF as our measure in profile similarity, we believe that the evaluation
of all measures in experiments with real social network data will better highlight their
usefulness and shortcomings so that in future studies researchers can be better informed
about them.
In profile similarity experiments, we will follow a methodology similar to the one we
used in network similarity. With timestamped new edges of user-stranger pairs, we will
compute profile similarity values for strangers by using different measures to compute item
similarity. Based on these results, we will rank strangers and find which similarity measure
gives the best performance.
3.4 Experimental Results on Undirected Graphs
In this section, we will discuss experimental results for network and profile similarity on
undirected graphs.
3.4.1 Comparison of Network Similarity Measures
In this experiment, we used the real Facebook data set from [129], denoted as FBdata
in what follows, where it is possible to determine the time of creation of each edge. The
dataset consists of 16K users and 1.5M edges. However, we have considered only a subset
of this dataset, consisting of the oldest 480 274 edges, according to their creation dates.
This is only to limit the computation cost. In 480 274 edges, 400 000 (83%) edges were
created between users and their friends of friends (i.e., 2 hop strangers). Only 80 274 (17%)
edges were created between 3 or more hop distance pairs. For each edge e in FBdata, we
choose the first node as user u and the other one as user x. We then create the graph status
in the time instant before creation of e = 〈u, x〉, denoted as GTe , and compute similarity
measures among u and all of its strangers in GTe , including x.
The numbers of win/loss/draw of our network similarity measure (NS) against L1 Norm,
Cosine and PMI are given in Table 3.4, where we show that overall, NS has the best
performance.
In Figure 3.3, we further analyze the performance, by showing the ratio of wins to losses
of NS against the other measures. Figure 3.3 clearly shows that the proposed measure
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Figure 3.3: Win ratio against L1, Cosine, and PMI. The x-axis shows increasing network
similarity values.
outperforms others when network similarity value is less than 0.3 and bigger than 0.7,
whereas in the interval between 0.3 and 0.7 we see that the difference of number of wins
















(b) Win/loss ratio over L1
Figure 3.4: Win/loss ratios for [0.3,0.7] similarity range
A better view of this middle interval is given in Figure 3.4. The lowest win ratio against
L1 occurs at 0.45 abscissa, with an ordinate value of 0.41. At this point the edges among
mutual friends have an unexpected impact on the network similarity, and they increase
similarity more than needed. In a sense, connections among mutual friends are given too
much importance. This can happen in situations when the user has not many friends, and
the mutual friends are well connected.
3.4.2 Comparison of Profile Similarity Measures
In this experiment, we wanted to find out which categorical similarity measure can bet-
ter predict new edge formation between user and target stranger pairs. From FBdata,
we created a dataset for each user-target stranger pair (u, x) by including item values of
stranger x, user u and friends of user u. In Table 3.5, we give similarity and rank results
for the different measures in average terms. In the similarity column, we report the average
similarity of all strangers who have become friends with target users. Similarly, the rank
column shows average rank of these new friends. A 0 value for the rank column means
that the target stranger was ranked the last among all strangers, whereas a 1 value means
that the target stranger was ranked the first. In the zero similarity column, we report the
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Measure Similarity Rank Zero similarity
OF 0.621 0.483 0.023
IOF 0.623 0.38 0.023
Eskin 0.852 0.322 0.023
Overlap 0.469 0.309 0.247
Lin 0.053 0.428 0.359
Lin1 0.033 0.345 0.431
Goodall1 0.343 0.317 0.247
Goodall2 0.345 0.307 0.247
Goodall3 0.146 0.568 0.278
Goodall4 0.214 0.306 0.249
Table 3.5: Comparison of profile similarity measures. Higher ranks show better perfor-
mance, and the zero similarity column shows the percentage of strangers that are assigned
zero similarity.
percentage of strangers whose similarity to target users were found to be zero.
In average, Eskin gives the highest similarity to target strangers, but it ranks them only
higher than 32.2% of all strangers. Average similarity does not convey much information on
performance, because a similarity measure can assign high similarity to all strangers. As a
result, we cannot make a distinction among strangers. By the rank column, we can have a
better view on how similarity measures can predict new edges. Higher average rank means
that the measure gives higher probability to edge formation between user-target stranger
pairs. Goodall3 gives the best average rank overall; it puts a target stranger higher than
56.8% of all strangers. However, this measure fails to find a similarity for 27.8% of all
strangers. This is because all Goodall versions assign zero similarity to non-indentical
value pairs. They rank fewer strangers the best but fail to find a similarity value for a
big portion of strangers. Our chosen measure OF has the second best average ranking
performance, and it returns a zero similarity value only when the stranger or the user has
no profile items (i.e., their profiles are blank).
For these reasons, we believe that the experiments on undirected graphs confirm our
choice of using OF.
3.4.3 Inferrals in Item Similarity
In doing this experiment we used our data extracted from Facebook consisting of 39 users
and 12 567 friends of those users. The dataset consists of network and profile information
of these users received by an application from Facebook during a one year period. All
information is timestamped, and new friendships or friendship removals are updated in the
dataset. Each user profile reflects the profile structure of Facebook, and changes in profile
items and their values are also updated. In this dataset, the missing values are distributed
as described in Figure 3.5, where for each item the percentage of missing value on 12 567
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of missing item values for the considered dataset.
friends (f) thr. (t) #inferred prec.
Gender 3.34 0.59 594 0.728
Location 3.20 0.55 634 0.648
Hometown 3.55 0.61 982 0.717
Table 3.6: Inferral results
friend profiles is shown.
Table 3.6 shows the learned inferral parameters for gender, hometown and location.
System learns the friend count f and the threshold t for a user u by inferring item values of
each of u’s friends and comparing the inferred values with friends’ existing values.4 From
our modularity function, number of friends (f ) that are required to make an inferral are
found to be around 3, and threshold value (t) is close to 0.5. Among considered items,
hometown has the biggest friend count for an inferral. In average, we need 3.55 friends to
be able to infer a hometown value. Location, on the other hand, has the lowest precision
with 64.8%.
Among single value items, political view and religion are the most difficult to infer
because only 1% of all users enter this data. Inferring multi-value items proved to be very
difficult; as Facebook has been accepting user entered information for these items until
recently, abbreviations of schools and work places are prevalent, and natural language
processing is required before starting an inferral.
4In the table, precision is the correct inferrals over all inferrals, i.e., precision =
#correct inferrals/#all inferrals.




































































(c) Average profile similarity for edge cre-
ation.
Figure 3.6: The effect of network and profile similarity for new edge creation.
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3.4.4 Combining Network and Profile similarity
To evaluate how our network similarity measure compares to the profile similarity measure
on undirected graphs, we carried out experiments on data extracted from DBLP datasets5
and enriched with author information from the ACM digital library. By exploiting these
data, we generated a co-authorship graph, where each edge is complemented with the
year of its creation, and each user profile contains research fields and subfields organized
according to the ACM classification. More precisely, the obtained graph, which we refer
to as PCA, has been generated by crawling DBLP authorship relationships starting from
a given author X to other nodes who are at most 3 hops away from X. In its current form,
PCA contains 40 115 edges and 3651 nodes.
From PCA, we tried to observe how network and profile similarity affect co-authorships.
We defined friendship of two users as their co-authorship in a research article. The oldest
co-authored research article in the DBLP dataset denoted a friendship edge between two
users, and the edge is timestamped with the publication date of the article. Given a node
u and one of its strangers x (i.e., for u and x, there exists a node f which is a co-author
of both u and x), we analyze the time interval, denoted as t̂(u, x), since x became a friend
of f until x becomes a coauthor of u. We analyze the time interval by comparing how it
changes against network and profile similarity values.
Figure 3.6 shows three graphs for years of edge creation, where the axes show the t̂(u, x)
values. Figure 3.6a shows edge creation as t̂(u, x) increases. Interestingly, 33% of all the
new co-authorship edges are created within one year after having a stranger. Extreme
t̂(u, x) values are also possible, but very unlikely: only 1, 3 and 2 pairs of users coauthor a
publication 18, 19 and 20 years after they were linked through a mutual coauthor. Despite
these exceptional values, in average it takes t̂(u, x) = 3.29 years to create a link between
two users once they have a common coauthor, and the median time is 2 years.
Figure 3.6b shows how network similarity affects the edge creation rate. Despite some
exceptions, as t̂(u, x) increases, average network similarities decrease, which highlights that
users that are more connected (in terms of network), coauthor a publication sooner than
those that are less connected. Exceptions are in 11, 15, 17 and 20 years as the average
similarity in these years increase unexpectedly. However, these years only represent 1.5% of
the all edges. In general, this graph pointed out how human connections between authors,
modeled as network similarity, affect creation of new co-authorships. It also shows that
this kind of relationships is very much affected by the time. Figure 3.6c shows the profile
similarity values between u and x when t̂(u, x) increases. Despite some exceptions, profile
similarity distribution along years is more uniform than it is in the network similarity
graph. This highlights that authors can create coauthorship relationships even after a long
term if they have common research fields (i.e., they have higher profile similarity values),
regardless of how much they are connected.
5 http://dblp.uni-trier.de/xml/
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3.5 Experimental Results on Directed Graphs
For directed graph experiments, we evaluated similarity measures on two datasets. The
first dataset consists of Youtube videos, from which we created a directed graph based on
“relations” between a video and those videos suggested by Youtube as “related videos”. The
second dataset is the Epinions.com dataset [88], where trust / distrust relations between
users are mapped onto a directed graph. In the following subsections, we will discuss our
findings.
3.5.1 Comparison on Network Similarity Measures
In this section we will explain experiments for network similarity on both Youtube and
Epinions graphs.
Experiments on Youtube
The Youtube dataset that we have considered has been crawled by Cheng et al. [33]
between February 22nd, 2007 and July 27th, 2008. In their 59 crawls, Youtube video
pages have been visited, and for each video, 20 related videos have been added to the
dataset. From this dataset we created a directed graph by adding each crawled video
and the corresponding related videos as nodes and by inserting a new edge to the graph
from a node representing a related video to the node denoting the crawled video. More
precisely, in our graph we represent a video as a target user and its related videos (20
related videos) as friends. Hence, related videos of related videos are the strangers of a
video, i.e., strangers for a target user. Figure 3.7a shows a Youtube interface of videos and
related videos, whereas Figure 3.7b shows how these videos are represented on a graph.
For example, video node 1 is a friend of video 1.1. Similarly, video 1.1 is a friend of video
1.1.1, whereas video 1 is a stranger of video 1.1.1.














(a) Related videos of crawled ones are added
to the future crawl queue, and crawled after-
wards. Arrows show the crawling sequence
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(b) Related Youtube videos are modeled hav-
ing directed edges to the crawled video in the
graph. From a page, first four of the 20 re-
lated videos are shown.
Figure 3.7: Graph creation process in Youtube dataset.
First, we will explain the usage of Youtube dataset for evaluating our measures.
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When a video is first updated to Youtube, it does not have user views and hence the
first data that can be used to compute its related videos are user-generated tags, title and
description of the video ([34]). These information pieces are mostly required to upload a
video (e.g., entering a title for the video or choosing a category).
A similar process happens in a social network (e.g., Twitter.com) during registration,
since users enter few profile information. At this step, the user does not have any preference
about possible new friends, so these can be suggested by only looking at user profile data.
For new friends / followings, existing social networks, like Twitter.com, offer lists of people
to follow based on user profile information (users with the same interests can be offered
as potential friends).6 Similarly, at the beginning, Youtube offers related videos that have
similar tags or titles. After the video is uploaded, a percentage of social network users
watch the video and Youtube creates a more robust related videos list depending on what
other videos these users watched.
As related videos are aggregated from these user watch lists by employing the rec-
ommendation algorithms of Youtube, we argue that choosing the most related videos is
similar to user decisions on which other social network users to follow and be friends with.
Validity of our assumption is then directly linked to how efficient these algorithms are in
finding related videos. In the past, the quality of Youtube algorithms has been observed
by a work on a Youtube dataset. In ([135]), Zhou et al. note that “YouTube recommenda-
tion helps viewers discover videos of their interest rather than popular videos only”. This
result implies that related videos are indeed reflective of the video’s content because same
users have shown interest in the same videos. [34] also find that Youtube provides a well
clustered network of videos. If the Youtube recommendation algorithms cannot effectively
find the most related videos, clustering would be poor (for a traditional social network
clustering would also be poor if social network users followed other users randomly). This
is also what we expect to see in a social network because of homophily (finding similar
nodes close to each other on the graph, and dissimilar nodes distant from each other).
A further important consideration is due to the fact that the network evolves in time.
Indeed, although a video itself is not a living entity and does not choose its related videos
list7, users’ video watching patterns change gradually in time. For instance, due to socio-
cultural issues some videos are more frequently viewed together. An example of this can be
Mitt Romney-Barack Obama videos which have become very relevant to each other start-
ing from the beginning of the US election campaign, and now appear together on Youtube
very often. This is the time dimension that we focused on. Therefore, videos, although
not related in the past, can be relevant to each other in the future. Our experiments
are about observing the network in time, and making predictions about new relationships
before videos become relevant, that is, before they are recommended by Youtube.
For computational complexity issues, we limited the graph size to a predefined number
of seed nodes and their relations. Starting from the oldest crawled Youtube videos and
6If there is no profile information, a generic list of celebrity accounts are offered.
7Related videos list of a video can not be determined by the user who uploaded the video:
http://support.google.com/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=92651
CHAPTER 3. USER SIMILARITY AND INTERACTIONS 50
Figure 3.8: Win ratios of NS against the other similarity measures for 100K seed nodes in
a trimmed network.
their related 20 videos, we construct a directed graph such that the number of nodes in the
graph is equal to a number s. As such, we stopped the graph creation when the number
of nodes reaches s.
To evaluate the impact of graph density in similarity measures, we further elaborate the
obtained graphs by removing nodes with less than 10 degrees. We will refer to this node
removal as “trimming”. As such, experiments have been conducted on graphs computed
on: (1) 100K seeds (s = 100k); (2) 100K seeds and trimmed; (3) 200K seeds; (4) 200K
seeds and trimmed.
Note that adopting the methodology introduced in Section 3.3 for the Youtube dataset
implies forecasting the creation of a relation between videos. As such, given an edge
between videos u and x in the Youtube dataset, we create the graph GT at the time instant
T just before the edge creation and compute the similarity measure between u and all its
strangers, x included.
Performance evaluation involves performance comparison of our network similarity
measure with the network similarity measures discussed before. Following the evalua-
tion methodology reported in Section 3.4.1, similarity values for all strangers of a node u
are computed according to PMI, L1, Cosine and our network similarity measure (NS).
Figure 3.8 shows the win ratio of our network similarity measure on a 100K seeds,
trimmed Youtube graph. The x-axis shows increasing network similarity values in [0.0,1.0].
Our measure performs better than all other measures, and just like in undirected Facebook
graph (see Figure 3.3), PMI performs better than L1 and Cosine similarity against our
measure. Win ratios against L1 and Cosine similarity measures stay above 0.5 most of the
time, whereas L1 is correlated with Cosine in performance.
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Seed Number Trimmed Number of predictions
100K No 29 130
100K Yes 19 379
200K No 43 816
200K Yes 29 098
Table 3.7: Number of future friends found in depth 2. Trimmed graphs contain fewer future
friends than untrimmed ones
Figure 3.9: Win ratios of NS against the other similarity measures for 100K seed nodes in
an untrimmed network
In Figure 3.9 we show the impact of a more sparse graph (i.e., 100K seeds, untrimmed
graph) on performance. Win ratios have been lowered around the middle section, but the
difference is not too big. This implies that edge density has not made a big difference in
performance. As a result, trimmed graphs can be favored when computational complexity
issues arise in such big datasets. However, when trimmed graphs lose many strangers
(friends of friends), the number of future friends which are found at depth two decreases.
As a result, measures produce fewer predictions, as presented in Table 3.7; 200K trimmed
Youtube graph produces only as many predictions as 100K untrimmed Youtube graph.
In Figures 3.10 and 3.11, we use a 200K seeded graph to see the impact of graph size on
performance evaluation. In the trimmed graph, Cosine similarity performance is worse than
it was in the 100K seed graphs, but PMI and L1 do not show a performance fluctuation
with PMI having the most stable performance in both 100K and 200K graphs.
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Figure 3.10: Win ratios of NS against the other similarity measures for 200K seed nodes
in a trimmed network
In Figure 3.11, untrimmed graph shows better performance for Cosine similarity. In-
deed, Cosine similarity is shown to perform poorly when the graph is sparse, whereas L1
performance increases for sparse graphs.
Experiments on Epinions
The Epinions data set ([88]) includes both network and profile information. User profile
information consists of subject ids associated with authored articles, where timestamped
ratings (+1, -1) represent graph edges. A user gives a +1 rating if he/she likes the content
or the behavior of a stranger (i.e., a two hop user) and would like to see more of what the
stranger does in the site. Social networks where edges can be weighted to show friendliness
or antagonism are called signed networks. If user u rates user x with 1, a trust relation is
said to be formed. If the rating is −1, a distrust relation is observed. We divide network
information into these two (trust/distrust) sets, and create graphs from each set. A mixed
set is also used to combine both trust and distrust graphs.
Due to computational costs, we restricted our network dataset to 498K edges, where
400K edges are timestamped with the first date in the dataset (i.e., 2001 / 01/10). In a 2
year period (2001/01/17 - 2003/08/07), 98K new edges have been added to the graph. Each
edge carries a trust (+1) or distrust (-1) sign. In creating the directed Epinions graph, we
consider a directed edge originating from user u to the rated user x with its corresponding
sign. In experiments, we try to predict these future edges based on the network information
of 400K initial edges among nodes. Experiments consisted of predicting 80K edges in the
trust network, and 18K edges in the distrust network. In Figure 3.12 predictions8 are
8In Graph theory, triadic closure is used to refer to predictions for such graphs where two pairs of nodes
have strong ties, and a weak tie among them is expected, i.e., the dashed line already exists or it is expected
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Figure 3.11: Win ratios of NS against the other similarity measures for 200K seed nodes









Figure 3.12: Trust, distrust and mixed relations on the graph. Dashed edges are the
predictions.
shown with dashed edges for all three graphs. Note that in the mixed graph, edges can
have trust or distrust (1,-1) weights.
In Figure 3.13, performance of our network similarity measure is shown for the distrust
graph. Overall we see that PMI, L1 and Cosine similarity measures show a poor perfor-
mance against our similarity measure. However, PMI performs better than L1 and Cosine
similarities. In Figure 3.14, we see a distinctly different performance shape for the trust
graph. Performance greatly varies in trust and distrust graphs, and our measure performs
much better in the distrust graph of Figure 3.13. We will defer the discussion on why this
behavior is observed to Section 3.5.2.
We also experimented with a mixed graph of trust and distrust edges. This helps us
build a denser graph where edges in a triadic closure can now have alternating trust and
distrust signs. Note that the number of predictions in the mixed prediction will be higher
than the total sum of closures in trust and distrust graphs. Performance for this graph is
shown in Figure 3.15, and it is very similar to what we had found for the trust graph.
to be formed in future. Our experiments try to predict this edge.
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Figure 3.13: Win ratios of NS against other similarity measures for Epinions distrust
network. X-axis values are increasing NS values
Figure 3.14: Win ratios of NS against other similarity measures for Epinions trust network
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Figure 3.15: Win ratios of NS against other similarity measures for combined Epinions
network
3.5.2 Comparison of Profile Similarity Measures on Directed Graphs
Similar to the undirected DBLP graph experiments, we start with the initial graph of
400K Epinions edges that are timestamped with the oldest data (i.e., 2001/01/10). For
the future edges of a 2.5 year period (2001 - 2003), we evaluated profile similarities of users
and strangers. In doing so, we used Occurrence Frequency (OF) and Goodall3 categorical
similarity measures in our profile similarity computations. We chose these two because in
Section 3.4.2 we found them to be the top two best performing measures in average rankings
of strangers. Figure 3.16 shows the results we had by employing these two measures.
Overall, +1 ratings (Trust) occur between less similar users, whereas -1 ratings (Dis-
trust) are given to higher similarity strangers. This user behavior differs from what we have
seen on undirected networks where similar users tend to create friendship edges between
them.
To understand this, semantics of this signed Epinions graph should be taken into ac-
count. Trust/distrust ratings are the result of stranger articles and content. We believe
that high similarity between two users indicate that they can judge each other’s articles
with more authority, and in less similarity users do not feel confident to rate articles with
-1 (Distrust). As a result, people tend to use -1 ratings for articles whose subjects are well
known to them.
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(a) Average profile similarity with Oc-
currence Frequency.
(b) Average profile similarity of
strangers with Goodall3 measure.
Figure 3.16: Figure shows average profile similarity as time progresses. The x-axis values
are number of months since a user first rated another Epinions user.
3.6 Absolute Performance Values
Until now, we have compared our similarity measures to other ones in the literature. In
this section, we will present the absolute performance of our similarity measures.
3.6.1 Profile Similarity
The absolute performance results for our profile similarity measure can give a better un-
derstanding of how much profile similarity can explain the probability of edge formation.
In Table 3.8 we give the results of our profile similarity measure in predicting next edges
on FBdata and DBLP datasets. In the first column, we give the percentage ranks, where
rank 0 shows the least likely strangers to become friends with a target user, whereas rank 1
shows new edges with the most likely strangers.9 The second and third columns show the
percentage of strangers that formed new edges with target users in the considered datasets.
For example, in FBdata, 9% of new edges were formed with the least likely strangers (rank
0), while this ratio is 31% for the DBLP data set. From this table we see that our profile
similarity measure works better for the Facebook dataset, with 11% of new friendships have
been established with the rank 1 strangers. The results for both the Facebook and DBLP
datasets show that a big percentage of new friends come from lower ranks. We see a similar
performance on the directed Epinions dataset for Trust and Distrust rankings. Table 3.9
shows that more than 30% of new friendships on both networks have been created with
strangers whose similarity values to target users are in [0, 0.05).
9 Values are rounded to two decimal points.
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Table 3.8: Profile similarity rankings for strangers of newly formed friendship edges on
Facebook and DBLP datasets.
Rank













Table 3.9: Profile similarity rankings for strangers of newly formed friendship edges on the
Epinions dataset.
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These results imply that profile similarity is not very powerful to predict new edges
when used alone, but this low performance is due to a combination of both missing profile
items and semantics of edge creation.
Missing profile items on datasets lower the performance of our measure because we have
no data to compute similarity. As a result, many strangers are given zero similarity, and
correspondingly zero ranks. In missing item values, Facebook dataset is the best dataset
with only 20% of users having blank profiles, whereas this number is 28% for the DBLP
data and as much as 35% for the Epinion dataset.
Semantics of edge creation on social networks also plays a role in how much of the profile
items are available before an edge is created. On Facebook, profiles are populated at the
beginning of memberships, and predicting new edges with these already entered profile
data is easier. On the other hand, DBLP profile information is populated by coauthoring
new papers; research field is learned after the edges/co-authorships are already formed.
If the researcher has not yet authored enough papers, profile similarity performs poorly
because it does not have enough profile information to predict new edges. 10
However, even with these issues profile similarity allows us to understand reasons behind
edge formation by discovering common profile values between users who formed the new
edge. Indeed, by using profile similarity, edge formation can be attributed to these common
profile items such as nationality, education or hometown. For this reason we believe that
even if profile similarity results in poor predictions, it provides a good way to understand
edge formation.
3.6.2 Network Similarity
In this section we will show the absolute performance of our network similarity measure on
all the datasets we considered. These performance values will be given in terms of ranks;
we will show the percentage of newly added friends with their corresponding rank values
among all strangers. Our similarity measures can then be judged by how much percent of
new friends were rank 1 strangers.
In Figure 3.17 we show the percentage of new friends and their corresponding ranks for
the DBLP dataset. Like all the other figures in this section, in Figure 3.17 the x-axis is
shown for the rank interval [0.8-1.0] for a better view. The y-axis gives the percentage of
strangers for their corresponding ranks on the x-axis. The figure shows that the prediction
of next friends is accurate 8% of the time (i.e., rank 1 strangers are added as friends 8% of
the time). These results also show that 20% of new friends are ranked within the interval
0.97-1.0.
Similarly, rankings for the Facebook dataset are given in Figure 3.18. Here we see that
Facebook results are better than DBLP results, because 33% of the time rank 1 strangers
are added as friends. This rate drops to 12% for rank 0.99 strangers. Despite this, on
Facebook 50% of new friends are ranked within the interval 0.97-1.0.
These results show that our network similarity measure is more efficient to predict new
10This problem is known as the cold start problem in recommender systems.
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Figure 3.17: Percentage of strangers of newly formed edges on the DBLP dataset by their
ranks according to NS.
Figure 3.18: Percentage of strangers of newly formed edges on the Facebook dataset by
their ranks according to NS.
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Figure 3.19: Percentage of strangers of newly formed edges on the Youtube dataset by
their ranks according to NS.
relations on the Facebook dataset than on the DBLP dataset. Although both networks
are undirected social networks, Facebook exhibits stronger homophily effects, i.e., friends
of friends tend to create more friendships.
Homophily effects are not limited to undirected graphs. In Figure 3.19, we see that the
Youtube dataset performance of our network similarity measure is comparable to Facebook
results (in Figure 3.18). For untrimmed and trimmed Youtube networks, 18% and 14% of
new friends can be predicted to be rank 1 strangers. In accordance with our comparative
results in Section 3.5.1, trimmed network performance versus untrimmed network perfor-
mance values do not seem to differ very much. This result shows that when computational
costs are considered, the Youtube network can be trimmed while still retaining a good
performance.
Strong homophily effects can also be seen on the directed Trust and Distrust networks
of Epinions. Figure 3.20 shows these rankings for newly formed edges between the target
users and their strangers. An interesting observation is that Distrust performance is better
than the trust performance.
In Section 3.5, we have shown the comparative performance of our network similarity
measure on the Epinions dataset. From Figures 3.13 and 3.14 we observed that distrust
prediction of our similarity measure performed better than it did for the trust prediction.
25% of distrust strangers who have rank 1 become friends with target users (i.e., in 25%
of the cases we correctly predict who will get a distrust rating from the user first). In
the trust network, this figure drops down to 22%. The distrust performance is also better
than the trust performance for all ranges. This result is interesting because, although
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Figure 3.20: Percentage of strangers of newly formed edges on the Epinions dataset by
their ranks according to NS.
trust has been used in transitive models with success, distrust transitivity can have mixed
performance results. For instance, in some settings on the same dataset [53] found that
one step propagation of distrust can help in predicting trust or distrust. Our experiments
also assume distrust propagation, but it is propagated for one step only (i.e., A distrusts
B, B distrusts C, hence A distrusts C).
From our experiments on profile similarity for the distrust network (see Figure 3.16),
we were able to observe that distrust propagates to the users with similar interests (i.e.,
from the target user to other users who write about the target users’s article categories).
As such, similar users create edges between themselves by rating each other’s articles. This
results in a denser network and increases the performance of our network similarity measure
because our measure takes into account these rating actions (ratings given by friends of
the target user) in the target user’s social graph.
As a result of our network and profile similarity experiments, we believe that there
is transitivity in the Epinions distrust network, but it is not the distrust notion per se
that propagates. Rather, the transitive notion is the expertise that users have in article
categories; user ratings of distrust reflect their capability to judge others’ work in categories
that are similar to theirs.
3.7 Discussion on Experimental Results
In this chapter we mentioned that edge formation on directed and undirected graphs fol-
lows different social network dynamics. Whereas consent of both users is required for a
friendship in undirected graphs, directed graphs do not have this requirement. As a result,
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friend nodes on undirected graphs are more similar in profile than they are in directed
graphs. This can be seen in Figure 3.6c, where we evaluated profile similarity of coau-
thors in an undirected DBLP graph. There are consistent high similarity values in the
graph throughout the years. This is because researchers need to work on related topics
to coauthor a paper. Similarly, the profile similarity experiments (Table 3.5) on the Face-
book dataset show that the Occurrence Frequency that emphasizes similarity of strangers
to users’ already existing friends has the best performance; new friends should either be
similar to the user, or they should be similar to user’s friends. Here the underlying notion
is that friends are a good indication of user characteristics on undirected networks.
This argument does not hold on directed graphs, because edges are not formed by
mutual consent. In the Epinions dataset, we found that similarity is very low compared
to undirected graphs (see Figure 3.16). Furthermore, profile similarity patterns are very
dependent on the sign of the edge; distrust ratings are given to more similar users, whereas
trust ratings are given to less similar users.
The correlation of profile and network similarities is also different on different types of
graphs. In undirected graphs we see that profile similarity is a good indicator of network
similarity, i.e., users with similar profile characteristics tend to be closer on the social graph
and they share mutual friends with the same characteristics. This fact helped the perfor-
mance of our network similarity measure, because the underlying notion in our network
similarity measure is that users create edges with strangers who are connected to a denser
community in their social graphs.
On directed graphs, the reason behind edge formation has a big impact on the cor-
relation between network and profile similarity. In the Epinions dataset, there are two
motivations; users rate strangers with trust to see more of what they do on the website,
whereas the distrust ratings are given to indicate that a stranger’s content and activity are
of no interest to the user. In Figure 3.13 we showed that our network similarity measure
performs better for the distrust graph. However, profile similarity for these new edges
is shown to be very low in Figure 3.16. Clearly, here network similarity provides more
information than profile similarity for the distrust graph.
However, in real life situations, the motivation for edge formation might be difficult
to know a priori. It is important that new techniques are devised to mine the graph
type and edge motivation from the dataset. This knowledge is vital to understand which
characteristics should be observed in similarity studies.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a method for evaluating social networks according to net-
work connections and profile attributes. We comparatively evaluated our measures on real
life datasets. Our work highlights how network types can influence interactions among
social network users, and what type of social network information can be used for different
network types.
This study can be extended along two main dimensions. First, studies can focus on the
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impact of friends on user interactions. As our experimental results show, friends of friends
constitute a big percentage of new friends, so we can assume that they increase interactions
of a target user. Friends can be modeled in such a way that their contribution to a target
user’s social interactions can be aggregated, and the impact of friends can be deduced.
Moreover, how network similarity implies profile similarity (or vice versa) can be further
studied. Specifically, by using network similarity, changes in profiles of users can be learned





Having an account in an Online Social Network (OSN) opens a path to opportunities but
it also brings about certain risks; social network users can be bullied, their pictures can be
stolen or their status posts can reach unwanted audiences. Even when profiles do not list
any information, social graphs can be analyzed to infer personal information. Despite all
these, social networks have hundreds of millions of users, because users think that positives
outweigh negatives and they maintain their online presence. However, this user attitude
is not totally care-free; individual cases of privacy breaches and their consequences have
been widely discussed in social media and privacy risks have only grown with time as social
networks have grown in size exponentially [24].
Several research efforts have been carried out to alleviate these problems, with the
results of some tools helping users to be more privacy-aware. Notable examples are
relationship-based access control mechanisms [30], tools on support of privacy preference
specification [45, 83], as well as more expressive privacy settings recently adopted by com-
mercial OSNs, like Facebook. However, despite the relevance of these proposals, we believe
there is still the lack of a conceptual model on top of which privacy tools have to be de-
signed. Central to this model, that should be the basis for any conscious user decision
about profile information disclosure, should be the concept of risk one might be exposed
when interacting with other OSN users.
The introduction of this concept, new in OSNs, is mainly motivated by the consideration
that a large amount of friendships in social networks are just virtual. Indeed, people
connected in an OSN very often have never met before establishing a relationship (or a
long period has passed before they keep in touch again in an OSN). However, several
events reported in the media testify that users establish virtual relationships with never-
met people without considering the consequences these new relationships might have for
their privacy and, some time, personal safety. Indeed, a new relationship in an OSN always
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implies the release of some personal information. In general, this release is controlled by
user privacy settings. Unfortunately, empirical studies show that social network users are
not used to specifying privacy settings, and very often they do not change the default
privacy settings that are very permissive [62, 23]. As a consequence, the creation of new
relationships without specifying the appropriate privacy settings might expose a user to
the risk of unconscious release of personal data. This is due to the fact that in almost all
OSNs users can reference resources of other users in their social graph; and it is generally
not possible or very difficult for a user to control the resources published by another user.
This uncontrolled information flow highlights the fact that creating a new relationship
might expose one to some privacy risk. In addition, as said before, new relationships with
never-met users might have most serious consequences, since social networks have drawn
the attention of sexual predators and child molesters, just to mention the worst.
Despite the possible serious consequences of the establishment of new relationships,
current situation is that social network users are poorly informed about their friends, and
with whom their friends keep company. Hugely popular social networks still assume that a
friend is someone with whom a user can share everything, and furthermore, that the user
can even share most of his/her profile information with friends of friends. Recommended
privacy settings are in accordance with this friend notion. For instance, on Facebook,
friends of friends are by default allowed to see most parts of a user profile.
To cope with these issues, we investigate a risk measure to help users in judging a
stranger (i.e., a never-met user) with whom they might establish a relationship so as to
be informed of how much it might potentially be risky, in terms of disclosure of private
information, to have interactions with him/her. In defining the proposed measure we made
several design choices, inspired by real cases. The first is that risk evaluation is impacted by
several different dimensions, whose importance may greatly vary from user to user. Indeed,
different from other scenarios where user risk evaluation can be made by a unique trusted
entity (e.g., a bank, an insurance company) by processing profile information and users’ past
activities, we believe that in OSNs user risk attitude should also be taken into consideration.
As such, we adopt a solution closer to the social computing paradigm, where rather than
a trust entity judging social network users, we prefer the judgments given by community
members. This paradigm has resulted to be a winner choice in other communities, where
knowledge deriving from the community is used to take decisions, such as recommendation
systems, collaborative filtering, and so on. To this end, we try to assess the risk of a
stranger through the eyes of the user, hence the risk score is user-dependent and subjective.
Thus, our risk measure captures the personal judgment that a user, hereafter called owner,
expresses on a stranger Y with respect to his/her risk. However, to help owners in forming
their own opinion about risk, we provide them with objective information about strangers.
More precisely, inspired by homophily and heterophily theories, we provide information on
similarity (see Chapter 3) between owner and the stranger as well as the benefits owner
might have in terms of new information from strangers profile he/she might be authorized
to access. We believe that, by using this information, users are able to evaluate the trade-off
between similarities and benefits so as to estimate the risk of a stranger.
Other design choices for our risk measure are motivated by social network statistics,
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which show that new relationships are mainly established among contacts of direct friends
(i.e., second level friends). As such, we focus on second hop connections which act as
strangers in the rest of this chapter. Statistics also show that this set of users can be very
large (as an example, according to Facebook statistics each user has 16,900 strangers on
the average). This necessitates a prediction technique, since asking an owner to insert risk
judgments for each stranger is unfeasible. To this purpose, we adopt an active learning
process for risk estimation, where owner risk attitude is learned from few required inter-
actions. According to the proposed learning algorithm, once the classifier is built with the
training data (i.e., the owner risk labels), the system can predict risk labels of all those
strangers that were not included in the training data without any user intervention.
The risk estimation process discussed here has been developed into a Facebook appli-
cation and tested on real Facebook data. Our experiments show that with limited user
involvement, we can get accurate risk estimation. In particular, as experiments in Section
4.4 show, we are able to correctly predict risk labels with 83.38% of accuracy. Further-
more, in Section 4.4 we discuss how user decisions in assigning risk levels are affected by
the characteristics of other social network users.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a framework for computing
OSN users’ privacy risks which takes into account a rich set of dimensions, ranging from
structural properties of the social graph and profile similarity, to benefits arising from user
interactions and subjective risk perception.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss our risk measure in
Section 4.2, whereas Section 4.3 details the three phases of the risk learning process. In
Section 4.4 we discuss the performance of risk computation.
4.2 How to measure risk
In designing the proposed risk measure we take into account several design principles that
have been inspired from social network theory. In the following, we discuss these principles
and our assumptions, whereas in Section 4.3 we present our approach to estimate risk levels
according to them.
Strangers. As mentioned in the introduction, social network users tend to interact
and create new relationships with those that are close to them in the social network graph
[92, 68]. More precisely, given a social network user, hereafter owner, we compute risk
levels for those users that are connected to a friend of owner’s friends. In the following, we
will refer to these second-level contacts as strangers.
Subjective risk perception. Risk attitude has been found to be very subjective
[2, 47]. As such, we do not believe that it is possible to automatically estimate the risk
just on the basis of the characteristics of a user social graph and/or strangers’ profiles.
In contrast, we believe that we need to take into account also users’ risk attitude. To
cope with this issue, during the first phase of our risk estimation process we ask for owner
feedback. More precisely, we ask users to provide risk judgments for few selected strangers
from the social graph. Then, from the collected risk judgments, the process learns how to
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estimate risk levels of the remaining strangers.
Risk judgment. Since we want to estimate how much it might be risky to interact
with a stranger, the risk notion we want to model is related to social interactions. We
believe that to receive an educated risk estimation for a given stranger, we should provide
the owner with meaningful information that can help him/her to make a correct decision.
To determine what kind of information should be provided to owners, we take into account
two key tendencies that, according to social network theory, regulate social interactions.
Homophily. This is the tendency of people to interact with those that are similar to
them [92]. In social networks, users who are similar along certain attributes, such as gender,
education and hometown, tend to create new friendship links. Furthermore, as previously
discussed, users create new friendship links with others who are closer to them on the social
graph.
To take homophily into account, we provide owner with information on how much the
stranger, for which the risk judgment is required, is similar to him/her. This information
is provided by means of a ‘similarity measure’. It is worth noting that literature offers
several similarity measures [118], we adopt a similarity function that considers both network
similarity (e.g., information on owner and strangers mutual friends), as well as profile
similarity (e.g., how many common/similar profile attributes they have).
Benefits. In contrast to homophily, heterophily is the tendency to interact with people
that are not similar to you [113]. In social networks, this tendency is mainly motivated by
the fact that social interactions (e.g., creation of new relationships with a stranger) might
give owner some benefits in terms of acquaintance of new information (e.g., strangers profile
and social graph).
An illustrious example of heterophily can be observed on the social network Twitter.
Twitter users do not need approval from others before they can ‘follow’ them and view
their status posts. This allows users to follow people whenever they can get benefits, and,
in many cases, followed users are distinctly different from the followers in their profile and
social graph. We wish to keep also this tendency into account, and therefore we provide
owner with information on which benefits he/she might get in starting social interactions
with the stranger.
To have a measure of benefits, the owner assigns an importance coefficient θi for each







(θi × Vs(i, o))
where M is the set of benefit items on the profile of s (e.g., photos, friends, wall), θi is the
importance of being able to see item i, and Vs(i, o) = 1, if item i of the profile of s is visible
to the owner, Vs(i, o) = 0, otherwise.
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4.3 Risk Learning Process
Our risk learning process relies on owner feedback to take into account the subjective nature
of risk. Feedback is gathered as owner feeling/estimation about how much it could be risky
to start social interactions with a given stranger. Since the owner might not know the
stranger, risk estimation is based both on the similarity the stranger has with the owner
and the benefits he/she might provide to the owner (cfr. the principles discussed in the
previous section). The benefits are considered as a pay-off for showing personal data to
strangers. This data exposure brings a sense of privacy loss, and the benefits must weigh
more than the perceived privacy loss. Collected risk judgments, hereafter risk labels, are
then used to learn owner risk attitude and predict risk estimation for those strangers for
which the owner does not provide a direct judgment.
The proposed risk learning process is based on supervised learning techniques [69],
where, by analyzing training instances (i.e., few labeled instances) it is possible to generate
a classifier to predict labels for unlabeled instances. In designing the supervised learning
process to be adopted for risk estimation we have considered two main issues. The first
is the potentially big number of strangers an owner might have. As an example, in our
experiments the average count of strangers per owner is 3,661.
Another important factor is the dynamic nature of the owner’s social graph, in that
stranger connections might change very fast. These changes are due to acquisition of
new strangers (i.e., some friends create new contacts) as well as new connections between
strangers themselves, which might impact their similarity measures with the owner. This
means that in our scenario it is not efficient to adopt a pre-defined and fixed training set.
Rather, it is preferable to select the training set on the fly so that changes in the social graph
are immediately reflected, and the number of required data to be labeled (i.e., strangers)
can be reduced as the accuracy of predictions improves. Due to these requirements, from
the many existing supervised learning models, we choose the active learning paradigm [117],
where the learning phase is computed in several rounds. During each round an annotator
(i.e., the owner) is interactively queried for labels (i.e., risk judgments) of selected unlabeled
data samples (i.e., unlabeled strangers).
Using active learning in our context implies that initially all strangers belong to the set
of unlabeled strangers. In each round, the risk learning process asks the owner to give risk
labels to a selection of the most informative strangers1 among those not labeled, which are
then moved into the labeled strangers set. Then, collected labels are used by a classifier to
predict labels for unlabeled strangers. Rounds of labeling and prediction continue until a
good level of prediction is met, where the required level is given as input by the owner to
take into account different risk attitude. The learning process is summarized in Figure 4.1.
To adopt active learning in our scenario, we need to cope with several issues. (1) In
order to really get the owner risk attitude, the learning process has to pose an appropriate
question to the owner, so as to get a meaningful feedback with respect to his/her risk
1Most informative strangers are selected according to a clustering-based approach explained in Section
4.3.2.
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Figure 4.1: Risk learning process
perception. Possible risk label values have to be carefully designed too. (2) Particular
attention has to be paid to the strategy for the most informative strangers selection, which
should be tailored to the social network scenario. (3) A good classifier should be chosen to
predict risk labels for unlabeled strangers. (4) Finally, we need to design stopping criteria,
which ensure the required accuracy.
All the above issues are discussed in the rest of the section.
4.3.1 Risk Labels
In order to explain owners that our risk estimation is based on similarity and benefits, we
query the owner for the risk level of a stranger with the following question:
“You and stranger name are x/100 similar and he/she provides you y/100 benefits in
terms of information you are allowed to see now on his/her Facebook profile. Do you
think it might be risky to establish a relationship with stranger name? Please respond
by considering how much you are similar to stranger name and that, after you become
friends of him/her, benefits might increase as you might be allowed to see more resources
in addition to his/her profile, e.g., his/her posts, photos, if privacy settings allow you.”
Rather than allowing owners to select any value in [0,1], we give them only three options
for risk labels, namely very risky=3 , risky=2, and not risky=1. We believe that these three
values are more easily understandable by average OSN users.
4.3.2 Stranger sampling
The literature offers several methods for sampling selection (see e.g., [117] for a survey).
Among these, we are interested in pool-based criteria according to which data to be labeled
in each round are greedily selected from the pool of unlabeled strangers.
Our idea is to cluster strangers based on their network connections and profiles, so as to
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generate a set of pools. Thus, the set of strangers is divided into a set of disjoint pools Pst
from which a number of strangers are randomly selected at each round i to be labeled by
the owner. Therefore, at each round i each pool P ∈ Pst has associated the corresponding
set of labeled strangers List as well as the gathered labels L
i, whereas U ist denotes the set of
unlabeled strangers. Then, based on labels in Li the classifier predicts labels for unlabeled
strangers in U ist. The process is iterated until the required accuracy in labeling prediction
is met in the corresponding pool P .
Pools are defined by clustering strangers according to two dimensions. The first takes
into account how much a stranger is connected to the owner in the network. Therefore,
we create a first-level grouping based on strangers’ network similarity with the owner as
follows:
Definition 7 (Network similarity groups) Let So be the set of strangers for a given
owner o. Let NS be a function returning the network similarity between o and s ∈ So,
NS(o, s) ∈ [0,1]. The Network Similarity Groups for o (NSG) consists of α disjoint sets
of strangers nsg1, . . . , nsgα, such that for each x ∈ {1, . . . , α}, nsgx = {si ∈ So | x−1α ≤
NS(o, si) <
x
α and 0 < x ≤ α}.
2
To estimate the network similarity between owner o and a stranger s, we use our
measure NS() defined in 3. Unlike existing similarity measures [118] which only consider
mutual friends of the owner and a stranger, the measure works by also considering the
connections among mutual friends. If the stranger is connected to a dense community
around the owner, the measure returns a higher similarity value.
Additional knowledge that can help in defining stranger pools is the one contained in
OSN user profiles. Indeed, these can be used to further refine network similarity groups,
so as to cluster similar strangers together, which we expect to improve label prediction
accuracy. Therefore, the first-level groups of strangers are based on network similarity
with the owner, whereas the second-level groups of strangers within the same network
similarity group are determined according to their mutual profile similarity.
In selecting the algorithm for profile-based clustering [49] that better fits our scenario,
we have to take into account that (1) social network profiles mainly contain categorical data
(such as hometown, gender and education); (2) it might be required to perform profile-
based clustering several times, since we need to generate separate profile clusters for each
network similarity group. Due to these requirements, we selected the Squeezer algorithm
[56]. This is a clustering algorithm for categorical data that makes only one pass on the
data set, and this helps us to deal with computational complexity issues when there are
thousands of strangers in a network similarity group. A further benefit of Squeezer is
that it allows us to customize clustering by associating different weights with each profile
item (e.g., age, hometown, educations). As it will be discussed in the section reporting
experiments, these weights help us in catching the relevance of some profile items over
the others while grouping strangers. In order to apply Squeezer to our scenario, we have
adapted it as follows. Given a network similarity group nsg, the algorithm starts with the
2We defer the discussion on α value to the experimental results section.
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first stranger as a profile similarity cluster psg and iterates over each stranger s ∈ nsg. An
overall similarity of stranger s with profile similarity cluster psg is computed by weighted
averaging all profile attribute similarities. More precisely, to find the similarity of a stranger
to a psg, the algorithm checks how many strangers from psg have the same value as s for
each profile attribute. Stranger s is put into the most similar cluster. If no similar cluster
can be found, that is, the similarity is below a given threshold, the stranger s itself creates
a new cluster. We have adapted the similarity measure defined in [56] for relational tuples,
to profile attributes as follows.
Definition 8 (Profile Similarity) Let So be the set of strangers for a given owner o. Let
nsg be a network similarity group generated on So. Let c be a subset of strangers in nsg
(i.e., a cluster) and s be a stranger such that s /∈ c. Let PA be the set of profile attributes,
we denote with s.pai the value of the i-th attribute in s profile, where i ∈ |PA|. The profile









where wi is the weight associated with the i-th profile attribute, V ALpai(c) is the set of
values for attribute pai in the profiles of strangers in c, and Sup(x) = |{si ∈ c|si.pai = x}|
returns the support of attribute x.
By using the above profile similarity definition in Squeezer, we define the second-level
grouping obtaining thus the set of network and profile based stranger pools Pst, defined as
follows.
Definition 9 (Network and profile based pools) Let So be the set of strangers for a
given owner o. Let α and β be two parameters. Let NSG be the set of α network similarity
groups generated according to Definition 7. For each nsg ∈ NSG, let Squeezer(nsg, β) be
the set of profile-based clusters formed on nsg by algorithm Squeezer using the similarity
measure in Definition 8 and β as similarity threshold to create a new cluster. The set of
disjoined pools Pst on So is given by
⋃
nsg∈NSG Squeezer(nsg, β).
Figure 4.2 graphically depicts the resulting network and profile based pools.
Up to this point, we explained how strangers can be grouped so that sampling can be
done. Next we will detail the prediction process which is performed over each distinct pool,
and the related termination condition. Therefore, in what follows we explain the process
for a given network and profile based pool P ∈ Pst.
4.3.3 Classifier
In searching a classifier for our scenario, we focused on those tailored for network data.
In this field, literature offers several classifiers, among these we selected the graph based
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Figure 4.2: Network and profile based pools
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approach by Zhu et al. [137]. This is a graph based classifier that works well with few
labeled samples, and this complies with our need to reduce labeling efforts.
According to Zhu’s approach, both labeled and unlabeled strangers are represented as
nodes in a graph, where each pair of nodes is connected by a weighted edge. Weights
represent the similarity according to the Euclidean similarity metric. The authors note
that different similarity metrics can be used in different settings. In our scenario data
are categorical, so we use edge weights based on strangers’ profile similarity. To compute
this similarity, we adopt the profile similarity function PS() defined in 3 which takes as
input two profiles. For each attribute, if values are identical on both profiles the attribute
similarity is set to 1. If they are non-identical, a non-zero value is computed by considering
the frequency of the item values in the data set (i.e., the profiles in the considered pool).
We refer the reader to 3 for more details.
After weights have been computed, the classifier predicts similar labels for similar neigh-
bors on the graph, by exploiting the random walk strategy presented in [137].
In our privacy context, erroneous predictions can have two types of consequences; a
stranger’s label can be predicted lower or higher than what the owner would give. Higher
label prediction poses no immediate threat to privacy; it only calls for more vigilance. On
the other hand, lower prediction can have the system assume that the owner is safe when
there is a real privacy threat.
4.3.4 Termination
In general, the risk learning process aims at soliciting owner labels till a good accuracy is
reached. Accuracy can be estimated by comparing the predicted labels against the labels
given by the owner. If the accuracy is low, we can ask owner to continue labeling. In
the case of a good accuracy value, we can stop and spare owner effort in labeling. Since
accuracy validation requires owner effort (i.e., owner labeling), we need to stop the process
even if not all predicted labels have been validated against owner labels.
Several measures have been proposed to understand when to stop labeling when all pre-
dictions cannot be validated [136]. Among these, we chose the classification change prin-
ciple. Classification change looks into predicted labels of strangers in consecutive rounds.
If predicted labels do not change in these rounds, we conclude that further owner labeling
will not change them as well and stop owner labeling. In what follows, we give more details
on the adopted accuracy and stabilization measures.
Accuracy. The basic idea to estimate accuracy is to compute the root mean square
error between labels predicted by the classifier and labels given by the owner for the same
set of strangers. This error can be iteratively computed. More precisely, in each round ri,
the learning process asks the owner to give risk labels for some strangers s for which labels
have been already predicted in previous round ri−1. The error is computed as the root
mean square between the predicted and owner-defined labels.
Definition 10 (Root Mean Square Error) Let P ∈ Pst be a network and profile based
pool, let U ist and L
i
st be the subsets of P denoting, respectively, the set of unlabeled strangers
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and the set of strangers for which the owner has given a risk label at round ri. Moreover,
let Li be the set of collected owner labels for pool P till round ri, and L̂
i
st be the set of
predicted labels for strangers in U ist. Let S be a set of strangers selected from those that
have been labeled at round ri+1 (i.e., from L
i+1
st \ List), where, for each s ∈ S, L̂(s)i and
L(s)i+1 denote the label for s predicted at round ri and the label given by owner at round







Since risk labels have values in the range [1,3] (i.e., very risky=3, risky=2, not risky=1),
the root mean square error can have a value in [0,2], where 0 implies that all the predictions
were correct.
Stabilization. For employing classification change in our unvalidated predictions, we
solicit owner to give a confidence value c ∈ [0,100], which is then used as a tolerance value
for the classification change, as the following definition clarifies.
Definition 11 (Classification Change) Let P ∈ Pst be a network and profile based pool,
and let L̂(s)i and L̂(s)i+1 be labels for stranger s ∈ P predicted at round ri and ri+1,
respectively. Let c be the confidence value selected by owner o. We say that P is stabilized
according to confidence c if, for all s ∈ P , the following condition does not hold:
L̂(s)i+1 − L̂(s)i ≥ (Lmax − Lmin)× (100− c)
100
where Lmax and Lmin are the lower and upper bound of the labels range.
Note that, if the owner wants to manually label all strangers, the confidence value can
be set as c = 100.
Stopping Condition. On the one hand, accuracy helps in validating label predictions,
but it requires owner effort. On the other hand, stabilization in predicted labels does not
guarantee accuracy in labeling; it merely informs us that further labeling by the owner
will not change predicted labels. To keep into account both these aspects, we adopt a
stopping condition that combines accuracy and stabilization. That is, we stop the risk
learning process when risk labels are predicted with a good accuracy (i.e., RMSE between
owner given and predicted labels has to be less than 0.5) and for at least n rounds there
should be no classification changes with a confidence c selected by the owner, where n is a
system-defined parameter.
4.4 Experiments on Facebook data
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of the proposed risk measure and related learning
process. At this aim, we conducted several experiments to validate that our proposed risk
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Figure 4.3: Snapshot from the extension
measure indeed captures the risk perception of social network users and that the learning
process correctly predicts strangers’ risk labels. Before giving the details of experiments,
we introduce the dataset that has been used.
4.4.1 Facebook Dataset
To perform the experiments on Facebook real data, we developed a Facebook application
(called Sight3). The aim of this application is to: 1) gather strangers’ information, so as to
generate the network and profile based pools, 2) ask owner (i.e., the social network user that
launched the application) risk labels only for selected strangers, on the basis of similarities
and benefits. To perform this last task we developed a Google Chrome extension. Due to
Facebook API limitations we cannot retrieve the complete social graph at once. Rather, we
listen owner profile to see friends’ interactions (e.g., tagging, posting) and, once a friend of
friend is found, we query Facebook for its mutual friends/profile information. According to
our experiments, the time period to learn a big portion of the social graph (4,000 strangers)
can take up to 1 week. However, the user can start label and learn about the risk since
the first day. In our experiments, in 2 months we were able to discover around 30,000
strangers.
Through Sight, owner can specify the benefit coefficients for each single item (e.g.,
profile attributes, wall, photos), as well as the confidence he/she wishes to reach. We list
received benefits on the extension interface, along with the similarity value of the selected
strangers, and ask the owner our query from Section 4.3.1. A snapshot from the extension
interface is shown in Figure 4.3.
During the test, Sight application has been used by 47 Facebook users, where 32 were
3http://www.facebook.com/developers/apps.php?app id= 103656703030138
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males and 15 were females, all aged in the range [18-35]. 17 of the users were from Turkey,
5 from Italy, 9 from USA, 1 from India, and 7 from Poland.4 We collected thus a total of
172,091 stranger profiles, and 4,013 owner-defined risk labels. On the average, owners have
3,661 strangers and gave 86 risk labels.
4.4.2 Parameters setting
The first couple of parameters are used to customize the creation of network and profile
based pools. These are α and β. We recall that the first determines the number of network
similarity groups computed using network similarity function NS(). As this function returns
value in [0,1], for this first set of experiments, for simplicity, we have set α=10, that should
represent 10% of strangers for each network similarity group under the assumption that
strangers follow a uniform distribution w.r.t. their network similarity with owner.
However, Figure 4.4 reports that stranger distribution in network similarity groups is
not uniform. More precisely, in the x-axis network similarity groups are ordered based
on increasing network similarity values. Thus, for example strangers in the 3rd group
have higher network similarity with owner than strangers in the 2nd network similarity
group. Figure 4.4 highlights that most of the strangers are weakly connected with owners.
Moreover, we found that no stranger has network similarity values greater than 0.6, so in
the following we do not report experiments for these network similarity groups.
In contrast, β represents the threshold for the creation of a new profile based cluster, so
it constraints the number of profile based clusters generated by Squeezer over each network
similarity group. Thus, increasing β could result in too many profile based clusters each
of which with few strangers, which implies too many distinct learning processes to be
executed. To avoid this situation, we select β=0.4.
A further parameter is related to the number of strangers that are required to be
labeled by the owner in each round, which in these experiments have been set to 3, to keep
minimum the owner effort. Finally, a cluster is considered stabilized when classification
change does not happen in 2 rounds of labeling (i.e., parameter n in Section 4.3.4).
4.4.3 Risk learning process
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed risk learning process we run several
experiments.
Risk Label Prediction. As explained in Section 4.3.4, the risk learning process stops
when both the accuracy and stabilization conditions hold. We recall that if both these hold
it means that risk labels are predicted with a good accuracy (i.e., RMSE between owner
and predicted labels is less than 0.5) and for at least 2 rounds there is no classification
changes with a confidence c selected by the owner.
At the average, the confidence selected by our 47 users is about 80% (i.e., 78,39). With
these confidence values, experiments highlight that labels prediction stabilize in about 3
rounds (i.e., 3,29 is the average).
4The statistics have been computed on those available user profiles.



















Figure 4.4: Stranger count for network similarity groups
Whilst these results confirm that we have good accuracy (an RMSE error less than 0.5),
we are also interested in those predicted labels that exactly match what the owner would
have given (i.e., L̂(s)i+1 = L(s)i). To have this estimation, during the accuracy evaluation,
we count the number of predicted labels that match the owner labels. The promising result
is that 83,36% of predicted labels exactly match the owner labels.
Stranger sampling. To validate the strategy adopted for pool generation, we perform
experiments to compare network and profile based pools (NPP) against pools generated
by only considering network similarity (NSP).
The impact of profile similarity grouping can be seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, showing
better results for NPP in terms of root mean square error and stabilization per round.
4.4.4 Risk Measure
As discussed in Section 4.2, risk labels are based on similarity and benefits. In the fol-
lowing experimental setting, we will evaluate how these two factors affect the owner’s risk
judgment.
Network and Profile Similarity. We first consider network similarity. In creating
network similarity groups, we wanted to capture how owner judgment is affected by network
connections. Our data shows that some strangers can have more than 40 mutual friends
with an owner. Hence, with increasing network similarity we assume that the possibility
of an acquaintance between owner and stranger increases. We expect that this increasing
possibility is reflected in lower assigned risky labels. Indeed, Figure 4.7 shows that with
increasing network similarity, the percentage of very risky labels in network similarity
groups consistently decreases.
Along with network similarity, we evaluated the importance of stranger profile similarity
in owner labeling. To this purpose, we look for patterns in profile attributes of strangers
that are assigned by owner to the same risk labels, so to determine how much each stranger
profile attribute affects owner decision. As an example, if risk labels given by owner show
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Figure 4.5: Error rate by rounds for NPP and NSP pools.
Figure 4.6: Average number of unstabilized labels for NPP and NSP pools.
CHAPTER 4. EXPLAINING PRIVACY WITH INTERACTIONS 79
Figure 4.7: Percentage of very risky strangers in network similarity groups
a pattern with gender (e.g., all males are labeled as very risky), we can infer that gender
is an important attribute in owner decision. In information theory, information gain ratio
[86] is used to capture the importance of a variable in decision trees. More precisely, a
high information gain ratio for a profile attribute implies a reduction in entropy5 caused
by attribute value. A higher gain ratio item carries more information in understanding the
rationale behind owner labeling (e.g., all males are risky).
In our setting, we use three profile attributes for clustering with Squeezer algorithm.
These are gender, last name and locale, where this latter denotes Facebook web interface
language of the owner. For example, English speaking owners from USA have EN US
locale, while owners from Great Britain have EN GB locale.
Definition 12 (Attribute importance) Given a profile attribute pai ∈ PA, we estimate





where IGR(pai) denotes information gain ratio of attribute pai.
In Table 4.1, we show profile attribute importance for our owners in an ordered list,
where I1 refers to the most important profile attribute (highest information gain ratio),
and I3 refers to the least important attribute. For example, in the table, values in Ii-th
column and gender row correspond to the number of owners for which gender is the i-th
most important item. As highlighted in the table, gender has the biggest average weight
5Here we refer to the entropy of label distribution in three risk classes (i.e., very risky, risky, not risky).
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Table 4.1: Profile attributes importance
I1 I2 I3 Avg Imp.
gender 34 12 1 0.6231
locale 13 33 1 0.3226
last name 0 2 45 0.0542
Table 4.2: Mined importance of benefits
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 Avg Imp.
photo 21 8 6 4 3 0 5 0.27
education 11 9 4 3 10 4 6 0.143
work 8 7 9 7 5 7 4 0.140
friends 2 10 7 6 6 8 8 0.13
hometown 0 7 9 11 6 9 5 0.11
location 1 4 8 9 11 8 6 0.092
wall 4 2 4 7 6 11 13 0.091
for owners, and for 34 owners it is the most important item (I1). Gender is followed by
locale, and last name. Although last name has low average weight, it is more important
than locale for two owners.
Benefits. The discussion on similarity aimed at finding similarity patterns in owners’
risk judgments. Now we will look at what benefit patterns can be found in owners’ risk
judgment. More precisely, we adopt for benefit items the same importance definition from
information gain ratio (Definition 12).
Whereas in similarity we have categorical item values such as gender:male, in benefits
we work with visibility values such as photos:1. Here item values 0 and 1 correspond to
visibility:false and visibility:true, respectively on stranger profiles.
In line with importance of items in similarity, we found importance of benefits in owners’
risk judgment. In Table 4.2 we show the average importance as well as the order of items’
importance. As reported, photos are considered the most important benefit item for 21
users, followed by education and work. Home wall has the least average importance, but
for 4 owners it is the most important benefit.
According to our benefit measure, we asked owners to give a θ weight to each benefit
item. In Table 4.3 those θ weights are shown. When comparing these weights to the ones
we found in Table 4.2, we see that home wall benefit is given a low importance in both
tables and some other weights are correlated. The relevant issue this table highlights is
that for some benefit items it is better to use system suggested weights.
Another aspect of benefits is related to stranger profile attributes, as some patterns
can be found with respect to the benefits they provide to owners. On social networks,
gender of a stranger has been known to affect the visibility of profile items. In [47], Fogel
et al. show that females have stricter privacy settings than males. As a result, the benefits
they provide as strangers are lower than those of male users. To understand how provided
benefits change with gender, we computed visibility of profile items based on gender. In
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Table 4.4: Item visibility for different genders
wall photo friend loc. edu. work hometown
male 25 % 88 % 56 % 42 % 35 % 20 % 41%
female 16 % 87 % 47 % 32 % 28 % 12 % 30%
Table 4.4, female strangers are shown to have lower visibility values for profile items.
However, in photos male and female strangers do not show a big difference and visibility
is almost the same for both genders. In Fogel’s study, social network users were asked this
question: Do you include a picture of yourself on your profile?. This picture of yourself
can be the profile picture, or a picture in photo albums. In our experiment, the photos are
photo albums on Facebook, excluding a profile picture. Fogel reports that the answer to
the asked question was yes for 90.4% of males, and 81.6% of females. In our experiment, we
found the visibility of photos to 88% and 87% for males and females, respectively. However,
in our experiments we could not check if the visible photos on Facebook were self-pictures.
Visibility percentages can be lower when non personal photos are excluded.
Similar to male/female difference, benefits show a pattern with locale values. In Table
4.5 we show visibility of profile items for strangers from 7 locales (TR:Turkey, DE:Germany,
US:USA, IT:Italy, GB:Britain,ES:Spain, PL:Poland). Work has the lowest visibility among
items.
It is interesting to note that although home walls are considered very private and hidden,
home was one of the lowest importance items in both Tables 4.3 and 4.2. It seems that
social network users do not share their walls with strangers, but they are also not interested
in other strangers’ walls. Photos have very high visibility among all locales while friends list
visibility ranges from 41% to 72%. In Table 4.5 we can also see some correlation between
locales. Visibility of profile items do not change greatly between IT and ES locales and the
difference between percentages is around 5%.
4.5 Conclusions
We have proposed a measure for estimating the risk, in terms of disclosure of personal
information, of interacting with OSN users. Risk levels are computed for 2 hop connections
by taking into account both similarity and benefit metrics as well as user risk attitude. They
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Table 4.5: Visibility of profile items for different locale strangers
wall photo friend loc. edu. work hometown
TR 20% 84% 41% 36% 31% 15% 32%
DE 20% 77% 46% 34% 17% 17% 34%
US 17% 89% 52% 42% 34% 18% 37%
IT 27% 92% 68% 32% 38% 14% 41%
GB 12% 91% 46% 38% 25% 17% 32%
ES 22% 87% 63% 37% 28% 13% 37%
PL 31% 95% 72% 33% 23% 13% 31%
are computed through an active learning process, where owner risk attitude is learned from
few required interactions. The initial experiments we have performed show the effectiveness
of our proposal. We plan to extend this work along several directions. First, we plan
to extend our tests to a greater data set and to data sets coming from different social
networks. Moreover, we plan to develop techniques to mine from the data most of the
values for the parameters on which our learning process relies. Finally, we envision a
variety of applications for our risk labels that we would like to explore in the future, such




Users register on social networks to keep in touch with friends, as well as to meet with
new people. Research works have shown that a big majority of people that we meet online
and add as friends are not random social network users; these people are introduced into
our social graph by friends. Although friends can enrich the social graph of users, they
can also be a source of privacy risk, because a new relationship always implies the release
of some personal information to the new friend as well as to friends of the new friend,
which are strangers for the user. This problem is aggravated by the fact that users can
reference resources of other users in their social graph; and make it very difficult to control
the resources published by a user. This uncontrolled information flow highlights the fact
that creating a new relationship might expose users to some privacy risks.
We cannot assume that friends will make the right choices about friendships, because
friends may have a different view on people they want to be friends with. Considering this,
privacy of a social network user should be protected by building a model that observes
friendship choices of friends, and assigns a risk label to friends accordingly. Such a model
requires knowing a user’s perception on the risks of friends of friends. We made a first effort
in this direction in Chapter 4 by proposing a risk model to learn risk labels of strangers by
considering several dimensions. To validate the model, we developed a browser extension
showing for each stranger (i) his/her profile features, (ii) his/her privacy settings, and (iii)
mutual friends. Based on this information, the user is asked to give a risk label l ∈ {1, 2, 3}
to the stranger. These risk labels correspond to not risky, risky and very risky classification
of a stranger. Through the extension, 47 users (32 male, 15 female users) have labeled 4013
strangers. However, we did not consider risk of friends.
This new work starts with considering two factors in assigned risk labels. First,
strangers can be risky only because of their profile features. Second, a friend himself
can increase or decrease the risk of a stranger. Increases and decreases will be termed
as negative and positive friend impacts, respectively. In any case, if a risky stranger is
introduced into the user’s social graph it is because of his/her friendship with a friend.
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However, determining the friend impacts can help us to determine which privacy actions
should be taken to avoid data disclosure. We aim at learning how risk labels are assigned
to strangers depending only on their profile features, and how much a friend can impact
(i.e., increase or decrease) these labels. If strangers are risky just because of their profile
features, privacy settings can be restricted to avoid only these strangers. On the other
hand, if a friend increases the risk labels of strangers, all of his/her strangers should be
avoided.
In Section 5.2 we explain the building blocks of our model and Section 5.3 shows
how we use our dataset efficiently. In Section 5.4 we discuss the role profile features in
risk labels, and in Section 5.5 we show how impacts of friends are modeled. Section 5.6
explains finding risk labels of friends from friend impacts, and in Section 5.7 we give the
experimental results.
5.2 Overall Approach
We will start this section by explaining the terminology that will be used. In what follows,
on a social graph Gu, 1 hop distance nodes from u are called friends of u, and 2 hop distance
nodes are called strangers of u, i.e., strangers of user u are friends of friends of u. We will
denote all strangers of user u with Su, and risk label of each stranger s ∈ Su that was
labeled by u will be denoted as lus ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
A social network G = (N,E, Profiles) is a collection of N nodes and E ⊆ N × N
undirected edges. Profiles is a set of profiles, one for each node n ∈ {1, ..., |N |}. A social
graph Gu = (V,R, F ) is constructed from the social network G for each user u ∈ N , such
that, the node set V = {∀n ∈ N |distance(n, u) ≤ 2}. Nodes in Gu consist of friends and
strangers of u. Similarly, edge set R consists of all edges in G among nodes in V . Each
node v ∈ V in a social graph will be associated with a feature vector fv ∈ F . Cells of fv
correspond to profile feature values from the associated user profile in Profiles.
The goal of our model is to assign risk labels to friends according to the risk labels
of their friends (i.e., strangers). As we stated before, risk labels of strangers depend on
stranger features as well as mutual friends. We do not assume that all friends can change
users’ risk perception in the same way. Some friends can make strangers look less risky
and facilitate interactions with them (i.e., friends decrease the risk of strangers). On the
other hand, some friends can make strangers more risky (i.e., friends increase the risk of
strangers). For example, if users do not want to interact with some friends, they might
avoid friends of these friends as well. We will use positive and negative impacts to refer to
decreases and increases in stranger risk labels, respectively. To understand whether friends
have negative or positive impacts, our model must be able to know what risk label the
stranger would receive from the user if there were no mutual friends. This corresponds
to the case where the user given label depends only on stranger features. We will term
this projected label as the baseline label, and show it with bus. For instance, assume that
if there are no mutual friends, a user u considers all male users as very risky, and avoids
interacting with them. In this case, the baseline label for a male stranger s is very risky,
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i.e., bus = very risky. However, if the same male stranger s has a mutual friend with user
u, we assume that the user given label lus might not be equal to the baseline label bus
(i.e.,lus 6= bus), because the mutual friend might increase or decrease the risk perception
of the user. This difference between the baseline and user given labels will be used to find
out friend impacts.
Finding baseline labels and friend impacts requires different approaches. In baseline
estimates, we use logistic regression on stranger features, and for the friend impacts we use
multiple linear regression [98]. Both of these regression techniques require many user given
labels to compute baseline labels and friend impacts with high confidence. However, users
are reluctant to label many strangers, therefore we have to exploit few labels to achieve
better results. To this end, we transform our risk dataset, and use the resulting dataset in
regression analyses. In the next sections, this transformation and regression steps will be
described in detail. Overall, we divide our work into four phases as follows:
1. Transformation: Exploit the risk label dataset in such a way that regression analy-
ses for baseline labels and friend impacts can find results with high confidence. With
this step, we increase the number of labels that can be used to estimate baseline
labels and friend impacts.
2. Baseline Estimation: Find baseline labels of strangers by logistic regression anal-
ysis of their features.
3. Learning Friend Impacts: Create a multiple linear regression model to find friends
that can change users’ opinion about strangers and result in a different stranger label
than the one found by baseline estimation.
4. Assigning Risk Labels to Friends: Analyze the sign of friend impacts, and assign
higher risk labels to friends who have negative impacts.
5.3 Transforming Data
By transforming the data, we aim at using the available data efficiently to find friend
impacts with higher confidence. To this end, we first transform profile features of friends
and strangers to use k-means and hierarchical clustering algorithms [49] on the resulting
profile data. This section will discuss the transformation, and briefly explain the clustering
algorithms.
Our model has to work with few stranger labels, because users are reluctant to label
many strangers. This limitation is also shared in Recommender Systems (RS) [93] where the
goal is to predict ratings for items with minimum number of past ratings. In neighborhood
based RS [67], ratings of other similar users are exploited to predict ratings for a specific
user. Traditionally, the definition of similarity depend on the characteristics of data (e.g.,
ordinal or categorical data), and it has to be chosen carefully. We use profile data of friends
and strangers in defining similar friends and strangers, respectively. Friend impacts of a
user u is learned from impacts of similar friends from all other users. To this end, we
CHAPTER 5. RISKS OF INTERACTIONS 86
transform profile data of friends and strangers in such a way that friends and strangers
of different users are clustered into global friend and stranger clusters. Next sections will
describe the aims and methods of friend and stranger clustering in detail.
5.3.1 Clustering Friends
Clustering friends aim at learning friend impacts for a cluster of friends. This is because
we might not have enough stranger labels to learn impacts of individual friends with high
confidence. To overcome this data disadvantage, impact of a friend f can be used to
find the impacts of other friends who belong to the same cluster. For example, a user
from Milano can have a friend from Milano, whereas a user from Berlin can have a friend
from Berlin. Although these two friends have different hometown values (Milano and
Berlin), we can assume that both friends can be clustered together because their hometown
feature values are similar to user values. This hometown example demonstrates a clustering
based on a single friend profile feature and it results in only two clusters: friends who are
from Milano/Berlin and friends who are from somewhere else. However, in real life social
networks, friends have many values for a feature, some of which can be more similar to the
user’s value than others. For example, Italian friends of a user from Milano can be from
Italian cities other than Milano, and these friends should not be considered as dissimilar
as friends from Berlin. By considering these, we transform categorical friend values to
numerical values in such a way that similarities between friend and user values become
more accurate.
Our transformation uses the homophily [92] assumption which states that people create
friendships with other people who are similar to them along profile features such as gender,
education etc. In other words, we assume that all friends of a user u can be used to judge
the similarity of a social network user to u. For example, considering the case where the
user u is from Milano, a social network user from Rome is similar to the user if the user
has many friends from Rome. Moreover, we assume that different users will have similar
clusters of friends, e.g., friends from user’s hometown, alma mater etc. and friend impact
values will be correlated with their corresponding clusters, e.g., friends from hometowns
will have similar impact values. More precisely, the transformation of friends’ data maps
a categorical feature value of a friend, such as hometown:Milano, to a numerical value
which is equal to the frequency of the feature value among profiles of all friends of a
user. For example, if a friend f has profile feature value hometown:Milano, and there are
15 out of 100 friends with similar hometown:Milano values, hometown feature of f will
be represented with 15/100 = 0.15. After applying this numerical transformation to all
friends of all users, we compute a Social Frequency Matrix for Friends (SFMF) where each
row represents numerical transformation of feature vector of a user’s friend.
Definition 13 (Social Freq. Matrix for friends) The Social Frequency Matrix asso-
ciated with a social network G is defined as |N | × |F | × n, where N is the set of users in
G, F ⊂ N is the set of user in G that are friends of at least one user u ∈ N , and n is the
number of features of user profiles. Each element value of the matrix is given by:
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SFMF [u, f, v] =
Sup(~fv)
|Fu|
where Fu ⊂ F is the set of friends of u, Sup(~fv) =
∣∣∣{g ∈ Fu|~gv = ~fv}∣∣∣ and f ∈ Fu, whereas
~gv and ~fv show the value of profile feature v for users g and f , respectively.
Having transformed friend data into numerical form, we can now use a clustering al-
gorithm to create clusters of friends. After applying a clustering algorithm to the Social
Frequency Matrix for friends, output friend clusters will be denoted by FC.
5.3.2 Clustering Strangers
By clustering friends, we can learn impacts of friends from different clusters, but this raises
another question: do friends have impact on all strangers of users? Our assumption is
that correlation between stranger and friend profile features can reduce or increase friend
impact. For example, if a student user u labels friends of a classmate friend f , we might
expect friends of f who are professors to have higher risk labels than student friends of
f , because u might not want his/her professors to see his/her activities and photos. Here
the work feature of strangers changes friend impact of f by increasing the risk label of
professor friends of f . To see how friend and stranger features change friend impacts, we
transform strangers’ profile data to numerical data and cluster the resulting matrix just
like we clustered friends. This clustered stranger representation helps us detect clusters of
strangers for whom certain clusters of friends can change risk perception of users the most.
Formally, we prepare a social frequency matrix as follows:
Definition 14 (Social Freq. Matrix for strangers) The Social Frequency Matrix for
Strangers associated with a social network G is defined as |N | × |S| × n, where N is the set
of users in G, S ⊂ N is the set of user in G that are strangers of at least one user u ∈ N ,
and n is the number of features of user profiles. Each element value of the matrix is given
by:
SFMS[u, s, v] =
Sup(~sv)
|Fu|
where Sup(~sv) = |{g ∈ Fu|~gv = ~sv}| and S ∈ N , whereas ~sv shows the value of feature v
for stranger s.
Note that we still use friend profiles in the denominator to transform stranger data.
This is because we cannot see all strangers of a friend due to API limitations of popular
social networks. To overcome this problem, we use friend profiles because we expect them
to be similar to profiles of their own friends (strangers). We again use the Social Frequency
Matrix for strangers to create clusters of strangers. We will denote stranger these stranger
clusters by SC.
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5.3.3 Clustering Algorithms
In our experiments, we used the k-means and hierarchical algorithms [49] to produce clus-
ters of friends and strangers. This section will briefly explain these algorithms. In what
follows, we will use data points and strangers/friends interchangeably to mean elements in
a cluster.
The k-means clustering algorithm takes the number of final clusters as input and clusters
the data by successively choosing cluster seeds and refining the distance within cluster data
points. The required input for the number of final clusters is usually unknown beforehand
and this makes k-means unfeasible in some scenarios. However, in our model it gives us the
flexibility to experiment with different sizes of clusters. k-means is also a fast clustering
algorithm which suits our model for the cases where all friends of all users can reach a few
thousands. In our experiments, we used different k values to find optimal performance. In
hierarchical clustering1, a tree structure is formed by joining clusters and the tree is cut
horizontally at some level to produce a number of clusters.
In friend and stranger clustering, choosing the number of final clusters or the horizontal
level requires some trade-offs. The advantage of using many clusters is that data points
in each cluster are more similar to each other (i.e., friends or strangers in a cluster are
more similar in profile feature values). On the other hand, too many clusters decreases the
average number of data points in a cluster, and our model may not be trained on these
clusters with high confidence, i.e., there may not be enough data points in a cluster to
prove anything. Using too few clusters also has a disadvantage. Final clusters may contain
too many data points that are not very similar to each other. This decreases the quality
of inferences because what we infer from some data points might not be valid for others
in the same cluster. Despite this, if data points are naturally homogeneous, the similarity
among data points in a big cluster can be high. As a result, a big cluster may offer more
data to prove our inferences with more confidence.
After transforming our data and creating friend and stranger clusters, we will now
explain baseline label estimation for stranger clusters.
5.4 Baseline Estimation
Baseline estimation analyzes how feature values on stranger profiles bring users to assign
specific risk labels to strangers. The baseline estimation process results in baseline labels
for each stranger s ∈ S. These labels are found by using statistical regression methods on
already given user labels and stranger profile features. In this section we will discuss this
process.
Baseline estimation corresponds to the case where a user would assign a risk label to a
stranger without knowing which one of his/her friends are also friends with the stranger.
Figure 5.1 shows an example of baseline estimation. In the figure, each stranger s ∈ Su is a
1We used the agglomerative form where a new stranger is added to clusters by considering the complete
distance. Height of the tree was 3.






Figure 5.1: Features and risk labels
node surrounded by a ring representing his/her feature vector fs. Each cell in the feature
vector corresponds to a feature value of the stranger (e.g., hometown:Milano). Different
colors for the same cell position represent different values for the same feature on different
stranger profiles. In the example shown in Figure 5.1 strangers S2, S4 and S5 are labeled
with 2 (i.e., the risky label). These three strangers share the same feature vector as shown
with the same colored cells. Based on these observations, if any stranger has the same
feature vector with S2, S4 and S5, the stranger will be given label 2. The evidence to
support this statement comes from the three strangers (S2, S4 and S5), and the number of
such strangers determine the confidence of the system in assigning baseline labels.
Although in Figure 5.1 stranger features are shown to be the only parameter in defining
stranger labels, in our dataset labels of strangers have been collected from users by explicitly
showing at least one mutual friend in addition to the stranger feature values. Because of
this, stranger labels that are learned from users can be different from baseline labels; they
can be higher (more risky) or lower (less risky) depending on the friend impact. Considering
this, in baseline estimation we use the labels of strangers who have the least number of
mutual friends with users. These are the subset of labels which were given to strangers who
have only one friend in common with users, i.e., for user u and stranger s, |Fu ∩ Fs| = 1.
In what follows, we will use first group dataset to refer to these strangers.
In our approach, we use logistic regression to learn the baseline labels from available
data. This allows us to work with categorical response variables (i.e., one of the tree
risk labels). Stranger features are used as explanatory (independent) variables and risk
labels as the response (dependent) variable which is determined by values of explanatory
variables (i.e., feature values). Although the response variable has categorical values, it
can be considered ordinal because risk labels can be ordered as not risky (label 1), risky
(label 2) and very risky (label 3).
Ordinary Logistic Regression is used to model cases with binary response values, such as
1 (a specific event happens) or 0 (that specific event does not happen), whereas multinomial
logistic regression is used when there are more than two response values. As multinomial
logistic regression a basic variant of logistic regression, we will first start with the definition
of logistic regression. For this purpose, assume that our three risk labels are reduced to
two (risky, not risky).
Suppose that π represents the probability of a particular outcome, such as a stranger
being labeled with risky, given his/her profile features as a set of explanatory variables
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x1, ..., xn:







where 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, Xk is a feature value, α is an intercept and βs are feature coefficients,








By transforming the probability (π) of the response variable to an odd-ratio (log[ π1−π ]),
we can now use a linear model. Given the already known stranger features and labels, we
use Maximum Likelihood Estimation [99] to learn the intercept value and the coefficients
of all features.
Although standard binary logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression use
the same definition, they differ in one aspect: multinomial regression chooses a reference
category and works with not one but N − 1 log odds where N is the number of response
categories. In our model, N = 3, because the response has three labels (1, 2, 3). In
both binary and multinomial logistic regression, intercept and coefficient values are found
by using numerical methods to solve the linearized equation(s). With the found values,
we can write the odd ratio as an equation. For example, in equation log[ π1−π ] = 0.7 +
1.2 × X1 + 0.3 × X2, the intercept value is (0.7) and feature coefficients (β1 = 1.2 and
β2 = 0.3). We can then plug in a new set of values (e.g., X1 = 0.5) for features, and get
the probabilities of response value being one of three labels. For example, for a specific
stranger, the model can tell us that risk label probabilities of the stranger is distributed as
%0.9 very risky, %0.09 risky and %0.01 not risky. As we can compute baseline label in real
values, a stranger s ∈ S is assigned a baseline label by weight averaging the probabilities
of risk labels.
5.5 Friend Impact
So far, we have discussed clustering and baseline label estimation. In this section we will
first discuss how these two aspects of our model are combined to compute friend impacts.
After finding friend impacts, we will discuss how risk labels can be assigned to friends by
considering the sign of impact values. In computing friend impacts, we use multiple linear
regression [98], which learns friend impacts by comparing baseline and user given labels to
strangers. To this end, we define an estimated label parameter to use in linear regression
as follows:
Definition 15 (Estimated label) For a stranger s and a user u, an estimated label is
defined as:
l̂us = bus +
∑
FCi∈FC
FI(FCi, SCj)× Past(u, s)
CHAPTER 5. RISKS OF INTERACTIONS 91
where l̂us and bus are estimated and baseline labels for a stranger s, and s belongs to
the stranger cluster SCj ∈ SC. Friend clusters FC are found by applying a algorithm
to the mutual friends of user u and stranger s. Past(u, s) denotes an intermediary value
based on stranger labels given by user u, whereas FI(FCi, SCj) represents impact of a
friend f from a friend cluster FCi on the label of stranger s from a stranger cluster SCj .
In the rest of this section, we will define the Past(., .) and FI(., .) parameters, and
explain how they are used to compute friend impacts.
5.5.1 The Past Labeling Parameter
We start by discussing the past parameter Past(., .) which returns a value from past la-
bellings of strangers by user u.
The past parameter is traditionally used in recommender systems to adjust baseline
estimate [93]. The need for this parameter arises from the fact that baseline estimation is
computed from labels of all strangers who have only one mutual friend with user u (i.e.,
first group dataset), and it tends to be a rough average. To overcome this, a subset of
strangers, who are very similar to s and who have been labeled in the past by u, are
observed and the baseline label is increased or decreased to make it more similar to the
user given labels of these strangers.
In defining the past parameter, we consider two factors: how many similar strangers
should be considered in this adjustment and what is an accurate metric for finding similarity
of two strangers? For the first question, we use the computed stranger clusters. For a
stranger s, similar strangers from the first group dataset are those (i) that are labeled by
the same user u, and (ii) that belong to the same stranger cluster with s. Although we
use stranger clusters to choose similar strangers, the similarity of strangers in a cluster
can be low or high depending on the clustering process. With too few clusters and too
many clusters, similarity of strangers in a cluster can be low and high respectively. We
adjust the baseline labels by considering labels given to most similar users. To this end,
we use the profile similarity measure that we proposed in Chapter 3. This measure assigns
a similarity value of 1 to strangers with identical profiles, and for non-identical profiles the
similarity value is higher for strangers whose profile feature values are more common in
profile features of u’s friends. Formally, we define the past labeling as follows:
Definition 16 (Past Labeling Parameter)






PS(s, x)× (lux − bux)
where PS() denotes the profile similarity between two strangers, lux is the user given label
of stranger x, and bux is the baseline label of x. Strangers s and x belong to the same
stranger cluster Ci.














(b) Single impact for a friend cluster.
Figure 5.2: Friend impact definitions by considering the number of friends from the same
cluster. In the single impact definition, two friends do not increase the friend impact.
5.5.2 The Friend Impact Parameter
The second parameter from Definition 15, FI(f, s), is used to show impacts of mutual
friends on the risk label given to s by u. In modeling friend impacts, we wanted to see
how friends from different clusters changed the baseline label. By using this approach, we
explain impacts of friend clusters in terms of friend features that shape friend clusters. If
there is at least one mutual friend from a friend cluster FCi, we say that friend cluster
FCi may have impacted the label given to the stranger s. For the cases where a stranger
s has two or more mutual friends from a friend cluster FCi, we experimented with both
options for FI(f, s). Next, we will explain these options.
Multiple Impact for the Friend Cluster
In our first approach, we assume that a bigger number of mutual friends from friend cluster
FCi ∈ FC will impact user labeling. Assume that from a friend cluster FCi ∈ FC, we are
given a set of mutual friends MFi = {∀f |f ∈ FCi, f ∈ {Fu ∩ Fs}} of user u and stranger
s. We define the impact of friend cluster FCi on the label of stranger s ∈ SCj as follows:
FI2(FCi, SCj) = |MFi| × IFCi,SCj
where IFCi,SCj is the impact of a cluster FCi|f ∈ {FCi ∩MFi} on the label of stranger
s ∈ SCj . Note that this impact (IFCi,SCj ) is the unknown value that our system will learn.
Single Impact for the Friend Cluster
In the second approach, we assume that a bigger number of friends from the same cluster
does not make a difference in user labeling; at least one friend from the cluster is required,
but more friends do not bring additional impact. This approach is shown in Figure 5.2b,
where friends are shown with their cluster ids, and two friends from friend cluster FC2
bring a single impact. Assume that from a friend cluster FCi ∈ FC, we are given a set of
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mutual friends of user u and stranger s. We give the impact of friend cluster FCi on the
label of stranger s as follows:
FI1(FCi, SCj) = IFCi,SCj
where IFCi,SCj is the impact of a friend cluster FCi on label of stranger s ∈ SCj .
These different friend impact approaches change the model by including different num-
bers of friend impacts. The unknown impact variable IFC∗,SC∗ is learned by the least
squares method [60]. The least squares method provides an approximate solution when
there are more equations than unknown variables. In our model, each stranger’s label
provides an equation to compute impacts of k1 friend clusters on k2 stranger clusters (k1
and k2 are the final numbers of friend and stranger clusters in the k-means algorithm). In
Example 5.5.1, we will explain these points and give equations of one stranger for single
and multiple impact definitions.
Example 5.5.1 Given a stranger s1 ∈ SC1 who is labeled by u, assume that the user
given label lus1 = 2.3, while the baseline label is bus1 = 2.7. Again assume that Past(u, s) =
−0.2. Equations for the stranger s with single and multiple friend impact definitions are
respectively given as follows:
2.3 = 2.7 + (IFC2,SC1 + IFC1,SC1)×−0.2
2.3 = 2.7 + (2× IFC2,SC1 + IFC1,SC1)×−0.2
After choosing one of these definitions of friend impact, we input one equation for each
stranger s to the least squares method to compute impact values of friend clusters on
stranger clusters. In the experimental results, we will discuss the definition that yielded
the best results.
5.6 Friend Risk Labels
Learning impact values allows us to see the percentage of positive and negative impacts for
each friend cluster. Negative impact values for a friend cluster shows that the friend cluster
increases the risk label of strangers. Depending on a user’s choice, friend clusters which
have negative impacts less than x% of the time can be considered not risky. Similarly, a
threshold y% can be chosen to determine very risky friend clusters. In our experiments,
we heuristically chose x = 20 and y = 50. With these threshold values for risk labels, we
formally define the risk label of a friend f as follows:
Definition 17 (Friend Risk Label) Assume that the percentage of positive and negative





i = 1. We assign a risk label to a friend f who is a member of the friend cluster
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not risky if Im−i < 0.2
risky if 0.2 ≤ Im−i < 0.5
very risky if Im−i ≥ 0.5

Next we will give the experimental results of our model performance.
5.7 Experimental Results
In this section we will validate our model assumptions, and then continue to give detailed
analysis of performance under different parameter/setting scenarios.
5.7.1 Validating Model Assumptions
Before finding friend impacts, we validated our model assumption (i.e., mutual friends have
an impact on the risk label of a stranger) by using logistic regression on the whole dataset
(4013 stranger labels and profiles). For this, we included the number of mutual friends as
a parameter, and computed the significance2 of model parameters. In overall regression,
photo visibility, wall visibility, education and work parameters were excluded from the
model because they were found to be non-significant. For significant parameters, Pr(> |t|)
values are shown in Table 5.1.
In the regression, there are two friend related parameters: the number of mutual friends
and the friendlist visibility. Differing from the number of mutual friends, friendlist visibility
is a categorical variable which takes 0 when the stranger hides his/her friendlist from the
user and 1 otherwise. From Table 5.13, we see that seeing a stranger’s friendlist increases
the probability of the stranger getting label 1, whereas it is not an important parameter
for label 3. Our main focus in regression analysis was to verify that the number of mutual
friends parameter is significant. We found that an increasing number of mutual friends
indeed helps a stranger get label 1, and decreases the probability of getting label 3. This
result tells us that friends have an impact on user decisions and our assumption about the
existence of friend impacts holds true. After validating our model assumption, we continue
to the baseline label estimations.
5.7.2 Training for Baseline
Baseline calculation predicts labels for strangers without friend impacts. For this purpose
we take strangers who have one mutual friend with users (|MF | = 1) into a new dataset
(first group dataset), and train a logistic regression model. Logistic regression on the first
2Significance is measured by p-values. The p-value is the probability of having a result at least as
extreme as the one that was actually observed in the sample. Traditionally, a p− value of less than 0.05 is
considered significant.
3 Notes: Reference category for the equation is label 2. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
codes: ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
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Table 5.1: Regression results for all data points. p-value=2.22e-16. Total N=4013.
Label 1 Label 3
Intercept -1.2668850*** -0.7626810***
(0.146) (0.138)











Table 5.2: Regression results for the first group data points. p-value = 5.6701e-11. Total N=1520.














group dataset finds how stranger features bring users to label strangers. Table 5.2 shows
model parameters and their corresponding p-values.
In Table 5.2, we see that when users label the first group strangers, photo and wall
visibility are significant parameters. If these items are visible on stranger profiles, the
probability of strangers getting label 1 increases. In the whole dataset (see Table 5.1),
these two parameters were found to be insignificant. Another interesting result is that
locale4 is significant for label 3 whereas it is non/significant for label 1. A high locale value
means that the stranger is similar to existing friends of users, but this high similarity is
shown to increase the probability of strangers being labeled as very risky, i.e., receiving
4Locale is the web interface language of the user on the social networking site (e.g., IT for Italian and
RU for Russian).
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Figure 5.3: Deviation of user given labels from baseline labels. Values in the x-axis are the number
of mutual friends between a stranger and user.
label 3.
After computing a baseline label for all strangers, we use the difference between user
given and baseline labels (lus−bus) to model the friend impact. These differences (deviations
from the baseline label) are shown in Figure 5.3. In the figure, we see that user given labels
are lower than the computed baseline label, which shows that in overall friends have positive
impacts (i.e., thanks to mutual friends, users assign lower risk labels to strangers.). Overall,
we found that there is not a linear relation between the number of mutual friends and the
deviation values. This non-linearity changes how we define the impacts of friend clusters.
In Section 5.5 we gave two definitions for friend impacts (see Figure 5.2) to account for
deviations from the baseline label.
In multiple friend impacts we assumed that more mutual friends from a friend cluster
bring additional impacts. On the other hand, in single friend impact one friend was enough
to have the impact of a friend cluster. This finding implies that more friends of the same
cluster do not provide any benefits to strangers on Facebook and mutual friends from
different clusters are more suitable to change the user’s risk perception about a stranger.
We believe that this can be generalized to other undirected social networks.
In the rest of the experiments, we will give the results computed by using the sin-
gle friend impact definition. We will now explain the model performance under different
clustering settings.
5.7.3 Clustering
For clustering 12659 friends, and 4013 strangers we experimented with k-means and hier-
archical clustering algorithms. In our experiments with different numbers of final clusters,
the k-means algorithm yielded the best results for friend clustering, whereas hierarchi-
cal clustering was better for stranger clustering. Due to space limitations, we will omit
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Figure 5.4: Coefficient of determination (R2) values for 2 and 9 friend clusters
hierarchical clustering results for friends and k-means results for strangers.
Friend Clustering: In Figures 5.4 and 5.5, we show the adjusted coefficient of
determination5 (R2) of our multiple regression model with different k values for friend
clustering. The x-axis gives the number of stranger clusters for which at least one friend
cluster has an impact. In Figure 5.4 we see the performance for maximum and minimum
number of friend clusters. For k = 2, friend clusters are very roughly clustered, and each
cluster is not homogeneous enough (i.e., contains different types of friends) to mine friend
impacts6. As a result, we can observe friend impacts on very few clusters. For k = 9,
friend clusters are more homogeneous, but in this case our multiple regression model does
not have many data points (strangers) to learn the impacts of friend clusters.
Figure 5.5 shows the results for k = 5, 6, 7 values. For two k values, 5 and 6, we have
the best results. Our model hence suggests that friends of social network users can be put
into 5 or 6 clusters when considering how much they can affect user decisions on stranger
labeling.
Stranger Clustering: In Figure 5.6 we show how the R2 values change for the biggest
and smallest numbers of stranger clusters. With 8 stranger clusters, our model can detect
friend cluster impacts on 5 out of 8 stranger clusters only, whereas for 158 clusters the
number is 15 out of 158. For 158 stranger clusters, R2 values are generally low because
strangers are distributed into too many clusters, and each stranger cluster does not have
many data points (strangers) to learn from. Although finding impacts on 5 out of 8 stranger
clusters seems like a good performance, low R2 values (lower than 0.5) show that the model
can explain less than 50% of the variation in data. In Figure 5.7 we see that more stranger
5The adjusted coefficient of determination is the proportion of variability in a data set that can be
explained by the statistical model. This value shows how well future outcomes can be predicted by the
model. R2 can take 0 as minimum, and 1 as maximum.
6We use F-ratio probability to test the significance of parameters, i.e., a low probability (we use .05 as
cutoff) for the F-ratio suggests that at least some of the friend cluster impacts are significant.
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Figure 5.5: Coefficient of determination (R2) values for 5, 6 and 7 friend clusters
Figure 5.6: Coefficient of determination (R2) values of friend impacts for 158 and 8 stranger
clusters.
clusters can improve the model performance and this leads to R2 values close to 1. For
26 stranger clusters, R2 values are better, and we can find friend impacts in 16 out of 26
stranger clusters.
Cross Validation: A major point in statistical modeling is the response to out of
sample validation; a statistical model can be over-fitted to the training data, and it can
perform poorly when applied to new testing data. After clustering and prior to learning
friend cluster impacts, we prepare a test set for validating our model. We remove 10% of
strangers from stranger clusters and set those aside as the test strangers (T ). Once friend
impacts are found for stranger clusters, we plug in the set of test strangers, and calculate the
root mean square value (RMSE) of their labels. RMSE for a stranger s and user u is defined
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Figure 5.7: Coefficient of determination (R2) values of friend impacts for 26 and 49 stranger
clusters
Table 5.3: Performance values for different numbers of stranger clusters.
Cluster count 8 26 49 82 158
R2 0.51 0.64 0.48 0.54 0.45
Median Size 62 25 16 12 7
Validation points 179 99 69 48 27
RMSE 0.35 0.45 0.62 0.97 0.94
Cross validation results for different numbers of stranger clusters is detailed in Table 5.3
by using 6 friend clusters. The first row of the table shows the number of stranger clusters,
whereas the second row shows the average R2 values in these clusters. In the third row, we
show the median size of stranger clusters; with increasing numbers of clusters, the number
of strangers in each cluster decreases. In the case of 158, the average number of strangers
in a cluster is reduced to 7, and this results in a poor performance because the model
cannot have enough data to learn friend impacts on stranger clusters. The average number
of validation points are shown in the fourth row. An increasing number of stranger clusters
results in fewer validation points because some clusters will have less than 10 strangers
themselves. In the fifth row, the root mean square values (RMSE) are shown for these
validation points. In 26 stranger cluster our model yields the best R2 and RMSE pair
results.
These experimental results suggest that the optimal number of stranger clusters (26)
is bigger than the optimal number of friend clusters (k = 5, 6). We explain this by the
fact that although users can choose friends of specific characteristics, they cannot do so
with strangers. As a result, strangers are more diverse than friends, and they need to be
clustered differently from friends.
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(a) 5 friend clusters (b) 6 friend clusters
(c) 7 friend clusters
Figure 5.8: Percentage of positive and negative impact values for friend clusters.
5.7.4 Friend Impacts and Risk Labels
In this section we will give computed friend cluster impacts, and show how friends are
assigned risk labels.
The rationale behind clustering was to observe different friend cluster impacts on dif-
ferent stranger clusters. Although a friend cluster can have an overall positive impact
(i.e., reduces the risk label of most strangers), friend clusters might have different signs
and multitudes of impact values on stranger clusters. In Figure 5.8 we show how different
friend clusters can have positive and negative impact values for different k values (number
of friend clusters). Note that clusters are not identical across these figures, i.e., cluster 1
can have different members in each figure. This is because with different number of final
clusters, the clustering algorithms produce potentially different clusters of data points. As
seen in Figure 5.8a, when we increase the number of friend clusters from k = 5 to k = 6,
positive and negative impact frequencies change for each cluster because either friend clus-
ters became more homogeneous or some clusters did not have enough data points to learn
from. Figure 5.8b shows two friend clusters with overall negative impacts (friend clusters
1 and 6). Figure 5.8c shows the positive and negative impact frequencies for k = 7, where
frequencies are more emphasized for negative and positive impacts of a cluster. Note that
the number of overall negative clusters is reduced from 2 to 1 here. Similar to a transition
from 5 to 6 clusters, friends of two negative clusters might be put into the same cluster
(cluster 1) or there were no longer enough strangers for some friend clusters to learn a
negative impact.
The existence of both positive and negative impact values for each friend cluster con-
firms our intuition that impacts of friend clusters vary depending on a stranger cluster. A
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friend is assigned a higher risk label when a friend cluster has a big percentage of negative
impact values. In Section 5.6, we gave definitions of friend risk labels according to two
threshold values (x=20, y=50) of negative impact percentages. By using k=6 friend clus-
ters, from Figure 5.8b we see that friends from friend clusters 1 and 6 are labeled as very
risky because the negative impact percentages for the clusters are > 0.6. In the figure, we
also see that none of the clusters have < 0.2 negative impacts, hence no friends cluster is
said to be not risky (label 1).
We tested the accuracy of our risk definition for friends by observing 261 deleted friend-
ships of users. As a performance measure, we assumed that the deleted friends should come
from friends who are labeled as very risky, i.e., friends who belong to the 1st and 6th clus-
ters. We have found 117 of the 261 deleted friends were found to belong to the 1st and 6th
friend clusters.
Although we chose to use specific values for very risky and not risky label thresholds
(x=20, y=50) in assigning risk labels to strangers, our model can ask social network users
to define these threshold values on their own. With this approach, our risk model for
friends can be personalized by users and applied to privacy settings on social networks.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we looked into risks of friendships and analyzed how the risk labels of
friends of friends can be used to compute risk labels of friends. We found that the number
of mutual friends is not very important to change the risk perception of a user towards a
friend of friend. On the other hand, having different types of mutual friends (i.e., friends
from different friend clusters) with a friend of friend plays a bigger role in users’ risk
perception. Our results showed that in terms of risk, friends can be grouped into 6-7
clusters, whereas the number of groups for strangers can reach 26 or more. These results
show that even though user numbers reach millions, friends for each user have similar roles.
We have validated risk labels of friends on deleted Facebook friendships, and showed that
risks of friendships can indeed be learned by considering users’ risk perception towards
friends of friends. In the future, we want to create sets of global privacy settings by using






Over the last couple of years, there has been significant research effort in mining user
behavior on social media for applications ranging from sentiment analysis [107] to marketing
[126]. In most of those applications, usually a snapshot of the user behavior and user
relationships are analyzed to build the data mining models [18, 115]. Although such analysis
are really useful, in many cases, they do not find significant changes happening to a user’s
behavior over time.
For example, for marketing purposes, a user’s tweets may be analyzed to infer his/her
current interests. Although, understanding the current interests of a user is helpful for
showing display ads, detecting significant changes in interests over time could be as impor-
tant. For example, after a significant life event such as having a baby, a user may start
tweeting more about baby food. Furthermore, such a user may start to follow a lead-
ing pediatric expert on Twitter who tweets about best practices related to infant feeding.
Detecting such significant changes or anomalies1 may have important applications. For
instance, if we detect such an ”anomaly” in the context of the above scenario, we may
predict that in the future such a user may be interested in child seats even though his/her
current tweets may not show any interest. Detecting such anomalies in user behavior may
have other important applications. For example, anomalies may indicate the hijacking of
an account. Of course, in order to make such kind of predictions, we should start with
understanding and detecting such significant changes (i.e., anomalies) in user behaviors.
Although recent work in emerging topic detection [31] or trend analysis [89] have studied
changes in mentioned or tweeted topics, they are prone to miss some significant changes
in individual user behavior because they require users to tweet about these changes. In
other words, detecting behavior changes by monitoring tweets depends on users’ willingness
to tweet about these changes. However, recent work show that Twitter’s content stream
1We use the term “anomaly” to represent such significant changes in user behavior.
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is dominated by a small number of users, and the top 15 percent of users account for 85
percent of all tweets [75]. Furthermore, a quarter of users active during a one month period
are reported to tweet just once, while half tweet between one and four times. With this
dearth of user tweets, it is clear that detecting behavior changes by considering only tweets
may lead to undetected anomalies for a big portion of users.
In contrast, despite a shortage of tweets, users are more active in following new people.
For example, in our experiments we have found that 78 thousand users followed 16 million
new friends in a four year period. We show that, by observing the topics of new friends,
behavior changes can be found by a larger portion of Twitter users.
6.2 Overview of the Problem
We are interested in analyzing two definitions of anomaly of user behavior in Twitter.
In our first definition, we aim at capturing the divergence of individual behavior from
user’s past behavior. As such, a user is said to exhibit an anomalous behavior if newly
followed accounts have different topics from the ones followed in the past. In the second
definition, we take a wider view on Twitter, as we aim at finding a divergence of individual
behavior from collective behavior. As an example, a teenager’s new interest in following
users from academia can constitute an individual anomaly (i.e., divergence from his/her
past behavior). However, when we look at friendships of other teenager users we might
deduce that in collective behavior, teenagers start following academia users after their
college enrollments. Looking at collective behavior helps us put newly emerging patterns
in individual behaviors into perspective. Thus, we define anomaly as an individual’s interest
in following topics that are not followed by other similar Twitter users.
To highlight potential anomalies in user behavior we need to compare two different
snapshots. For this purpose, we have used the Twitter dataset crawled in 2009 by Kwak
et al. [72] as the first snapshot. For the second snapshot, we have crawled Twitter in 2013,
by querying the Twitter API 2 for friends and tweets/bios of users. Although an API call
can return the last 200 tweets of a user, we stored only the latest 50 tweets due to storage
limitations. Each tweet tx of a user ux is a short text of maximum 140 characters. In
what follows, for any user account ux, bx denotes its bio, whereas its tweets are denoted as
Tx = {∪t(m)x |m = 1, ..., 50}.
During data collection, we have discovered 11M Twitter accounts, and stored
bios/tweets of 3 million users. From these stored users, we chose 100K seed users S that
existed in the Twitter crawl of 2009 by Kwak et al. [72]. From 2009 to 2013, users have
added new friends, and deleted some existing ones. We call friends of users in 2009 and
2013 as old and new friends, respectively. More precisely, we will denote old and new




s , respectively, where Γs = Γ
′
s ∪ Γ′′s . In Figure 6.1,
the edges which existed in dataset [72] are labeled with 2009, whereas new edges that we
discovered are labeled with 2013. For instance, for the seed node B, its old friends are E,
2https://dev.twitter.com/












Figure 6.1: Old and new friends of users
C, and F, whereas the new friends are E, C and A. As depicted by the broken edge, F is
no longer a friend of B in 2013.
Other than seed users and their old/new friends, we have also queried 1.2 million twitter
users to avoid learning from a small sample of all Twitter users. These additional users
have been added to the dataset regardless of whether they existed in 2009 or not. In what
follows, the additional Twitter users will be denoted with Λ.
Based on 3 million user accounts, we have found a median number of 352 (1896 average)
friends per each user. For some service accounts, such as CNN news, this number reaches
up to several millions. As we are mainly interested in personal user accounts in our anomaly
metrics, we decided to use a cut off point to separate personal accounts from these service
accounts. To this end, we have only queried accounts that have less than 500 friends. This
pre-screening also reduces the number of queries sent to the Twitter API for bio information
and recent tweets. After pre-screening, an average number of 208 friends have been queried
for each seed user. These seed users represent the dataset on which we analyzed the possible
anomalies.
To discover anomalies in individual behavior, we compared 2009 and 2013 friends lists
of each seed user, so as to determine if these two lists are similar. As described in Section
6.3.1, similarity is computed as cosine similarity on labels associated with friends in the
lists, that is, descriptive labels associated with tweets and bio of friends. In Section 6.3.1,
we explain how these friend labels are computed.
In contrast to individual behavior, anomaly detection with collective behavior tries to
capture how other users that are similar to a seed user change their friends lists from
2009 to 2013. An important question is therefore how to find users that are similar to
the considered seed user, so that collective behavior can be studied. For this problem we
employ clustering techniques, and put seed users into k clusters (see Section 6.3.2).
Given a new friendship, we look into its compliance with both individual and collective
behavior of a user, so as to determine if this new friendship has to be considered anomaly
or not. We detail this process in Section 6.3.3.
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6.3 Methodology
In this section, we first discuss how we build topic models to capture user interests. Later
on, we discuss how we cluster users to find group of users with similar interests. Finally,
we discuss the anomaly measures used in our study.
6.3.1 Topic Models
To create topic models, we have used two kinds of information related to Twitter users:
bio texts and tweets. In both cases, stop words and punctuation marks are removed from
the documents before building the models.
In the first case, a bio text is used as a single document to label its owner. In the second
scenario, each tweet is considered as a separate document and multiple tweets are used to
label a user. Indeed, although each user has a single bio text, there can be thousands of
tweets from a user. As it is too costly to include all tweets of a user in our computations, we
had to limit the number of tweets used in the labeling process. Furthermore, using tweets
for labeling requires selecting the most informative tweets of a user, since unlike bios, tweets
can be about daily conversations and have fewer words after stop word removal.
Given 2013 bios/tweets of all users (i.e., seed users, their friends and additional twitter
users, Λ) represented as a set of documents, we use the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA)
[17] topic modeling to find a predefined number of latent topics in the documents. LDA
is a generative model that explains similarity of some documents by latent topics. During
initialization, LDA requires a total number of topics K and gives two sets of results that
we use to label users.
The first result is a set of latent topics as a mixture of words, where φk is the word
distribution for topic k. In other words, topic k is given as a set of words where each
word w has a probability φk,w of occurring in topic k (e.g., topic 1, social:0.85, media:0.15,
φ1,media = 0.15).
The second result of LDA is the topic distribution for a document t, denoted as θt.




θt,k = 1. For example, document 2 can have the topic distribution 1:0.8, 7:0.2,
which indicates that probability of topic 1 occurring in document 2 is θ2,1 = 0.8.
By itself, LDA does not name the topics that are discovered. Instead, the most probable
words related to a topic can be used to represent a topic. For example, a top 5 word list of
“university, student, school, college, professor” can reveal that the topic is about academia.
We use topic distribution (θt) of documents to assign labels to users. More specifically,
each user x is assigned a profile vector Px of K dimensions, where K are the number of
latent topics found by LDA. The kth value in a profile vector Px shows the probability of
user ux being labeled with the k
th topic.
Each user is said to have two profile vectors: a tweetLDA profile vector when tweets
are used as an input for LDA, and a bioLDA profile vector when bios are used as input for
LDA.
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In the case of bios, a user’s profile vector is the topic distribution of his/her bio. How-
ever, when using tweets as our LDA input, we need to aggregate topic distributions of
multiple tweets from a user to create a user’s profile vector. To this end, we employ a basic
weight aggregation, and define profile vector Px of user x as follows:
Definition 18 (Profile vector for tweetLDA) Given a user x, let TW be the set of
tweets of user x processed by LDA with K topics. The k − th element of the tweetLDA




t∈TW θt,k, where θt,k is the probability of
topic k in tweet t, and 0 < k ≤ K.
6.3.2 Clusters
By clustering, we aim at grouping users with similar profiles into the same clusters, so
that we can compare users’ new friendships with those of other similar users. To this
end, we created a dataset PC from profile vectors of seed users, where profile vectors
are computed by using tweetLDA or bioLDA. We have experimented with k-means and
hierarchical clustering [49]. This clustering process results in |C| clusters, where each
cluster Cc ∈ C holds a set of similar seed users.
In addition to clustering, we have considered using a similarity threshold or choosing
the top − n most similar users. The main difficulty of these approaches was to choose an
optimum threshold similarity or the n value so that only the most similar Twitter users
are analyzed for collective behavior. Furthermore, computational complexity issues require
choosing another threshold for how many similar users are chosen for analyzing collective
behavior. If top−n similar users are considered in the collective behavior analysis, n has to
be reasonably large to ensure that collective behavior is adequately observed. On the other
hand, if we choose a very large n value, we face the risk of including too many Twitter
users and making computations unfeasible.
Faced with these issues, clustering provides an efficient choice because it considers all
similarities among seed users, and does not require a similarity threshold value. Although
choosing a total number of clusters |C| is similar to choosing the n value, clustering does
not create fixed sized clusters and it ensures that regardless of cluster size, users in a cluster
are more similar to each other than to users from other clusters.
6.3.3 Anomaly Definitions
We propose two definitions for anomaly detection: individual and collective anomaly.
In individual anomaly detection, we are interested in detecting changing interests of
individual users over time. To this end, we define divergence as the dissimilarity of friends’
profile vectors taken at time t from profile vectors of friends taken at time t′. In other
words, a user is said to exhibit anomalous behavior if newly followed accounts are labeled
differently from the ones followed in the past. We have experimented with several definitions
for the dissimilarity. In two extreme cases, (1) new friends can be highly similar to few
old friends, or (2) new friends can have low similarity with many old friends. As our old
data comes from the early years of the Twitter social network when users had just started
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to use it intensively, we have decided to use definition 1, since it allows users to expand
their friends list in time by following users who are very similar to few old friends. If a new
friend is not very similar to at least some old friends, we define this new friendship as an
individual anomaly. Formally, we define anomalous friendship of a user as follows:
Definition 19 (Individual anomaly) Let us be a user and let Γ
′ and Γ′′ be his/her
friend sets at time t and t′ (t′ > t), respectively. A new friend uf ∈ Γ′′ \ Γ′ is individually
anomalous, if
ξ > arg max
uo∈Γ′
sim(Pf , Po)
where Po is the profile of uo, ξ is a global similarity threshold, and sim() is a similarity
function. A user profile P∗ is computed by using either bioLDA or tweetLDA.
In collective anomaly, we take a wider view on Twitter, and define anomaly as a seed
user’s interest in following topics that are not followed by other similar Twitter users. We
use clusters for forming the similarity definition; similar users of us are those that belong
to the same cluster. Given a seed user us, a user’s collective divergence is computed as the
dissimilarity of its new friend from the old friends set of users belonging to its cluster.
Definition 20 (Collective anomaly) Let us be a user and let Cc be the cluster of users
such that us ∈ Cc. Let Γ′′ and Γ′ be us friend sets at time t′ and t (t′ > t), respectively. A
new friend uf ∈ Γ′′ \ Γ′ is collectively anomalous, if:
ξ > arg max
uo∈Γ′∗
sim(Pf , Po)




c is the union of old friends of
users from cluster Cc.
For both anomaly definitions, we use cosine similarity to compute the similarity between
profile vectors.
By definition, a new friendship of a seed user us is individually anomalous if the profile
vector of the new friend is not very similar to at least one old friend of us. This new friend
is also collectively anomalous if his/her profile vector is dissimilar to the old friends of users
who are similar to us.
We term a new friend uf as a verified anomaly (vf = 1) if both individual and collective
anomaly conditions hold, and unverified (vf = 0) if both conditions do not hold. A user
is said to show more anomaly when the number of anomalous friends increases. However,
importance of one friend’s anomaly for a user also depends on the size of both Γ′, and
Γ′∗. When these old friend sets are larger in size, the probability of a new friend being
an anomaly decreases because there will be a bigger number of old friends that can be
similar. Considering this, we give more importance to anomalous seed users who have a
bigger number of old friends, or have a bigger number of similar users. In other words, if
seed users have already well established Twitter accounts, we do not expect their interests
to diverge greatly in the future. To quantify the anomalous behavior of a user, we take into
account old friends of users and cluster members, and define an anomaly score as follows.
CHAPTER 6. DETECTING ANOMALIES IN INTERACTIONS 108
Definition 21 (Anomaly Score) Let us be a user with an old friends set Γ
′, and union







where vf = 1, if friend uf is a verified anomaly, Γ
′∗ is the union set of old friends of
cluster members from cluster Cc|us ∈ Cc, and a log function is used to dampen the impact
of cluster members’ friends.
In Definition 21, a bigger value for |Γ′∗| ensures a higher anomaly score. In other
words, if a user has many anomalous friendships despite a bigger union set, the user will
be assigned a higher anomaly score.
6.4 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we first describe how we use text based Twitter data in our experiments, and
explain how the topic model has been constructed from tweets and bio texts of users. Then,
in Section 6.4.2 we look into topic model, and analyze its performance. In Section 6.4.3,
we discuss some characteristics of Twitter network data, and show how new friendships
change the way data is consumed on Twitter. Section 6.4.4 describes anomaly detection
results. Finally, Section 6.4.5 describes the validation of found anomalies.
6.4.1 Text Data Characteristics
For our topic model input, we have used an expanded stopwords list (554 words) and also
removed from tweets and bios internet related technical terms, such as http, tinyurl and
bit.ly. After this trimming, tweets and bio texts of more than 30 characters have been used
as input documents. With this criteria, %4 of all tweets, and %16 of all bios have been
removed from the dataset. The number of removed bios is higher, because bios are poorly
populated by many users.
Although we have used all available bios, we had to limit the number of tweets due to
computational costs. To this end, we have picked at most 10 longest tweets from each user,
and used a total of 21686103 tweets in our topic model. In the next section, we describe
the topics extracted from our text data.
6.4.2 LDA Results for Topics
In topic modeling, we experimented with K = 100, K = 150 and K = 200 numbers of
topics to describe our dataset. Overall, building a LDA model using 100 topics has given
better sets of words for documents, therefore in the rest of this chapter, the results are
shown for LDA models with 100 topics.
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(a) Top 20 topics found from bio texts of users.





















(b) Top 20 topics from tweets.
Figure 6.2: Topics and their top words.
In LDA topic modeling, we have used 2013 bios and tweets of users as separate datasets,
and found two different (potentially) topic distributions for each user (bioLDA and tweet-
LDA, respectively). As bio texts define a user’s profile, whereas tweets are mostly messages
about daily lives, we considered bioLDA to explain who a user is, and tweetLDA to show
what a user writes about. Top 20 topics from tweetLDA and bioLDA are shown in Figure
6.2.
In order to understand the performance of bioLDA and tweetLDA, we created a list
from official Twitter accounts of 41 U.S. senators. Among these, 27 and 14 accounts belong
to senators from the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, respectively. Nine of
these senators are excluded in our experiments, because they are not followed by any user
in our LDA datasets. Out of 41 senators, 22 democrats and 10 republicans have been
found to be in our tweetLDA dataset, whereas bioLDA dataset includes 20 democrats and
10 republicans. 3
By summing the number of times a topic appears in senators’ profile vectors, we have
computed five most frequent topics for democratic and republican senators. Table 6.1
shows top-5 topics and party affiliations for tweetLDA and bioLDA. To represent each
topic, we have used its top two most frequent words. For example in tweetLDA, senators
from both parties have topic 42 as the most common topic in their profile vectors, and
this topic is represented by two words: obama and president. The 42nd topic also includes
many political terms, such as vote, election, gop, state, debate, house, and bill. In the
table, tweetLDA results show that senators from both parties share one topic, but other
3Two senators are excluded in bioLDA because of short or blank bios.
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Table 6.1: Top words from each one of the top-5 topics of U.S. senators found by tweetLDA
and bioLDA
tweetLDA bioLDA





city, area city, area




















four topics are different. The fourth most common topic for democrats is about solar and
energy, whereas this topic appears 23rd in the list of topics for republicans. 4 The second
most common topic (i.e., tax, year) for republicans is the 12th most common topic in
democrats’ accounts.
Overall, bioLDA results show that technical words, such as official and Facebook, lead
to found topics that can describe the function of an account (e.g., Official Twitter feed
for Senator Frank R. Lautenberg), but these topics fail to give us a sense of what the
Twitter profiles are about. On the other hand, tweetLDA is more useful to understand
characteristics of users, because tweetLDA uses more information (i.e., multiple tweets
instead of a short bio) and diverse texts (i.e., multiple tweets about different topics).
6.4.3 Network Data and Changing Data Interests
Our anomaly definitions are based on a dynamic network where both network connections
and user generated data can be observed over time. In line with this assumption, we have
tracked changes in friendship counts of twitter users from 2009 to 2013. In Figure 6.3, we
show this change by plotting friendships counts in 2009 for friendship counts in 2013. With
this increase in friend counts, we also assumed that Twitter users change their interest in
who to follow for their data.
Similar to the “who and what” argument we discussed in topic modeling, new friends
of a user can tell us “how” a user consumes data. In order to find a global pattern on
data consumption, we tracked the relationship between profile vectors of users, and profile
vectors of their new friends. Given a seed user’s profile vector Ps and the profile vector of
his/her new friend Pf , we found prominent topics (i.e., the highest probability valued topic)
in each profile vector, and counted the number of times users from these two topics become
4Other words from the topic include words such as green, water, power, wind, oil and gas
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Figure 6.3: Changing friend counts on the Twitter network. The x-axis values are numbers
of friends in 2009. In the y-axis, median values of 2013 friend counts are shown. As shown
in the left bottom corner of the chart, Twitter users who had almost zero friends in 2009
have a median number of 150 friends in 2013. X-axis values are limited to a maximum of
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friends. Figure 6.4 shows the results in a graph, where each one of 100 tweetLDA topics
is represented as a node, and a directed edge shows the number of friendships between
users that are identified with those topics. In the graph, the users identified with social
media topic (given with the word social in both parts of Figure 6.2) has the biggest number
of friendships from users identified with other topics. Although social media is the most
popular topic in the graph, its users become friends with users identified with the marketing
topic, which is not popular among users identified with other topics.
Unlike undirected networks, such as Facebook.com, Twitter friendships are not built
on mutual consent. As such, friend counts of users can be vastly bigger than those on undi-
rected networks. Figure 6.1 shows this phenomenon, where many users have more than
1000 friends in 2013. However, Figure 6.4 shows that friendships are not uniformly dis-
tributed among users identified with different topics. In other words, many new friendships
are created in time, but new friends are chosen from users identified with small number of
topics.
6.4.4 Anomaly Results
In anomaly detection experiments, we used both tweetLDA and bioLDA topics to under-
stand the friendship behavior of Twitter users. Our experiments have worked with 100K
seed users (i.e., users who had a Twitter account in 2009), and after removal of inac-
tive accounts (i.e., users with no tweets, hidden tweets, blank bios or no new friends), we
have examined 78K seed users and their 16016152 new friendships and 2905004 deleted
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Figure 6.4: Number of friendships among users of different tweetLDA topics.
friendships from 2009 to 2013.5
Our anomaly experiments start with finding individual anomalies of new friendships,
and continues with checking discovered individual anomalies for collective anomalies. In
the next sections we will first discuss similarity of new friends to old friends and give
performance results of tweetLDA and bioLDA. Afterwards, we will detail our findings in
collective anomaly.
Individual Anomaly
In individual anomaly, we are interested in seeing how cosine similarity values between
2009 and 2013 friends are distributed. According to our definition (see Section 6.3.3),
a threshold similarity value of ξ is used to define an individually anomalous friend. As
such, if similarities of new friends are low, more new friends will be signaled as individual
anomalies.
Our experiments with bioLDA resulted in lower similarities and higher variance values
while computing profile vector similarities. A total of 1200392 new friends were found to
have 0 similarity to old friends, whereas by using profiles vectors from tweetLDA we only
had 87890 new friends with zero similarity. Furthermore, other than the zero similarity
region in the distribution, bioLDA also results in high variance values for similarity values
above 0.75. We give the bioLDA similarity distribution in Figure 6.5, where percentage of
friends with zero similarity (i.e., x=0) is not shown to increase clarity of the figure.
Unlike bioLDA, as shown in Figure 6.6, tweetLDA results in low variance values in the
similarity distribution.
5The number of new friendships is greater than the total number of queried Twitter users because we
have queried Twitter breadth first, and many new friendships are shared by seed users.
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Figure 6.5: Similarity of newly added friends to old friends with bioLDA used as the topic






































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.6: Similarity of newly added friends to old friends with tweetLDA used as the
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In order to better understand users’ behavior on data consumption, we have also looked
into the similarity distribution of deleted old friends. In Figures 6.7 and 6.8 we show these
values.
Figure 6.7: Similarity of deleted friends to old friends with bioLDA used as the topic model







































































































































































































































































































By comparing deleted old friends and added new friends, we see that new friends are
more similar to old friends than deleted friends are, in both bioLDA and tweetLDA. This
is an expected outcome, because as time progresses, users refine their data interests and
conserve friendships that appeal to them (i.e., consuming more data from same friends),
while deleting friends whose data are no longer interesting.
In finding individual anomalies, we experimented with different values of the similarity
threshold parameter ξ. In Table 6.2 we show percentages of users and friendships that
were labeled as anomalous for different ξ values. From the table, we see that for ξ = 0.1
only 1% of new friends are found to be anomalous. However, the percentage of users who
have an anomalous friendship reaches up to 20% of all seed users. The percentage of users
with an anomalous friendship rises quickly, and reaches 80% by ξ = 0.5. In contrast, the
percentage of anomalous friendships rises slowly, and barely reaches 22% by a ξ value as
high as 0.7.
From these results, it can be deduced that most of the new friends of seed users are
similar to their old friends. However, most of the seed users become friends with at least
one user who is not similar to old friends. In the next section, we will check these new
anomalous friends for collective anomalies.
Collective Anomaly
In collective anomaly detection we are given a list of users and their new friendships which
are individually anomalous. Our goal is to compare found anomalies with collective be-
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Figure 6.8: Similarity of deleted friends to old friends with tweetLDA used as the topic








































































































































































































































































































Table 6.2: Percentages of users and friendships that were labeled as anomalous for different
ξ values.
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havior and assign an anomaly score to seed users. To this end, we first cluster seed users
in order to find their similar users. As we described in Section 6.3.2, finding similar users
requires setting a total number of clusters for the k-means algorithm. For this number we
experimented with k=100, 200, 500 and 1000. For k=500 we had the best trade off between
cluster size and within-cluster similarity. In the rest of this chapter we will present our
results for k=500.
After finding the cluster Cs of a seed user us, we compute the similarity of a seed user’s
anomalous friends to the old friends of users from the cluster Cs. For simplicity, in the rest
of this chapter we will call these old friends of users from a seed user’s cluster Cs as the
seed user’s extended friends.
Similar to individual anomaly results, value of the similarity threshold ξ determines the
number of individual anomalies that are verified by collective anomaly. For small ξ values,
individual anomalies are rarely labeled as collective anomalies because an extended friend’s
similarity to the anomalous friend can exceed or equal ξ. For example, from our experiments
with tweetLDA results, none of the individual anomalies is labeled as a collective anomaly
for ξ = 0.1. With increasing ξ values the number of collective anomalies also increases,
because even from the extended friends set there will not be a friend whose similarity to
the individual anomalous friend exceeds or equals ξ. In Figure 6.9, for different ξ values
we give the number of individual anomaly friends who were also found to be collective
anomalies.
Increasing the ξ value from 0.6 to 0.7, in Figures 6.9b and 6.9a, we see that even users
with a big number of old friends are labeled as anomalous.
As we described in Section 6.3.3, we assume that established users with an already big
number of friends are less likely to have anomalous friendships, because they should already
be following users of topics whose data is interesting to them. In order to choose a value
for ξ, we used this assumption and computed the median count of friends of anomalous
users for different ξ values. These median values are 3, 6, 23, 62, 121 and 150 for ξ values of
0.2, 0.3, ..., 0.7. From these values, we chose ξ = 0.6 which provides a median friend count
of 121, because it provides the best trade off between median friend count, and number of
found anomalies.
By using ξ = 0.6, we have detected 2334627 individual anomalous friendships and 79657
of these were also labeled as collective anomalies. In the next section we will give validation
results for a subset of these verified anomalies.
6.4.5 Validation of Anomalies
We have employed a manual validation scheme for a subset of verified anomalies. The
validation process entailed a web interface6 with two panels. In the left panel, we listed the
bio and last ten tweets of a user, as well as a summary of the accounts he/she currently
follows. The summary consisted of 20 most frequent words, and their frequencies (e.g.,
actor25) from the followed accounts. In the right panel, a new friend was shown with
6http://sight.dicom.uninsubria.it/anomaly/







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Number of collective anomaly friends for a




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Number of collective anomaly friends for a
threshold similarity of 0.6
Figure 6.9: The relationship between number of collective anomaly friends and number of
old friends for ξ = 0.6 and ξ = 0.7. An increasing ξ value results in a bigger number of
anomalous friends.
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his/her bio text and last ten tweets.
The validation process has been completed on the Amazon Mechanical Turk7 by 245
users. Works of 183 users were accepted and used in the following experimental discussion.
62 validators’ works were rejected because they either did not give proper explanations
when labeling, or finished their tasks in very short times without properly analyzing the
friendships.
Validators were given three labels to indicate whether a friendship between the user
and the friend were anomalous, or not: yes, no and possible (i.e., not enough data to tell).
In a separate text field, validators were instructed to give an explanation for their answers.
Although the possible label does not require an elaborate explanation, we still solicited
input so that the validators would not use this label to finish the experiment in a shorter
time. From the accepted works, in average each explanation was 50.93 characters long.
We randomly chose 40 user clusters, and extracted a total of 1960 anomalies from them
to be labeled by validators. In addition to anomalous friendships, we added 840 non-
anomalous friendships to the list of user pairs to be labeled by users. Each friendship was
given to five validators, so that aggregated labels would be based on decisions from multiple
validators. Our validation process was divided into training and test phases. Each validator
was trained by showing him/her five new friendships from a given cluster Cc (see Section
6.3.2). In the training phase, we aimed at familiarizing validators with the user interface,
and help them learn expected user behavior (i.e., new friendship patterns). Afterwards,
each validator was taken to the test phase where he/she was asked to label at most 45
new friendships from the same cluster Cc. The expected answer for the anomalous and
non-anomalous friendships were yes and no, respectively.
We measured the consistency of labels given to friendships by validators and found a
Fleiss’ Kappa [46] value of κ = 0.3288. Fleiss’ Kappa is a statistical measure that computes
the reliability of agreement between validators when assigning the three labels to a number
of items (i.e., friendships).
87% anomalous friendships have been given at least one yes label, whereas for 94%
of them the number of possible and yes labels are bigger than the number of no labels.
In 50% anomalous friendships, number of yes labels exceeds the number of no labels.
Considering that friendships which are labeled with possible can be anomalous or non-
anomalous, for 1960 asked anomalous friendships, the precision of our metrics lies in the
interval (#yes/1960) ≤ p ≤ (#yes+ #possible)/1960, that is, 0.50 ≤ p ≤ 0.94.
In terms of recall, 59 of the 840 non-anomalous friendships have been labeled as anoma-
lies by a majority of the validators. Overall, the precision of our metrics can reach 0.87,
which provides a good accuracy.
7Approved by the Office of Research Compliance - University of Texas at Dallas, human experiment
IRB MR 13-231.
8For Fleiss’ Kappa, > 0.2 Fair agreement, > 0.40 Moderate agreement, > 0.6 Substantial agreement
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(a) Yes, anomaly (b) Possible, not enough data (c) No, not an anomaly
Figure 6.10: Wordclouds of explanations for validator given decisions to the friendships
which were detected as anomalies by our methods.
6.5 Experimental Discussion
In this section we will analyze explanations of validators and evaluate the cases where
our method mistakenly or correctly labels new friendships as anomalies. Furthermore, we
will categorize user explanations, so that we can understand which types of new friend-
ships are considered anomalies by human subjects. In Figure 6.10, we show wordclouds of
explanations for each type of user decision.
In categorization, we parsed given explanations, so that explanations can be assigned to
categories, and the accuracy of our methods can be analyzed for each category. Tables 6.3
and 6.4 show our categories, their frequencies for true and false positives and an examplary
explanation for the considered category. In total we have empirically detected 47 categories,
and here we show the most frequent ones.
Table 6.3 shows the results where human validators did not agree with the anomaly
label given by our methods. The most common explanation is related to shared interests
among user-friend pairs.
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For these false positive anomalies, validators have given reasons ranging from “users
are from the same location (i.e., India)” and “data engineer is interested in hacker” to
“both users work at Apple Inc.”. A closer look at these given reasons shows that users’
backgrounds, such as being Indian or working at Apple Inc., can lead to friendships that
cannot be explained by a data interest of user in the the friend’s account.
These type of friendships are mostly due to shared location, hometown or work. In
some cases, intrinsic characteristics of users can also lead to anomalous friendships. For
example, we have noticed that a female user had many anomalous friendships, but there
was an underlying theme in the newly followed friend accounts. These new friends were all
influential women from different fields who were tweeting about a wide variety of topics.
Another type of anomaly that results from a lack of data interest is related to friendships
which are initiated by anomalous friends. In these cases, an ad(vertisement) account starts
following a personal user account, and expects the user to follow back. After a time period,
users who have not reciprocated the friendship are unfollowed by the ad account. If the user
reciprocates the friendship, our metrics identify these ad accounts as anomalous friends,
because they tweet spam ads. Similarly hacked friend accounts are easily identified as
anomalies once they start tweeting spams.
Our validation process shows that some user characteristics may lead to the creation
of diverse friendships, however the main reason behind user friendships on Twitter is data
interests. Thus, a model that is trained on limited information from users (e.g., last 10
tweets) can provide an accurate global view on Twitter. By analyzing this information,
we can accurately predict which friendships are unexpected, and should be considered
anomalies.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we outlined an approach to consider both user generated text data and
network connections in detecting anomalous user behavior on Twitter. By this approach, a
user’s data interests on the social network is expected to comply with his/her past behavior
and significant changes with respect to past behavior are treated as anomalies. Our results
indicate that proposed anomaly detection models could be used to effectively analyze data
consumption patterns in a Twitter graph.
By extending our model from detecting anomalies to understanding why friendships are
formed in terms of shared topics, in the future we will study the evolution of the Twitter
network according to topical interests. This approach can be useful in not only detecting,
but also in explaining the long term user behavior on Twitter.
Chapter 7
Micro Analysis of User
Interactions
7.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing number of successful online social networks catering
to different social needs on the Internet. From professional social network LinkedIn to
personal social network Facebook, online social networks are diversified to meet needs of
a growing online population. As a result, an Internet user has several accounts on online
social networks, where his/her activities are governed by different motivations.
Two of the most successful online social networks, Facebook and Twitter, have grown in
recent years to accommodate millions of social network users, and hold millions of personal
profiles for the same sets of users. Dynamics of these online social networks are affected
by different factors; the directed nature of Twitter enables fast and efficient information
propagation, whereas undirected Facebook is still meshed by close familial or regional
networks, and users interact in more conservative ways.
Despite these differences, both Facebook and Twitter provide means (i.e., like and
retweet, respectively) to make another user’s post visible to a larger audience. Analyzing
how retweets and likes are employed provides clues in understanding how to spread ideas,
disseminate news and propagate influence on a social network.
In this chapter, we study the problem of how a post is liked/tweeted by social network
users across Facebook and Twitter. Rather than external features such as the network
structure or user information, we focus on tweets/posts themselves to understand what
aspects of tweets/posts help them to get retweeted and liked. Moreover, we analyze how
location information influences retweet, comment and like interactions.
To this end, we extract the following features from text based social network posts:
named entities, lexical errors and sentiments. In named entity recognition, we locate atomic
elements of seven categories: people, organizations, locations, date, time, percentage and
money. By observing found entities, we show how the functionality (i.e., usage purpose) of
online social networks can be mined.
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In lexical analysis, we locate lexical errors of texts, and classify these errors into ten
most frequently committed errors. An analysis of these lexical errors show that social
network users make similar mistakes on both sites.
Sentiment analysis aims at studying user interactions for different sentiments that are
found in social network posts. We investigate the impact of positive/negative/neutral
sentiments on conversation patterns.
Furthermore, using location information from Twitter bios and Facebook profiles, we
show that users’ interaction patterns are heavily dependent on their current locations.
Although online social networks have connected millions of users from all over the world,
interaction patterns are still location limited, and governed by densely connected networks.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 explains our data collection process on
Facebook and Twitter. Section 7.3 explains our methodology, and discusses the software
tools we used. In Section 7.4, we analyze the four dimensions we considered, whereas Sec-
tion 7.5 shows how considered dimensions affect each other. Finally, Section 7.6 combines
our insights with geolocation data, and presents our results in a visual way.
7.2 Data collection
Data sets of this chapter have been created by querying Twitter.com and Facebook.com
APIs.
A Facebook application 1 was used to query Facebook for user data in an offline manner
and store posts from the 2008-2013 period. Through the application, 75 users have given us
permission to track data items (i.e., status posts, photos, videos, etc.) along with comments
and likes these items receive from other Facebook users. This data crawling allowed us to
track conversations of 670K Facebook users. Each considered data item has been posted
on Facebook by users, their friends or friends of friends. Similarly, likes/comments on these
data items belong to the users, their friends or friends of friends. Facebook status posts
can contain pictures and videos. As we cannot analyze contents of these additional data
items, we limit our analysis to Facebook comments that consist of textual data only. In
what follows, we will refer to Facebook comments as Facebook texts.
Our Twitter dataset comes from a crawl between December 2012 and April 2013, and
the considered tweets have been posted between 2008 and 2013. By using a Twitter appli-
cation 2, we have stored bio information and last 10 tweets of 11M Twitter users.
In what follows, we will use the terms Twitter texts and tweets interchangeably. For
geolocation analysis we used bio information on user profiles. Bio information for each user
contains a current location field, where unstructured texts can be entered for city/country
values, e.g., Boston, MA. We have used Google Geocode API 3 to convert these location
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7.3 Methodology and tools
In order to understand what factors improve the chances of a text getting liked/retweeted by
other users, we have considered the following dimensions: named entity recognition, lexical
and sentiment analyses. In what follows, we will discuss our methodology for mining each
of these dimensions.
In given sentences, named entity recognition (NER) [100] locates atomic elements of
predefined categories such as names of people, cities, locations, time mentions, and money
values. For entity recognition, we used Apache OpenNLP 4 that allows training its clas-
sifier with seven different categories. We have used the categories “people, organizations,
locations, date, time, percentage and money”. This tool has a precision of 0.8 and a recall
of 0.74.
Lexical errors are grammar and spelling mistakes/typos found in sentences. These are
noun-verb agreement errors, missing words, extra words, wrong words, confusion of similar
words, wrong word order, comma errors, and whitespace errors. For Facebook and Twitter
texts, we used LanguageTool5
to find lexical errors. These errors are predefined text patterns defined in an XML file.
The tool reaches a precision of 93% on the English texts.
Sentiment analysis aims at extracting the general sentiment from a given sentence,
identifying whether it expresses a positive, negative or neutral emotion. For this purpose,
we used the Sentiment140 API, a Sentiment Analysis tool developed by Go et al. [50],
which is a recent and widely used tool. The tool is based on a machine learning algorithm
for classifying the sentiment of Twitter messages using distant supervision. The training
data consists of Twitter messages with emoticons (i.e., pictorial representation of a facial
expression), which are used as noisy labels. This type of training data is abundantly
available and can be obtained through automated means. The underlying idea is to use
emoticons to learn which words co-appear with emoticons, and use this information in
machine learning algorithms, such as naive bayes and support vector machines. They show
that the tool has an accuracy above 80% when trained with emoticon data [50].
7.4 Mining Dimensions
In mining the considered dimensions, we have focused on English language texts. To this
end, we have used the Ldig library in Python 6, which has a precision of 99.1% in detecting
the English language.
For Facebook and Twitter datasets, counts of English language texts and dimensional
statistics are given in Table 7.1. In columns named entity, error and sentiment, we give
the percentages of English texts which contain at least one named entity, lexical error and
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Table 7.1: Dimensional statistics and counts of English texts. Entitity, error and sentiment
values are given in percentages.
Count Entity Error Sentiment
Twitter 10.6M 29.8% 81% 32%
Facebook 1M 13% 69% 22%
detail.
(a) Facebook entities. (b) Twitter entities.
Figure 7.1: Entities and their percentage in Facebook and Twitter posts.
7.4.1 Entity Recognition
In Table 7.1, percentage of English texts which contain at least one named entity are
29.8% and 13% for Twitter and Facebook texts, respectively. Figure 7.1 further details
the composition of entities in these texts. Along seven different categories, we see that
on Facebook, Persons are mentioned in texts 35.14% of the time, whereas this value is
22.66% for tweets. Date and time entities are mentioned twice as much on Twitter, but
organizations have similar percentage values. We attribute the difference in date/time
values to Twitter users’ high mobility (i.e., mobile phone usage) compared to other social
network users [76]. Because of this mobility, tweets are more related to events happening
in real time. For example, 1.5% of tweets contain the word today, whereas this value is
only 0.02% for Facebook texts. In time entities, we found a similar pattern with tonight
appearing in 0.06% of tweets and 0.0012% of Facebook texts, respectively.
As seen on Figures 7.2 and 7.4, some organizations are frequently mentioned on both
Twitter and Facebook, but users on Twitter are more likely to mention a broader variety
of organizations, ranging from commercial brands to news agencies. In contrast, the two
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most frequently mentioned organizations on Facebook are related to basketball, and other


























































Figure 7.2: Most frequently mentioned organizations on Facebook.
7.4.2 Sentiment Analysis
We have found positive sentiment to be more common than negative sentiment on both
Facebook and Twitter. Percentages of posts with negative, positive and neutral sentiment
tags are shown in Figure 7.3. Although Facebook friends are more likely to be real life
acquaintances than Twitter followers, and Facebook posts are more likely to be directed to
a private audience, only 22% of Facebook posts contain a sentiment. On Twitter, tweets
are public, but 32% of tweets contain a sentiment, and 14% are positive sentiment tweets.
Negative sentiments are expressed less often on both sites, with 8% and 6.85% on Facebook
and Twitter, respectively. In Tables 7.2 and 7.3 we show some post examples with neutral,
positive and negative sentiments.
As posts on both sites are short texts, sentiments that are expressed in posts are mostly
dependent on a limited number of words. For example, in Table 7.3, the first negative tweet
has its sentiment expressed by the word ‘lonely’. However, the sentiment tool performs well
in labeling sentiments when texts include profanity or other swear words. The following
tweets are labeled as:
• Negative: i dont care what others think any more so if you dont like me suck it up
and keep your mouth shut or go f*** off. yes im in a bad mood nite
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(a) Facebook sentiment (b) Twitter sentiment
Figure 7.3: Percentage of sentiments in Facebook and Twitter posts.
• Positive: here’s to me actually making some f****** money!!!!!!!!! whoo hoo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
• Neutral: F*** I, we all do.
Table 7.2: Examples of Facebook posts with sentiments.
Positive I love this kid!!
I like Cinebistro too! Cant wait
to see the Artist
Thanks AJ and SW crew for bringing
both you and Thursday back to our shores!!
Negative No and no!!!
I dont think it worth it, it doesn’t
give back as I look at it, its ugly
and... why do they call it celtic?
Of course it is. Their negative attacks on each
other alone are bringing some nasty skeletons
out of the closet that will hurt whichever
Republican becomes the nominee in November.
Neutral I never heard Shaolin monks went to Chinese
university or teach some class in school, so they
teach Chinese culture more than kungfu
Im waiting on a special phone calll...cake up time
They have a show in new Orleans on march 29
We give the precision and recall values for sentiment detection in Table 7.4. Overall,
precision values for both online social networks are high, whereas the lowest values are
obtained for positive recall for Facebook posts (54%) and negative recall for tweets and
posts (63% and 64%, respectively). These values have been obtained by asking to a group
of three validators to assign a sentiment to messages, given a sample composed by 200





















































Figure 7.4: Most frequently mentioned organizations on Twitter.
posts and 200 tweets. Finally, we have computed the average values of precision and recall


































(b) Retweets for negative and positive tweets.
Figure 7.5: The impact of sentiments on like and retweet counts.
7.4.3 Lexical Analysis
In lexical analysis, we locate spelling or grammar mistakes within individual sentences of
a text. To this end, we have replaced @usernames and #hashtags on Twitter with generic
words before running the lexical analysis tool, so that site specific features (e.g., hashtag
usage) are stripped and the tool can parse sentences without errors. For example, ’Ask
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Table 7.3: Examples of tweets with sentiments.
Positive watching a snuff movie, so funny, I love these things
hey Laura thanks for the invite.
I am eating grapes.
Good Morning and good Ester to everyone
from Turin (Italy)!!!
Neutral Signing up for twitter
Catching up with online things...
Eating an apple
Negative so lonely =(
lonely days.........when will these lonely
days leave me?
is bored beyond belief
Table 7.4: Precision and recall values for Twitter and Facebook sentiments. + and - signs
refer to positive and negative sentiments, whereas P. and R. refer to precision and recall,
respectively.
+P. +R. -P. -R. Neut. P. Neut. R.
Twitter 88% 83% 79% 63% 87% 79%
Facebook 81% 54% 82% 64% 75% 82%
@user about #ny’ becomes ’Ask William about New York’. With this transformation,
Table 7.1 shows that 81% and 69% of Twitter and Facebook texts contain at least one
lexical error.
These errors are better analyzed in Figures 7.6a and 7.6b. An interesting error that
appears on Twitter but not on Facebook is the absence of a proper verb in a sentence.
Overall, errors on both online social networks are very similar; word spelling mistakes and
absence of uppercase letters in the beginning of sentences are major errors.
7.5 Dimension interplay
An interesting part of mining conversational user interactions is finding how different di-
mensions affect each other or retweet/like counts individually. In this section, we will look
at dimension correlations and analyze how these interplays affect likes/retweets of user
texts on Facebook and Twitter. In particular, we will analyze the interplay between: i)
retweet/like counts and sentiment, ii) sentiment and lexical errors, and iii) lexical errors
and likes/retweets.
Figure 7.5 shows the impact of sentiments on retweet and like counts. In the figure,
we see that negative texts receive more likes on average on Facebook, whereas on Twitter
neutral tweets are retweeted more. Despite similar retweet counts, positive tweets are
retweeted more often than the negative tweets.
We explain the high like count of negative Facebook posts by expressions of user com-



















































































































































































































































(b) Most common lexical errors on Twitter.



















Figure 7.7: Average lexical errors by sentiments in Facebook and Twitter posts.
passion. Facebook posts, such as “Lexi better not die tonight. :(” (96 likes), receive higher
like counts. On Twitter neutral tweets, such as news, are retweeted by many users.
Mining both sentiments and lexical errors allows us to see how user emotions lead to
lexical errors due to stress, anger or sadness. Figure 7.7 shows average lexical errors for
positive and negative sentiment texts, for both Facebook and Twitter. Positive tweets have
been found to contain more than 2 errors, whereas negative Facebook comments contain
1.8 errors in average.
In Tables 7.5 and 7.6 we show some text examples with neutral, positive and negative
sentiments containing errors.
Lexical errors can also affect the number of times a text is retweeted/liked by other
users. In Figures 7.8a and 7.8b we show the average value of likes/retweets a text receives
for different values of lexical errors. Although there are as many as 15 lexical errors in
CHAPTER 7. MICRO ANALYSIS OF USER INTERACTIONS 132
Table 7.5: Examples of Facebook posts with sentiments containing errors.
Positive strawberries would be the best.. oh my how good...
and make a chesecake from this... OH yes...
Negative Cant believe I pay tuition money for this stuff...;-(
Neutral Dear NBC: Please make your videos
viewable in other countries outside America.
Sincerly, - The rest of the world
Table 7.6: Examples of tweets with sentiments containing errors.
Positive Oh twitter! Me loves me loves!
It’ll lead me to my precioussssss!
Negative write the wrong words for the wrong thing
and make it worse and worse. wahahha
Neutral looking at a little tiger cat
who says hes in my server doing maintenance
both figures, number of posts with more than 5 errors are very low on both online social
networks. An example with 15 errors is the tweet omg omg omg omg omg omg omg 7 days
too goo and i shall be in greece :) also my heads f***** stupid boy y does he always do this
2 me :( x
Especially on Figure 7.8a we see that an increasing number of lexical errors leads to
lower like counts on Facebook. Figure 7.8b shows a similars pattern for Twitter posts, but
in this case retweet counts decrease with increasing numbers of lexical errors after the first
error.
7.6 Influence of Geolocation on Conversations
Although some research work [59, 101, 121] have worked on topical conversations on Twit-
ter, a comparative analysis of locations of social network users across multiple online social
networks has not been studied yet.
In order to analyze the impact of geolocations, we converted textual current locations
of Twitter users into geographical longitude-latitude values. From these values, Figure 7.9
shows the current location of Twitter users on a world map. On this map, red points and
green points correspond to users who post a tweet and retweet a posted tweet, respectively.
Edges between these two types of users connect them on the map. From the map, we see
that a large percentage of retweeted tweets come from the east coast of USA and north
Europe. Similarly, most edges are created between these two parts of the world. The
absence of China and most of the Russian territories are prominent features on the map.
The high concentration of Canadian cities around the northern border of USA is also visible
from the map.
Another presentation of this location data allows us to measure the distance between
two users in miles. A zero distance shows that a user u who retweeted a tweet from user x

































(b) Average retweet counts by number of lex-
ical errors.
Figure 7.8: Lexical errors and interactions.
lives in the city where user x currently lives. By plotting the number of such user pairs for
each distinct distance value 7 yields Figure 7.10. In the figure, we see that a big percentage
of user pairs have zero distance between them. Numbers of user pairs are shown to decrease
with increasing distances. An early anomaly in this trend is the low number of user pairs




























































































































































































































Figure 7.9: Locations of Twitter users. Edges show retweet behavior among Twitter users.
Unlike Twitter, Facebook privacy settings are very strict, and users are less willing to
7We have put distances into 100 mile buckets.
















































































































Figure 7.10: In miles, distances between user pairs who retweet each other’s tweets.
share their location information. Due to this shortcoming, we could not repeat the distance
experiment on the Facebook dataset. For a similar distance notion on Facebook dataset,
we have used the locale 8 field to analyze user proximity. We explain this choice with
the empirical observation that users from a country mainly use the official language of the
country in the Facebook interface. The main exception to this observation is that English
is also widely used by other nationalities.
Figure 7.11 shows locale pairs for Facebook users. In the figure, a locale value l is
connected by an edge to another locale m if users from l constitute 30% or more of users who
have liked Facebook comments of users from the locale m. Although EN US is connected
to a big portion of other locales, most locales have self loops, or they are connected to
a small number of other locales. Another relevant feature of the figure is the community
of Latin languages connected together, such as it IT, es ES, fr FR, etc.; users of Latin
languages interact more often.
In the previous sections, we have shown how different dimensions of user generated texts
affect how many times a particular tweet/comment will be liked or commented. Regardless
of these numbers, our geolocation experiments show that users who like/comment a text
are more likely to live closer to the owner of the text.
8Locale is the user chosen interface language for Facebook.com, such as EN US (English in USA), EN GB
(English in Great Britain)

























Figure 7.11: Like interactions among Facebook users of different locales.
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Chapter 8
Appendix: Experiment Interfaces
In this chapter, we will give the screenshots of our experiment website mentioned in Chapter
6. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show the initial welcome page where we teach the human validator
the basics of our testing website.
Our training screen for an anomalous user-friend pair is shown in Figure 8.3. In Figure
8.4, we show an exemplary test screen. In the figure, the user chooses a label for the
friendship pair, and enters an explanation for his/her decision to the text area.
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Figure 8.1: Help Interface 1
Figure 8.2: Help Interface 2
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Figure 8.3: Training Interface
Figure 8.4: Test Interface
